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Abstract of Thesis 
Author: James Jacquette Sterrett 
Title: Soviet Air Force Operational Theory, 1918 -1945 Degree: Ph-D 
This thesis examines the development of Soviet thinking on the operational 
employment of their Air Force from 1918 to 1945, using Soviet theoretical writings and 
Soviet analyses of combat actions written in the period examined. This thesis shows that 
Soviet theory did not form a monolithic bloc of opinion, nor was it copied wholesale from 
abroad, but instead was formed in a process of debates founded on fundamentally Soviet 
concerns about the nature of potential wars and on Soviet views of combats as they 
occurred. Equally, Soviet theory before World War 11 was neither wholly prescient, nor 
utterly flawed. However, Soviet utilization of their theory was crippled in the later 1930s 
and the early stages of World War 11 by problems with dissemination of lessons learned 
and training of air crew and officers. As these problems were overcome, the Soviet Air 
Force became an increasingly powerful weapon for carrying out the ground force support 
missions that Soviet theory determined was paramount. 
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RKKA: Raboche-Krestianskaia Krasnaia Armiia, Worker's and Peasant's Red Army 
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USAF: United States Air Force 
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Yak: Yakovlev (lakovlev) 
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Introduction 
The First World War ended in March 1917 for Imperial Russia. Its successor, the 
Provisional Government, was forced out when the Bolsheviks seized power in November. 
The Bolsheviks made peace with the Central Powers in 1918, by which point civil war 
had already begun to sweep across the steppe. The Civil War shook Russia until 1920, 
and aftershocks continued to ripple through Siberia and Central Asia for several years 
thereafter. Unlike much of the First World War, the Russian Civil War involved 
sweeping movements of forces in dynamic, decisive campaigns. In the decade and a half 
after the war, a group of gifted Soviet theorists forged a doctrine of maneuver warfare 
whose basic premises are still in use today. The land warfare aspects of this doctrine, and 
the course of its development, are becoming increasingly well known in the West. The 
best known of the Soviet theorists, Mikhail Tukhachevskii, was an ardent supporter of 
airpower - along with all other means of the mechanization of warfare - but the 
development of airpower in support of land maneuver operations is associated with the 
German Luftwaffe, while the concepts underlying the Red Air Force are virtually 
unknown to most Western readers. This dissertation breaks new ground by analysing the 
nature and development of Soviet theories of the employment of airpower from 1918 to 
1945. The dynamic interplay between theory and practice must also be explored, 
factoring in Soviet war experience ranging from Chinese warlords in Manchuria to the 
Luftwaffe's Condor Legion in Spain, the famous disaster at the hands of the Luftwaffe in 
1941 through its resurgence in 1942 and 1943, and eventual victory in 1945. 
Until recently, most books on aviation history concentrated on one of three things. 
The most common are still combat histories, which all too often turn out to be tales of 
aerial derring-do by various figures who are involved in operations whose nature is vague 
at best -a genre James S. Corum, writing of the Luftwaffe, has called "There I was, at 
7 
10,000 feet.... "' A second common group concentrates on the development of various 
technical aspects of airplanes, a category often giving rise to books consisting of little but 
pictures, statistics, and tales of design work. The third category examines the 
development of strategic bombing in the West, seeking to explain its development, and, 
often, to explain or condemn the mass bombings of cities or the use of atomic weapons. 
Fortunately, the field has been widening over the last ten years or so, with an increasing 
number of historians focusing their efforts on questions such as organization, links to 
industry, and understanding the conceptual framework governing the employment of air 
power. 
This work falls solidly in the latter category, examining the development of Soviet 
thinking about the operational employment of airpower - specifically, in its later stages, 
the employment of Frontal Aviation. While it bears a certain similarity to the histories of 
strategic bombing by looking at theory, it does not deal with the wider social issues such 
histories tend to examine. While not denying the importance of technical specifications 
in aircraft, or the ins and outs of their production, or the abilities of airplanes and crews in 
various tactical maneuvers, or of the social construction of warfare, these are not the 
focus of this work. Military aircraft are sent into the air to accomplish missions. The 
nature of those missions, and the way they are organized and carried out, is based on a 
theory. That theory may be no more than "Airplanes are a neat way of seeing what's over 
the next hill, " or it might be a complex and sophisticated construct for organizing the 
destruction of the enemy's combat order throughout its volume by means of the 
interaction of thousands of sorties of various types. Regardless of its complexity, at the 
beginning of any air force's actions is some idea providing direction to that action. 
Therefore, this work does not seek to be a history of the development of the Soviet Air 
' Coruni, James S., "From Biplanes to Blitzkrieg: The Development of German Air Doctrine Between the 
Wars", (War in Histoty, volume 3, no 1, January 1996), p. 85. 
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Force's aircraft. It is not a history of the Soviet economy, or pilot training, or maneuvers, 
or tactical strike methodology, or PVO (National Air Defense), or Naval Aviation. All of 
these are important and well warrant further study, but they are not the focus here, 
coming to the fore, if at all, only as they relate to questions of theory. 
The central focus of this thesis is the answer to deceptively simple question, 
"What were they thinking? " It shows how the Soviets approached the employment of 
airpower, and where possible shows the nature of the debates that occurred on the topic. 
In turn, it covers several lesser points. Showing the nature of the debate and the 
development of Soviet thinking demonstrates that the Soviets did not slavishly copy any 
of several foreign models: foreign influence certainly existed, but foreign ideas were 
brought in where they suited the Soviet's attitude to air power, and ignored where they 
did not. Equally, this thesis provides an explanation to the Soviet's relative lack of 
interest in the strategic bombing concept that enthralled many other air forces' theorists in 
the 1920s and 1930s. The later two chapters, covering combat experience from 1936 
through 1945, highlight both successes and failures in the Soviet ability to learn from 
their experience, while the section on 1941 explains some of the mysteries surrounding 
the Soviet disaster in Barbarossa. 
The Soviet Air Force itself has been little studied in the West and only slightly 
more so in unclassified works in Russian. 2 Most of the histories of the Soviet Air Force 
that have been produced concern themselves primarily with its activities in the Cold War; 
some of them, notably those by Jacob Kipp, Robin Higham, and Asher Lee 3, have also 
included a survey chapter on the Soviet Air Force before World War 11. Of those with 
2 it is entirely possible that in-depth studies of the development of Soviet Air Force operational art are 
buried and classified somewhere in the bowels of the Russian Defence Ministry's archives, but they are 
unknown to the author. 
3 Kipp, Jacob, and Higham, Robin, eds., Soviet Aviation and Air Power: A Historical View, (Westview: 
1977), Lee, Asher, The Soviet Air Force, (London: Gerald Duckworth & Co., 1950), Lee, Asher, ed., The 
Soviet Air and Rocket Forces, (London: Wiedenfield and Nicolson, 1959); Higham, Robin, Greenwood, 
John T., Von Hardesty, Russian Aviation and Air Power in the Twentieth Centiaý,, (London: Frank Cass, 
1998). 
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significant material on the inter-war years, Jackson's The Red FalconS4covers tactical 
combat in a "10,000 feet" manner, usually from the viewpoint of the Soviet's adversaries - 
which makes for odd reading, given the title! Higham, Greenwood, and Hardesty edited a 
much-needed update to Kipp and Lee's Russian Aviation andAir Power in the Twentieth 
ýV5 Centur in 1998, expanding the material on the inter-war Soviet Air Force though still 
not concentrating fully upon it. Only one major modem work has concentrated solely 
upon the inter-war years, V. S. Shumikin's Sovetskaia voennaia aviatsiia 1917 - 1941 .6 It 
covers only the structural and political sides of the Air Force, with some tactical narrative 
thrown in for spice. For the period of the Second World War, von Hardesty's 1982 Red 
Phoenix 7 still provides an excellent starting point. 1. V. Timokhovich produced a number 
of works on the Soviet Air Force in the 1941-1945 period, culminating in his 1976 
Gperativnoe iskusst-vo Sovetskikh VVS v Velikoi Otechestvennoi voine (The Operational 
Art of the Soviet Air Force in the Great Patriotic War). 8 Unfortunately, written in the 
Brezhnev era, his work suffers from a tendency to pull punches, and Timokhovich's focus 
is on learning lessons for the present, not the mindset of the past. V. 1. Migulin's Teoriia 
i praktika primeneniia sovetskikh VVS v mezhvoennii period (1921 - 1941 gg) Uchebnoe 
posobie (The Theory and Practice of the Employment of the Soviet Air Force in the Inter- 
War Period (1921-1941) Study Aid) 9, was for internal use in the Moscow Military- 
Political Academy's related courses. While useful, it covers a very wide range of themes 
and does not contain any particular detail on the subject of Air Force employment theory. 
4 Jackson, Robert, The Red Falcons: The Soviet Air Force in Action, 1919 - 1969, (Brighton: Clifton 
Books, 1969). 
' Robin I-Egham, John T. Greenwood, Von Hardesty, Russian Aviation and Air Power in the Twentieth 
Century, (London: Frank Cass, 1998). 
6 Shumikin, V. S. , Sovetskaia voennaia aviatsiia, 
1917 - 1941, (Moscow: Nauka, 1986). 
7 Von Hardesty, Red Phoenix: The Rise ofSoviet Air Power, 1941-1945, (Washington: Smithsonian 
institute Press, 1982). 
8 Timokhovich, 1. V., Operativnoe iskusstvo Sovetskikh VVS v Velikoi Otechestvennoi voine, (Moscow: 
Voenizdat, 1976). 
' Migulin, V. I., Teoriia ipraktikaprimeneniia sovetskikh VVS v me,: hvoennii period (1921 - 1941 gg. ) 
Uchebnoeposobie, (Moscow: Voenno-Politicheskaia Akademiia, kafedra istorii voennovo iskusstva, 
1988). 
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The best book in English covering the entire period, Alexander Boyd's The Soviet Air 
Force Since 1918,10 combines both technical and combat history with more of an eye 
towards doctrinal development that the others. While of high quality, it covers far more 
territory than the inter-war years. It is also slowly becoming out of date, and Boyd's 
source material on Soviet doctrine was very limited. " 
While access to Russian archives themselves Proved impossible due to limited 
funds, and consequent limited time in Moscow, this thesis nonetheless draws from a 
wealth of published primary source material that has been largely untapped. The 
highlights of this material include a complete run of the main Air Force j ournal, Vestnik 
vozdushnogoflota (Air Force Herald) for the period 1918-1941 (wartime issues proving 
harder to confirm a complete set, due to the chaotic printing schedule), and likewise of 
the main Army j ournal, Voennaia misl' (Military Thought) and its predecessors 12 , 
combined with an extensive collection of books on air power written from 1918 through 
1946. For the war years, the declassified Sborniki dokumentovpo izucheniia opita voini 
(Collected documentsfor the use of war experience) 13 proved very helpful. Every Soviet 
formation from the echelon of army and higher, from the summer of 1942 onward, wrote 
a report on every operation in which it took part. The Sborniki collections are the 
capstone result: compiled and edited after action analysis of Soviet operations by Soviet 
officers, written during and shortly after the war for a limited professional audience and 
intended not to glorify but to improve combat Performance. While the archives 
undoubtedly contain extremely useful materials - not least the air army after action 
10 Boyd, Alexander, The Soviet Air Force Since 1918, (London: Macdonald and Jane's, 1977). 
" Other Soviet works with significant coverage of the entire 1918 - 1941 period: Vasilev, B. A., DaPhaia, 
raketonosnaia, (Moscow, 1972), and the j oumals Vestnik vozdushnogo flota, and Voennaia Mysl' and its 
predecessors, for the period 1918-1945. 
12 Voennaia misl' went through a number of title changes: Voennoe delo (1918-1920), Voennaia nauka i 
revolutsiia (192 1 -February 1922), Voennaia misl' i revolutsiia (March 1922 - 1924), Voina i revolutsiia 
(1925-1937), Voennaiamisl'(1937-present). 
13 NKO SSSR, Sbornik dokumentovpo Lucheniia opita voini, volumes 1-25, (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1942- 
1947). 
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reports on which the aviation portions of the Sborniki were based - this study is possible 
without them. 
The precise nature of the source base for the thesis changes in nature in different 
chapters, due to the nature of material available. The first two chapters, covering 1918 - 
1936, rest Primarily on Sovietjournal articles and books written at the time. These first 
two chapters thus base themselves mostly on theoretical writings. The second pair of 
chapters ground themselves much more firmly in Soviet practice. The compressed time 
frame and difficult political circumstances of the third chapter, 1936 - 1940, reduced the 
availability ofjournal and book sources, but Soviet analyses of the small wars they 
participated in during this period provide an alternative source of information on the 
Soviet's evolving viewpoints on aerial warfare. The fourth chapter, covering the Great 
Patriotic War of 1941 - 1945, relies heavily on the wartime Sborniki after-action analyses. 
While there are no few Soviet post-war analyses of these events, the analyses perforined 
closest to the time itself provide the best window into their thinking about the use of 
airpower at that time. 
Where, then, lies the originality in this work? This is the only work to pay close 
attention to the development of Soviet Air Force theory from 1918-1945. The material in 
chapters I and 2, covering 1918-1937, covers an especially neglected period and puts the 
material in the later sections into needed perspective. The third chapter brings new 
material regarding Soviet analysis and understanding of their experience in small wars 
from 1936 through 1940.14 The section covering 1941-1945 is least original, in light of 
Timokhovich's, Boyd's, and von Hardesty's work, but even this chapter has the 
advantage of laboring under no censor's restrictions on their conclusions, and better 
access to sources than was possible for Western authors during the Cold War. 
14 Note that sections of this chapter appeared as James Sterret [sic], "Learning is Winning': Soviet Air 
Power Doctrine, 193 5- 1941 ", (Sebastian Cox, Peter Gray, eds, Air Power Histon,: Turning Points ftom 
Kittj, Haivk to Kosovo, (London: Frank Cass, 2002), pp. 173-187. ) 
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This thesis begins with a very brief overview of the development of Soviet 
operational theory for land war. The Soviet Air Force had a significant role to play in 
these concepts, and, this thesis will show that most Soviet air force theorists considered it 
axiomatic that the Air Force's activities must complement those of the Army. Therefore 
it is necessary to understand the basic outline of the land side of the Soviet view of 
warfare before turning to the genesis of the air side. The thesis then continues to a brief 
overview of the Imperial Russian Air Service and the Soviet Air Force in the Russian 
Civil War, continuing from there to cover the development of Soviet Air Force theory up 
to 1928. Funding played an important, if subtle, role in the debate in this period. The 
Soviet Air Force was not under threat of extinction in the aftermath of the Civil War. ) 
despite the devastated Soviet economy, because of many supporters at all levels of 
government. This ensured that while Air Force's funding was not generous, neither did it 
need to fend off serious calls for its elimination or amalgamation into another branch. 
Nonetheless, the level of industrial support available was important in shaping the debate 
in this era and in differentiating it from that which followed. In military terms, the Period 
after the Civil War was one of relative quiet, which gave the Soviet Air Force time to 
rebuild and learn to operate in peacetime, and theorists time to ponder and argue - though 
a fully coherent doctrine did not emerge. ' 5 
The advent of the first Five Year Plan (1928-1933) changed the ground rules of 
debate. Previously, Soviet theorists basing their predictions in the realities of the day 
assumed a small Soviet Air Force into the foreseeable future. Now, those theorists who 
had previously pointed to a vague future in which they hoped there might be a large and 
powerful Soviet Air Force could claim to ground their arguments in reality. Furthermore, 
15 The four most important Nvorks in the period were: Mezheninov, S. A., Voý: dushnioe sili v voine i 
operatsii, (Moscow: 1927), Lapchinskii, A. N., Taktika aviatsii, (Moscow: Avioizdatelstvo, 1926), A. V. 
Sergeev, Strategiia i taktika Krasnovo iv: dushnovoflota, (Moscow: Vestnik Vozdushnovo Sila, 1925), and 
A. S. Algazin, Obespechenhe vozdushnikh operatsfi, (Moscow: Gosizdat, 1928). 
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operational theory, which had begun to enter Air Force thinking in 1927-1928, expanded 
widely and flowered. Buoyed by the productive force of their new industries, the Soviets 
experimented extensively with making their new theories work in practice, and tried to 
sharpen their theories in the light of the experience thus gained. 16 
Theory got its first real test when the Soviets sent military assistance, including 
aircraft and crews, to assist the Republicans in the Spanish Civil War. From this point 
until Barbarossa the Soviets were involved in a series of small wars: in Spain, China, 
Mongolia, and Finland. The last of these proved a great shock to the Soviet leadership 
and resulted in crash programs to try to better prepare the military for war. The impact of 
Soviet air campaigns in Spain, Finland, and elsewhere on the development of theory from 
1938 to 1941 is shown primarily through Soviet analysis of these wars -a process 
complicated by the execution of many of the best and brightest theorists in the purges. 
By the end of this period, the Soviets were still lacking a consensus on a theory of air 
force operations. 
17 
Despite crash programs to improve their combat readiness after the Finnish War, 
the Soviet Air Force was devastated in a carefully planned and well-executed operation 
when the Luftwaffe struck on June 22,1941. Most Soviet works pass over the initial 
period of the war with a description of the devastation of the Luftwaffe's initial strike, and 
the difficulty the air supremacy thus seized caused the Red Air Force, then skip forwards 
to happier times. No satisfactory explanation has been put forward for the Soviet 
vulnerability to the initial blow, but this study sheds more light on this problem and 
16 Among the major works of the period: Lapchinskii, A. N., Vozdushniie sili v boiu i operatsii, (Moscow: 
Voenizdat, 1932), Algazin, A. S., Aviatsiia v sovremennoi voine, (Moscow: 1935), Khripi-n, V. V., 0 
gospodstve v vo.: dukhe, (Moscow: 1935), also the aviation portions of Polevoi Ustav 1929, and Vremennii 
Polevoi Ustav 1936. 
17 Key sources for this chapter include: Voina v Ispanii: Boevie deistviia aviatsii (s nachala miateý: hapo 
aygust 193 7), (Moscow: Razvedivatelnaia Upravleniia RKKA, 193 8), Voina v Ispanii: Boevie 
deistviia 
aviatsii, (Moscow: NIKO SSSR, 1937), Boevie deistviia VVS KBF v voine c Belofinnami (c 30 noiabria 
1939 g. Po 13 marta 1940 g. ), (Moscow: Gosvoenmorizdat SSSR, 194 1), Zolotarev, V. A., et al., Russkii 
arkhiv. - Velikaia otechesti, ennaia. Tom 1, Nakanune voini: Matetiali soveshchaniia vishchevo 
rukovodiashchego sostcwa RKK, 4 23-31 dekabria 1940 g., (Moscow: Terra, 1993). 
14 
follows the overall development of Air Force operations through the 1945. The Soviet 
Air Force steadily improved over the course of the rest of the war, re-inventing much of 
its theory in order to support combat operations in progress as seen through the lens of 
their after-action reports. By the end, the Soviet Air Force had been honed into a 
powerful weapon, with an operational doctrine emphasizing powerful surges of massed 
air power in support of major land offensives -a doctrinal emphasis retained ever since. 18 
There are few studies of the Soviet Air Force in this era at all, and this work 
begins to fill that gap: but much work remains to be done on the topic. We still know 
very little about the main Soviet airpower theorists, esPecially those in the 1920s and 
early 1930s. Archival access would shed light on the workings of their doctrinal debate 
in the corridors of the General Staff. Other blank pages include the evolution of the 
tactical employment of their aviation, both in peacetime and wartime; detailed analysis of 
specific air operations and series of such operations; and the details of the reasoning and 
debates behind aircraft design requirements and aircraft adoption. For such further 
studies, this work provides a framework for understanding the way the Soviets thought 
about airpower, permitting us to understand the Soviet decisions of the time inside the 
historical Soviet frame of reference. 
'8 Parikin, V. E., ed., 1941 god - opit planirovaniia i primeneniia voenno-voidushnikh sil, itroki i vivodi (po 
materialam voenno-nauchnoi konferentsii rukovodiashchevo sostava tsentralnovo apparata VVS, 
posviashchennoi 70-letiiu Sovetskoi Armii i Voenno-Morskovo Flota), (Moscow: Tsentr operativno- 
takticheskikh issledovanii VVS Ministerstvo obomi SSSR, 1989), Kozhevnikov, M. N., Komandovanie i 
Shtab VVS Sovetskoi Armii v Velikoi Otechestvennoi voine 1941 - 1945. (kdanie vtoroe, isprai, lennoe i 
dopolnennoe), (Moscow: Nauka, 1985); NKO SSSR, Sbornik d6kitmentov po Lucheniia opita voini, 
volumes 1-25, (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1942-1947); Timokhovich, 1. V., Operatii, noe iskusstvo Sovetskikh 
VVS v Velikoi Otechestvennoi voine. (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1976). 
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Chapter 1: Early Concepts 
From the Imperial Russian Air Force to the Eve of the First Five Year Plan 
1900- 1928 
Before discussing the development of the Soviet Air Force's theories, we must 
turn to a brief discussion of how the Soviets understood the concept of operational art in 
the 1920s and 1930s. This is necessary for several reasons. First, because the subject of 
this work is the employment of the air force, Primarily at the operational level, it is 
necessary to provide a working understanding of how the Soviets understood the nature 
of this level of war. Second, this overview discusses it from the perspective of land 
warfare, both because Russian and Soviet understanding of the operational level of war 
first arose regarding land warfare, and because the activity of the Soviet Air Force was 
expected to be directly related to the activity of the Soviet Army, though on occasion the 
extent of the tie between them was a source of contention. Since the Soviet Army 
increasingly utilized the concepts of operational art and successive deep operations, the 
activity of their Air Force is not comprehensible without reference to that framework. 
An understanding of the operational level of war is also necessary for understanding 
Soviet concepts of independent air operations as well. Thus, this chapter begins with the 
rise of the notion of the operational level of war in Russia and the Soviet Union, then 
discusses how the Soviets understood the concept as it evolved, moving on to the outline 
of how they expected the Air Force to fit into Army operations, as a prelude to the close 
examination of the development of the Soviet Air Force's theories that follows. 
The roots of Soviet understanding of the operational level of war stretch back into 
the later I gth century Imperial Russian Army, when various officers, notably Genrikh 
Leer, began to develop the notion of theater tactics as distinct from battlefield tactics and 
national strategy. Leer's position as chief of the General Staff Academy from 1889 to 
16 
1898 gave him an excellent opportunity to pass on his developing ideas to junior 
members of the Russian officer corps. Thinking on the operational level of war began to 
develop more fully in the aftermath of the Russo-Japanese War (1904-1905), albeit 
amidst much debate over its validity. Many of the Soviet Army's best theoreticians, 
including Aleksandr Svechin and Mikhail Tukhachevskii, began their careers as officers 
in the Tsar's army during this period of intellectual ferment, and carried that intellectual 
legacy to the new regime - even if this heritage went unacknowledged by the Soviets. ' 
9 
The Soviets developed their concepts of operational art over the course of the 
20 1920s and 1930s. The term itself, coined by Aleksandr Svechin for a lecture in 1924 , 
rapidly gained acceptance. In the Soviet understanding at the time, operations and 
operational art occupied a middle ground between the battle-fighting of tactics and the 
strategy of fighting the entire war. To quote two of the key formulators of these 
definitions, 
In grouping battles, the modem operation is a complex act; it is understood as the totality 
of maneuvers and battles on a given sector of a theater of military operations 21 directed toward achieving the overall aim.... 
All branches of the art of war are closely interrelated: tactics takes the steps that make up 
an operational leap, and strategy points the way. 
In the art of war an operation means a combination of different actions aimed at 
achieving a goal set forth by strategy. Several operations integrated in time and 
space form a campaign .... 
22 
The Soviets saw the stalemate of World War I as arising from a process driven by 
improvements in technology and industry, by which the Napoleonic strategy of a single 
'9 See Richard W. Harrison's 7-he Russian Way of War: Operational Art, 1904-1940 (Lawrence: University 
of Kansas Press, 2001), chapter 1, which provides a thorough discussion of this legacy and its transmission. 
20 Jacob W. Kipp, "General-Major A. A. Svechin and Modem Warfare: Military History and Military 
Theory", (foreword to Aleksandr A. Svechin, Strategy, (Minneapolis: East View Publications, 1992), pp. 
23-56), pp. 37-38. 
2' N. Varfolomeev, "Strategy in an Academic Formulation", (Voina i revolutsiia, Book 11,1928, pp. 78-93), 
[translated in Harold S. Orenstein, The Evolution of Soviet Operational Art: The Documentary Basis: 
Volume L Operational Art, 1927-1964, (London: Frank Cass, 1995), pp. 33-47], p. 38. Varfolomeev held 
the chair of "Conduct of the operation" at the Frunze Academy from 1924 (when the position was 
founded) 
to 1927 [Jacob Kipp, Mass, Mobility, and the Red Arm , 
v'S Road to Operational Art, 1918-1936, Soviet 
Army Studies Office: Fort Leavenworth, undated, pp 18-19]. 
22 Svechin, Strategy, p. 269. Svechin's service in the Soviet Army was nearly entirely spent teaching in 
various academies [Harrison, Russian Way, p. 129]. 
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point, in which approach marches culminated in a day of decisive battle, spread into the 
multiple sequenced, but disconnected, engagements seen in the Wars of German 
Unification. These disparate battles, in turn, had melded into a continuous line during the 
Russo-Japanese War, and that line, in turn, extended its flanks to the limits of available 
terrain in World War 1. Unable to maneuver onto a flank to avoid losses from enemy 
firepower, armies had to find a means of penetrating the front line directly. They tended 
to fail because, as Georgii Isserson wrote of the German offensives in 1918 : 23 
There were no operational echelons to develop the penetration, and this reflected 
the entire indirect influence of the already obsolete linear strategy. It is 
senseless to break down a door if there is no one to go through it. 24 
A key work in developing the concept for ensuring someone could go through the 
door, V. K. Triandafillov's The Nature of the Operations of Modern Armies 25 examined 
numerous problems of operations, from approach marches, to sustainment, to combat. He 
saw the solution to the problem of the operational engagement in the concept of depth: 
that armies deployed not only along a width of front, but into the areas behind it, 
generating issues of time. If an infantry corps marching to the front is 30 miles long, the 
lead elements of the corps may enter battle more than a day in advance of the rear guard. 
From looking at these problems, they realized that the staying power, defensive 
operational depth, and offensive logistical limitations on the abilities of modem armed 
forces was such that a single battle or campaign was very unlikely to destroy an enemy's 
military. Combining this realization with their understanding of operational art produced 
the concept of 'successive operations'. Successive operations required planning each 
operation so that it would not only be within the combat and logistic capabilities of the 
23 G. S. Isserson, "The Evolution of Operational Art", (Voina i revolutsiia, 5-6 (1932), pp. 25-52), 
[translated in Harold S. Orenstein, The Evolution of Soviet Operational Art: The Documentary Basis: 
Volume I. - Operational Art, 1927-1964, (London: Frank Cass, 1995), pp. 48-77]. 
24 Isserson, "The Evolution of Operational Art", p. 76. At the time of writing this article, Isserson was the 
Chief of the Operations Department of the Frunze Academy [Harrison, Russian Wqv, p. 203]. Emphasis in 
original. 
25 V. K. Triandafillov, The Nature of the Operations ofModern Armies, (London: Frank Cass, 1994), 
translated by William Burhans. 
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forces available, but also planning a set of sequential (and sometimes concurrent) 
operations, using either the same or adjacent groups of forces, so that the combined effect 
was greater than the sum of the individual efforts and achieved a significant strategic 
goal: each operation setting up the preconditions for the successful prosecution of the 
succeeding ones. An obvious predecessor to this is the Allied offensives in the 100 Days 
of 1918. However, the Soviets intended not a series of small bite-and-hold attacks, but 
offensives to advance one hundred kilometers or more. They expected this level of 
manoeuvre partly because of the nature of World War One on the Eastern Front - 
somewhat more mobile that that in the West - and partly because of their experiences in 
the Russian Civil War, which was often very mobile. Successive operations, then, is a 
general prescription for what operational art is intended to accomplish. The specific 
application paired the tactical concept of Deep Battle with the operational concept of 
Deep Operations. 
Deep Battle came from the Soviets' study of recent wars and the application of the 
concept of depth to the problem of overcoming tactical defences. Most elements of the 
solution had appeared on the Western Front in World War One - including hurricane 
bombardments for suppression, improved flexible infantry tactics, effective 
counterbattery work, and support from aircraft and armour. Combined into a coherent 
whole and called 'Deep Battle' during the later 1920s, it began to appear in official 
manuals with the 1929 Field Regulations, and was more explicitly laid out in the 1932 
Instructionsfor Deep Battle and the 1936 Field Regulations. The essence of the concept 
was the recognition that each tactical element had its own special role to play, and that all 
must work together to overcome the enemy defence throughout its depth: 
For the defeat of the enemy it is not sufficient to concentrate superior strength and 
equipment. Cooperation is required across the entire depth of the battle of all 
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forces, acting on a given axis, as are supporting actions by forces fighting on other 
axes. ý26 
The combination of artillery, aircraft, infantry, and tanks, working together, could 
create an extremely violent, fast-moving attack capable of cracking the enemy defence 
and forming a workable breakthrough at acceptable cost to the attacker. The enemy 
defence was expected to be arrayed in depth, from the outpost line to the heavy artillery 
and mobile reserve. Friendly forces were intended to engage all of these positions 
simultaneously in order to prevent the various elements of the defence from supporting 
each other. In addition, friendly forces were to be echeloned in depth, with the initial 
wave in the front line and successive groups of assault forces held in the rear to exploit 
success and drive into the enemy's defensive array, expanding the breach and driving into 
the deeper parts of the enemy defence. The ultimate objective of the battle was to pass 
subsequent echelons beyond the enemy defences to exploit the breakthrough into 
undefended areas. Deep Battle was a solution to the problem of breaking a dug-in 
defence by the synchronized application of massed, mobile firepower - and in order to 
prevent presenting a dense target array to the enemy, the forces producing this result had 
themselves to be arrayed in depth. 
The expansion of this concept into the operational realm the Soviets called Deep 
Operations, which were developed on the basis of Deep Battle, and laid out in the 1936 
Temporary Field Regulations. The combination called for a 
... simultaneous assault on enemy 
defences by aviation and artillery to the depths 
of the defence, penetration of the tactical zone of the defence by attacking units 
with widespread use of tank forces, and the violent development of tactical 
success into operational success with the aim of the complete encirclement and 
destruction of the enemy. ' 27 
26 Polevoi ustav 1929, p. 12. Emphasis in original. 
27 Polevoi ustav 1936, quoted by V. Daines, 'Razvitie taktiki obshchevoiskogo nastupatelnogo boia v 1929 
- 1941 gg', Voenno-istoricheskii ýhurnal, 
10/1978, as translated by David Glantz, Soviet Militarv 
Operational Art, p. 79. 
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Deep Battle was the tactical prerequisite for this style of operation. By enabling 
Soviet forces to blow holes in the enemy lines, it enabled forces echeloned in depth to 
exploit tactical successes and develop them into an operational gains. The primary 
exploitation forces were expected to be armoured, assisted by airborne forces inserted to 
seize key points whose control would ensure the tanks could move as rapidly as possible. 
Aircraft would provide both tactical support once the exploiting forces had outrun the 
range of friendly artillery, and interdiction of enemy logistical systems and reserve 
movements. The entire operation was intended to unfold swiftly, using careful 
synchronization to make maximal use of the disruption caused by the high tempo of the 
breakout. In keeping with the concept of successive operations, each operation was to 
seize objectives that set up the conditions for subsequent operations' success. Successive 
deep operations were expected to accomplish decisive campaigns, and the Soviets spent 
much of the early and middle 1930s building a force structure to conduct Deep 
Operations, and testing it in large exercises. Experimentation with these ideas ground to 
a halt in 1937, when many of the best and brightest of the Soviet theorists were shot in the 
purge of the military. 
Both the Soviet Army and the Air Force intended the Soviet Air Force to play a 
major role in operations. Soviet Army theoreticians intended the Air Force to provide 
firepower in the depths, which we would call Air Interdiction. Matters were not quite so 
clear-cut from the point of view of the Soviet Air Force. Over the course of the period 
under study, it wrestled with the issue of its role and how to accomplish it. The rapidly 
changing technical capabilities of aircraft kept the question of what was tactically feasible 
open. Since any force would be ill-advised to attempt tactically impossible missions, 
these changes in technology in turn kept open the issue of which missions the Air Force 
could or should attempt to accomplish, and the relative priority and sequence of those 
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missions. This in turn linked up to the strategic sphere, as emphasis on different missions 
suggested different force structures and directions of research, development, and 
production to emphasize. The Soviet Air Force agreed that its mission was to support the 
Soviet Army. In detail, however, we find a far less unified picture, not least in the debate 
as to what 'supporting the Army' actually meant. The tale of the Soviet Air Force, like 
that of its ideas, begins before the existence of the Soviet Union, in the Imperial Russian 
Air Service. 
While Imperial Russia evinced interest in aviation, in 1914 its air force, while 
large, was no more formidable than its equally large army. The Soviets inherited some of 
the wreckage of this force, and worked on turning it into a battleworthy force. The 
Soviets inherited a grab-bag of pilots and officers from Imperial Russia, one of whom, a 
former teacher from Kiev named Aleksandr Nikolaevich Lapchinskii who served as an 
observer/navigator during the First World War, turned out to be the Soviet's most prolific 
and coherent theorist on air power until his death in 1938. Soviet thinking about 
airpower, just as Soviet thinking about land power, included a willingness to throw away 
the past. However, until the First Five Year Plan in 1928, the Soviets were equally faced 
with the stark reality that they had few aircraft and little means with which to produce 
them. This, combined with the debatable nature of the future capabilities of airpower, 
formed the dominant theoretical split of the timeframe up to 1928, driving the nature of 
debate over cardinal issues such as the nature of the mission of the air force, and to whom 
it should be subordinated. These issues were not resolved by 1928. However, the 
initiation of the first Five Year Plan demonstrated that the future could reliably be 
expected to include large numbers of advanced aircraft for the air force, thereby changing 
the basic nature of debate. 
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Imperial Russia's interest in aviation increased as the 19'hcentury wore on, to the 
point that by 1895 observation balloons were a common feature in manoeuvres, and these 
balloons played a useful role in the 1904-1905 Russo-Japanese War. Investment in 
heavier-than-air machines increased sharply after the Grand Admiral, Grand Duke 
Alexandr Mikhailovich, noticed the implications of Bleriot's flight across the English 
Channel in 1909. Stating that 'victory in a future war will be impossible without an air 
fleet', he put funds and institutional muscle towards the acquisition of aircraft and the 
training of pilots. By the outbreak of war, Russia had several firms producing aircraft. 
While most of them were foreign, the star of the lot, Igor Sikorsky's firm, was domestic 
and producing advanced aircraft. As a result of this attention, at the outbreak of war 
28 Imperial Russia's military had 244 aircraft - more than Germany's 232 or France's 138 . 
This apparent strength masked numerous underlying weaknesses. Imperial Russia 
was capable of building 400 aircraft a year, as opposed to Germany's 1348 in 1914, and 
its aircraft engine production capability was especially weak. These problems left Russia 
dependent on deliveries from the Western Allies. In addition, pilot training facilities were 
too few to keep up with the demand - reduced though that demand was by lack of aircraft 
- and many in the high command had little concept of the value of aviation throughout 
the war. There were bright spots: Major General M. V. Shidlovskii's squadron of 4- 
engine Sikorsky 'Ilya Muromets' heavy bombers could and did deliver ordnance up to 
150 miles behind enemy lines, but this squadron rarely had more than 25 machines in 
flying condition. General Brusilov concentrated 100 aircraft for his 1916 offensive, and 
conducted large-scale bombing raids with groups of 20 or more aircraft in order to try to 
disrupt Austro-Hungarian airbases and railroad stations on the Lutsk axis. However, it is 
important not to over-rate the importance of these actions. Often, half of Brusilov's 100 
2' David Jones, 'The Beginnings of Russian Airpower, 1907-1922', (1-figham, Kipp, eds, Soilet A ilation 
and Air Power, pp. 15-34), pages 16-20, Quote from page 17; Kork, A., 'Rol' aviatsii v sovremennoi 
voine', (Voennoe Delo, September 13,1918, pp. 15-17), p. 15. 
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aircraft were unable to fly, and of those flying only half were judged 'fully capable for 
combat missions'. When the Germans reinforced the Lutsk sector, air superiority passed 
immediately and irrevocably to them. In general, innovation was a slow affair and 
generally worked upwards from pilots. While they tried all conceivable manner of 
missions during the war, the vast majority of sorties flown by Imperial Russia in World 
War 1, over 90%, were nonetheless reconnaissance missions. By December 1917, Russia 
fielded all of 579 aircraft, with a further 1,500 in various states of storage, repair, or 
training use. 
29 
The revolutions of 1917 fragmented the Russian armed forces, and the air force 
was no exception. Many pilots went home, or to the Whites; an unknown number of 
others, including Shidlovskii, were shot by their subordinates. Only a handful wound up 
joining the fledgling Red Air Force; by 1918 only 33 flights of 6 aircraft remained of 91. 
By late 1919 the Soviets managed to scrape together around 300-350 machines, and 
managed to maintain this approximate strength throughout the rest of the Civil War. 
Despite the numerous difficulties of keeping flyable aircraft at the front, which seriously 
strained repair and production abilities devastated by effects of the revolution, the most 
serious shortfall was in trained aircrew. There were at most 300 of these in 1919, and an 
average loss rate of 50% per year made it difficult to improve on that number. 
Furthermore, the lack of training led to enough accidents -a disastrous average of one 
crash per 10 to 15 hours of flying in 1919 - that one article railing against it was entitled 
29 Kork, 'Rol' aviatsii', p. 15-16; Jones, 'Beginnings', pp. 20-26; Timokhovich, Operativnoe iskusstvo, p. 8: 
V. S. Shumikin, Sovetskaiai, oennaiaaviatsiia 1917- 1941, (Moscow: Nauka, 1986), pp. 10-11,33,51-58; 
Uskov, N. P., Ra:: i, itievoennogoiskiissti, ai, periodpervoiniiroi, oivoini(1914-1918gg). Boevoe 
primeneniie aviatsii (Glava 6, Istoriia voennogo iskusstva i istoriia aviatsii: uchebnik), 
(Monino, 1957), 
pp. 29-31,79; Nazin, I., Barakov, I., Latishev, A., 'Aviatsiia v Brusilovskorn prorive', 
(Voenno- 
istoricheskii : hurnal, 12,1940) pp. I 10- 117; Alexander Boyd, The Soviet A ir Force, p. 1. 
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'Destroyers and Self-Destroyers'. With effort, the training and equipment situation did 
improve over the course of the war, albeit slowly. 30 
The combat employment of the available aircraft was extremely haphazard at first, 
with small groups, rarely reaching as many as 30 aircraft, sent to every front of the Civil 
War in 1918, in an attempt to shore up Soviet positions. Fortunately, at that time the air 
war was not intense, as indicated by the total of six dogfights recorded in 1918, and the 
Soviets had time to attempt to remedy their efforts. In 1919, a group of senior air officers, 
including A. N. Lapchinskii, wrote the Nastavleniie po primenenHu aviatsii na voine 
RK-KA: Proekt (Regulations on the Employment ofAviation in War, RKKA: Project) on 
the basis of experience at Tsaritsin and laid out a rule which would become one of the 
central themes in Soviet Air Force thinking: 31 
'Due to our general insufficiency of military aviation, it is necessary to accept a 
basic rule: group them on the most important directions, completely starving secondary 
directions or serving them in extreme cases with single detachments and those with the 
smallest possible number of aircraft.... -)32 [Emphasis added] 
Aircraft were increasingly brought under centralized command in the Field 
Directorate of Aviation, which, combined with improvements in the Soviet transport 
30 Jones, 'Beginnings', p. 26-27; Boyd, Soviet Air Force, p. 2; Shumikin, Sovetskaia voennaia aviatsiia, p. 
18-22; Shishov, L., 'Sovershenstvovanie sposobov boevogo primeneniia Sovetskoi aviatsii v godi 
grazhdanskoi voini', Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal, 12,1973, pp. 27-34, p. 27; A. N. Lapchinskii, 'Uspekhi 
aviatsii na zapade', Vestnik vozdushnogoflota, 1,1920, pp. 5-6, p. 6; Lapchinskii, 'Aviatsionii 'patriotizm", 
Vestnik vozdushnogoflota, 1,1920, pp. 9- 10, p. 9; Nevolin, 'Istrebiteli i samoistrebiteli', Vestnik 
vozdushnogoflota, 3-4,1920, pp. 15-16; G. L., 'Itogi aviatsii v 1919 g. ', Voennoe Delo, May 22,1920, pp. 
339-346, p. 342-343. [Note: In Russian, 'istrebitel', 'fighter aircraft', literally means 'destroyer' and is 
translated here literally to maintain the pun in 'Istrebiteli i samoistrebiteli'. Elsewhere it is translated 
'fighter' to match common English language usage. ] 
31 Boyd, Soviet Air Force, pp. 3-4; Jones, 'Beginnings', 27-28; Pliachenko, P., 'Trudi po teorii boevogo 
primeneniia Sovetskikh VVS (1918 - 1940 gg. )' (Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal, 8,1970, pp. 82-88) p. p. 82; 
Shishov, L., 'Sovershenstvovanie sposobov, pp. 28,31 - 33; Lapchinskii, A. N., 'Iz boevikh deistvii 
aviatsii 9-1 ariiiii' (Vestnik Vozdushnogo Flota, 1,1920, pp. 27-30), p. 27; G. L., 'Itogi', p. 343-344, 
Nastavlenie po primeneiiu aviatsii na voine Raboche-Krestianskoi Krasnoi Armii. Proekt., (Moscow: 
Polevogo upravleniie aviatsii i vozdukhoplavania pri Shtaba Revvoensoveta Respubliki, 1919), p. 25, as 
quoted in Shishov, L., "Sovershenstvovanie', p. 33. 
32 Nastavleniepoprimeneiiii aviatsii, p. 25, as quoted in Shishov, L., 'Sovershenstvovanie', p. 33. 
Unfortunately, I was not able to find a copy of this regulation - it would be very interesting to know who 
wrote it. Lapchinskii's participation is noted in Irtiuga, M., 'Kombrig A. N. Lapchinskii, (Voenno- 
Istoricheskii Atirnal, 7,1972, pp. 122-125), p. 123. The issuing authority is listed in Pliachenko, 'Trudi', 
p. 82. it is logical to assume that A. V. Sergeev, then the head of the Polevogo upravlenie aviatsii i 
vozdukhoplavania, was also involved. 
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system, made it possible to put more and more aircraft on one axis. Nearly 100 aircraft 
were concentrated against Kolchak in 1919, and 2 10 supported Tukhachevskii's drive on 
Warsaw in 1920. At the same time, the intensity of the air war rose, with 23 dogfights in 
1919 and 93 in 1920 - most of the latter against the Poles. Fifteen of Sikorsky's four- 
engine Ilya Muromets bombers were brought together with about 20 other heavy aircraft 
into a 'Special Purpose Aviation Group' in August 1919 to form a strike group of heavy 
bombers. This group engaged in both close air support, including low-level strafing of 
enemy cavalry on Lenin's orders, and at least one strike on an enemy airfield, claiming 10 
enemy aircraft destroyed. Additionally, these aircraft conducted air interdiction against 
various targets such as railroad stations and supply dumps, and there are numerous 
testimonials to the effectiveness of their close air support and reconnaissance work. 
Lighter bombers occasionally formed groups of 8 to 15 aircraft for concentrated strikes. 
Overall, Soviet Air Force official statistics claim 19,377 sorties flown in the Civil War, 
for 27,566 hours and 94,508 kilograms of bombs dropped. 33 
However, the official statistics do not square well with other data - that there were 
8 00 sorties flown against Admiral Kolchak in the east during 1919, and 2 100 on the 
Western Front in 1920, and a total of 3250 hours total in 1919. The official statistics are 
probably either inflated, include numerous non-combat flights such as pilot training, or 
both. Losses in accidents, over 390, were nearly 5 times greater than those in combat, 83, 
which latter figure compares poorly to the claimed 21 kills in aerial combat. Even these 
figures are low if the claimed numbers of aircraft repaired and built during the war - 1574 
and 669 - are to be made to jibe with claims of an average strength of 350 machines by 
33 Boyd, Soviet Air Force, pp. 3-4; Jones, 'Beginnings', pp. 27-29; Pliachenko, 'Trudi, pp. 83-84; Shishov, 
'Sovershenstvovanie', pp. 28-29,32; Tsikin, A., 'Maloizvestniie dokumenti o sozdanii tiazheloi aviatsli,, 
(Voenno-Istoricheskii Zhurnal, 11,1974, pp. 64-68), pp. 64-68; Baranovskii, V. A., 'Tiazhelaia aviatsiia'. 
(Vestnik vo,: dushnogoflota, 3-4,1920, pp. 12-13), pp. 12-13; G. L., 'Itogi', p. 344. Tukhachevskil, M. N., 
'Taktika aviatsii', (Voennoe delo, July-August, 1920, pp. 87-94), p. 92. Official statistics from Jones (his 
source is not clear from his bibliographical notes; the figures are termed 'official' in his text. ) 
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the end of the war. However, even if the actual figures are murky, it is quite clear that the 
Soviet repair, construction, and logistical organization operated at full stretch to keep 
aircraft available. 
34 
The shortage of trained pilots, mentioned earlier, was even more desperate. The 
pilot training troubles were worsened by the nature of those aircraft available. In late 
1920, of 70 air detachments and four flights, 76% were reconnaissance, 18% were 
fighters, and the remaining 6% accounted for bombers, photoreconnaissance, and artillery 
correction. However, shortages forced most air units to conduct all manner of work, 
preventing the pilots from specializing so as to learn any one job well. It should come as 
no great surprise that complaints about the effectiveness of aircraft were not few. 35 
Even aviation's supporters complained of its shortcomings. A summary of 
progress in aviation work in 1919 noted that group bombing by even as many as five 
aircraft was rare, and that artillery correction had been practiced in only two armies. 
Tukhachevskii noted that aircraft were all too often seen as an assisting arm of service, 
useful only for reconnaissance and communications. 36 Even he, however, writing of their 
use under his command in the largest assembly of airpower the Soviets had yet manage to 
assemble, wrote that: 
'On the Western Front there was a real attempt at the massed use of aviation for 
decisive military goals. These attempts succeeded when the aviation operated separately. 
... when combined, cooperative activity of ground and air 
forces was required, things did 
not stick together and decisive results were not obtained. 37 
34 Boyd, Soviet Air Force, pp. 10-11; Jones, 'Beginnings', pp. 27-29; Shishov, 'Sovershenstvovanie', pp. 
33-34; Shumikin, Sovetskaia voennaia aviatsiia, p. 23. The repair and construction figures are from 
Shishov, who cites thejournal Samolet, 11,1937, p. 7 as his source, which may indicate extra caution 
should be taken with regard to these figures. 
35 Boyd, Soviet Air Force, pp. 10- 11; Jones, 'Beginnings', pp. 27-29; Shishov, 'Sovershenstvovanie', pp. 
33-34-, Lapchinskii, 'Aviatsionnii 'Patriotizm", p. 9, Lapchinskii, A. N., 'Uspekhi aviatsii na Zapade', 
(Vestnik voý: dushnogoflota. 1,1920, pp. 5-6), p. 6; Shumikin, Sovetskaia voennaia aviatsiia, p. 23,70; 
Nevolin, 'Istrebiteli', p. 342-343, G. L., 'Itogi, p. 343. 
36 Tukhachevskii, 'Taktika aviatsii', p. 92; G. L., 'Itogi', p. 344. 
37 Tukhachevskii, 'Taktika a\, iatsii', p. 92. 
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Tukhachevskii's observation is no surprise, however, because most Army 
commanders had little idea of what aircraft were capable of, and tended to either ask the 
impossible, or expect the minimal -a situation apparently exploited on some occasions 
by both Air Force and Army commanders. Indeed, the lack of education showed up even 
on the pages of the Air Force's main journal, Vestnik vozdushnogoflota (Air Force 
Herald), which periodically contained articles that betrayed an author's complete 
incomprehension of aerial work - sometimes to provide the editors with an opportunity to 
shoot down the stranger ideas. For example, the most egregiously strange idea came in 
reply to an article by Lapchinskii, in which he described and praised the Clock Method 
for correcting artillery fire with reference to his experience as an observer/navigator 
during World War 1. A reasonably incoherent article from one Vladimir Buze replied to 
point out the system's supposed failures. Lapchinskii, one of the journal's editors, replied 
with a comprehensive rebuttal, ending on the sarcastic note that, 'Despite the fact that I 
recommend the Clock Method, I cannot in good conscience claim that it can be used for 
the correction of fire on any target, when the observer can see only the firing battery, and 
not the target the battery is firing on. ' -a point which Buze had claimed was a critical 
weakness of the Clock Method. The Field Directorate of Aviation slowly educated Army 
commanders about the Air Force, in part by ensuring that orders came to air units only 
from Army and Front level, and that the orders were phrased as general directives, 
leaving the air officers to ensure that the desired result was achieved. Nonetheless, even 
the latter situation was far from perfect. Cooperation between ground and air units was 
weak and bombing accuracy was poor enough to be labelled a 'sport' by Lapchinskii in 
1920. In sum, much of the Soviet Air Force's energies in the Russian Civil War were 
spent keeping itself in the air under extremely difficult conditions. While theoretical 
works came out of the war years, they tended to be poorly connected to reality; as a 1940 
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Air Force manual stated, looking back over the Civil War experience, the 'sharp lack of 
aircraft prevented detailed study' of the conduct of tactical missions, let alone operational 
employment. 38 
The Civil War peaked in mid- 192 0 and wound down in early 192 1, though bits 
and pieces sputtered on as the Soviets broke up a variety of peasant movements in 1920- 
192 1, crushed the Kron shtadt revolt in March 192 1, and tracked down various bands of 
Basmachi in Central Asia throughout the 1920s. Aircraft took some role in all of these 
actions, but in small numbers. Their usual function was reconnaissance, though some 
were used to bomb Kronshtadt, and there were several attempts to use aircraft for air- 
landings against Basmachi bands in the later 1920s. However, the Air Force as a whole 
faced other struggles. 
39 
First and foremost stood the problem of survival given the fiscal limitations of the 
fledgling Soviet state and the desire for a militia military. The Air Force had powerful 
political support, including Lenin, Frunze, and Trotskii, who ensured that an Air Force of 
some sort would certainly exist. Even as the Army struggled with arguments over the 
transition to a militia system, there appears to have been little doubt that, as one 
commentator put it, 'an airplane is not a rifle, and storing it at home is difficult. 40 Most 
understood that the Air Force was a technical arm, requiring skilled pilots and mechanics, 
and that those skills could only be attained and maintained through the constant practice 
only available with a full-time commitment to the job. Moreover, the Air Force was 
38 Voennoe Delo, 1918-1920; Voennaia nauka i revolutsfia, 192 1; Vestnik vo,: dushnogoflota, 1918-192 1; 
Lapchinskii quote firorn Lapchinskii, 'Zametki o gruppovoi bombardirovke', (Vestnik vozdushnogoflota, I- 
2,192 1, pp. 14-16), p. 14; 1940 manual quote: Smirnov, M. D., Voiskovaia aviatsda (Moscow: 
Gosvoenizdat NKO SSSR, 1940), p. 24; VI. Buze, 'Neskolko slov o, tak nazivaemom, Angliiskom sposobe 
korrektirovaniia strelbi', (Vestnik vo--dushnogoflota, 3-4,1920, pp. 22-23), a reply to Lapchinskil, A. N., 
'Prosteishii sposob korrektirovaniia', (Vestnik vozdushnogoflota, 1,1920), p. 42; Lapchinskii's reply: 
'Otvet t. Buze na kritiku korrektirovaniia artilleriiskoi strelbi po sposobu chasov', Vestnik vo.: dushnogo 
flota, 1-2 (6-7), 192 1, p. 17. 
39 A. Borisov, 'Desant v peski na samoletakh', ( Vestnik vo,: dushnogoflota, 1,1929, pp. I 1- 13); B. M. 
Zaretskii, A. G. Pervov, Boevoe deistviia Sovetskoi aviatsii v lokalnikh konfliktakh i voinakh 1921-1941 
gg.: Lektsiia, (Monino, VVA, 199 1). 
40 Chredin, 'Rol' aviatsii v militsionnoi annii', ( Vestnik vo,: dushnogoflota, 1-2 (6-7), 192 1. pp. 8-11), p. 
11. It is worth noting that this was the only article to appear on this subject in Vestnik i, ozAshnogoflota. 
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assisted by the perception that, as a highly mechanical and technical arm, it was therefore 
inherently proletarian. 
41 
Despite the support of key political figures and the mobilization of the press in its 
support, the biggest threat to the Air Force after the Civil War was the state budget, 
because of the expense of maintaining the Air Force's aircraft and personnel on a full- 
time basis. World War I and the Civil War left the Russian economy in ruins, and its 
industry in shambles. While defence was necessary, there was not a great deal of money 
available to generate the industrial base needed to maintain the Air Force in its current 
state, let alone build a large, powerful air force. Until the first Five Year Plan, funds for 
the aviation industry, and for the research and development of new aircraft, were limited. 
This is not to say that research and development, industrial expansion, and the purchase 
of new aircraft did not take place before the advent of the first Five Year Plan. They did, 
if slowly, and the Air Force was not starved of funds. In 1925, for example, its budget 
was 2% of the State Budget, or 10% of the overall military budget. 42 
The Soviet Air Force's numerical strength slowly rose, reaching 800 aircraft in 
line units and 725 in reserve in 1928.43 The quality of the aircraft was beginning to rise 
as well as new designs began to be produced, with their first 'heavy' bomber, the TB- 1, 
entering service in 1929 on the basis of the 1925 ANT-5.44 Nonetheless, when the 
Soviets looked abroad, they were keenly aware that their Air Force was small compared 
41 For examples of high-powered support of the air force, see: V. 1. Lenin i sovetskogo aviatsiia. 
Dokumenti, materiali, vospominaniia, (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1979); Walter Jacobs, Frunfe: The Soviet 
Clausewit: ý, 1885-1925, (ne Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1969), pp. 122-123; L. D. Trotsky, Aviatsiia - 
orichiie budushchego, (Ekaterinburg, Uralkniga, 1923). pp. 91-163. 
42 Khripin, V, 'Voprosi strategii i taktiki Krasnogo Vozdushnogo flota (po povodu truda. A. V. Sergeeva)', 
(Vestnik vo,: dushnqgoflota, 8,1925, pp. 5-8), p. 6. 
43 M. N. Tukhachevskii, Ed., Budushchaia voina, (RKKA Staff 4h Directorate, 1928), p. 404. 
44 Boyd, Soviet Air Force, pp. 26. 
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to those of the Western powers, and even, potentially, those of Poland and Romania, and 
45 this should be kept in mind when examining the doctrinal debates of the period . 
One important method of disseminating skills and ideas was the various state 
publishing houses. Vestnik vozdushnogoflota began publication in 1918. It covered all 
aspects of aviation, but usually with an Air Force slant; a significant proportion of every 
journal was concerned with military aviation affairs. As time went on this proportion 
increased, and by the later 1920s the explicitly civilian aviation content of the journal was 
normally small. The journal also carried extensive technical material on both domestic 
and foreign aircraft, book and j ournal reviews, and summary reports on the proceedings 
of various aviation societies. Backing up this effort was an outpouring of literature on 
aviation, ranging from small pamphlets intended to introduce the reader to the concept of 
aviation to books on topics related to military aviation. Here, too, the Soviets were kept 
acquainted with foreign work, as attested by a steady flow of western books on aviation 
published in translation. The impact of this material on Soviet theoreticians is difficult to 
judge; in their own works they rarely referred to western writers except Douhet, who by 
and large came in for sharp criticism. Clearly, given the availability of translated material 
from abroad, Soviet aviation theory did not develop in a vacuum. Equally, however, the 
Soviets clearly were not slavishly copying notions from abroad. Notions that fit well with 
their own were taken in, and those that did not were generally left aside. Moreover, the 
central tenets of Soviet airpower theory, concentration of force and supporting the ground 
forces, appeared very early and received little domestic challenge. 46 
Western influence may have been tangential because its focus tended to be 
different from that of Soviet theorists, a problem that has had its own effect in turn on 
western writing about the Soviet Air Force. Western writers have reflected this difference 
45 A N. Tukhachevskii, Ed., Budushchaia voina, (1928) and, passim, numerous articles in Vestnik 
vo:: dushnogoflota. 
46 Vestnik vo:: dushnogoflota, 1918-1928. 
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in focus by largely ignoring the topic of the Soviet Air Force's theory and doctrine, and 
the few who look at the topic tend to miss the point by searching for supporters of 
citybusting strategic bombing, reflecting the preoccupations of the West. Even the best 
work to deal with doctrine (and the only one to attempt to do so in any detail whatsoever), 
Alexander Boyd's The Soviet Air Force Since 1918, spends most of the chapter on pre- 
war Air Force strategy on the issue of heavy bombers in the 1930s. Another found 
strategic bombing advocacy where none existed. As will be seen in this chapter and the 
next, the Soviets harboured deep doubts about the value of strategic bombing. 
Attempting to see their doctrine through the lens of the Western emphasis on strategic 
airpower distorts our view. Soviet airpower theory developed along lines determined by 
its own conditions and along its own internal logic. Anglo-American focus on strategic, 
independent airpower developed not least because airpower in both the United Kingdom 
and the United States went through extended battles for its own independence, and 
because both nations faced no significant land frontier threat. In the Soviet Union, the 
issue of air power subordination followed very different lines because, just like the other 
continental powers, the Soviet Union could not ignore the strategic reality of a hostile 
land frontier. If the land army suffered defeat, the air force's airbases would promptly be 
overrun. The prevalence of the notion of the air force subordinating itself in large 
measure to the needs of the land forces was not a failure of imagination, but recognition 
of reality. 
47 
Just as Soviet debates in the 1920s on the employment of the Army tended to fall 
into the camp of those who expected a 'peasant rear' with weak infrastructure and 
industrial resources, based on the real, existing Soviet Union, and those who based their 
47 Boyd, Soviet Air Force, chapter 4; also chapters 1-3,5-6 passim. Neil M. Heyman, in 'NEP and the 
Industrialization to 1928', (Higham. & Kipp, Soviet A viation and A ir Power, pp. 3 5-46), claims, 
'Lapchinsky, a noted air-power theoretician, openly promoted an important role for strategic bombing' (p. 
4 1) -a statement I can 
find no evidence to back. Boyd's Nvork is good but limited by the lack of source 
material available in the early 1970s, and focuses more on technology than 
doctrine. 
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ideas on a future Soviet Union whose industrial might had been awakened, the Air Force 
debates in the 1920s often contained, implicitly or explicitly, references to a 'small air 
force', such as the Soviet Union actually had, or a jlarge] air force', such as they hoped 
to someday possess. Partisans of small air force theory could claim to be insisting on 
examination of the 'real possibilities' of the current situation, while the large air force 
partisans could point to the growing strength of Soviet industry and claim the future was 
theirs. This forms one of the two key divisions in Soviet thinking during the period up to 
1928. 
Similarly, there tended to be a parallel split between those who felt that 
predictions should be based on the current capabilities of aircraft, and those who thought 
the capabilities that were thought to be likely or possible in the future. Some of the 
speculation can seem rather fantastic to the modem eye, aware of the actual path of 
aviation technology development. However, the pace and direction of change was by no 
means obvious to observers at the time. Consider that this is written at the dawn of the 
21 st century, and that the F- 15 is still one of the finest interceptors in the world after over 
20 years in service. Twenty-four years elapsed from the Wright brothers' first fleeting 
flight in 1903 to Lindberg's trans-Atlantic flight in 1927. The pace of improvement of 
basic aviation technologies in that time was extraordinary, and we should perhaps forgive 
those at the time for feeling that pace might continue unabated, as indeed in some respects 
it did. The newest aircraft of 1926 were completely outclassed by the newest of 1936, 
which were in turn obsolescent compared to those coming on line in 1946. However 
fantastic some of the speculation over the future of aviation, the split between those who 
refused to speculate, and those who were willing to do so, paralleled the difference 
between those who insisted on remaining grounded in the reality of a small air force and 
those who looked towards a brighter future. 
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Thus Soviet theorists and planners faced a number of dilemmas about the use of 
airpower. Their air force was small, but many expected it to grow in the future. Their 
aircraft were often weak and unreliable in the present, but trending towards ever-greater 
power and capabilities year by year. This folded into arguments about the organizational 
structure of the Air Force. The three questions, of Potential size, technological 
possibilities, and command structure, were all interrelated, and in turn were interwoven 
with the basic questions of the intended missions of the air force. Did reality restrict it to 
a set of small detachments for reconnaissance and artillery correction, commanded by 
corps and division commanders? Or should it look forward to a day of larger formations, 
commanded by higher commanders, at the army and front level, or indeed as a separate 
branch of service? 
During the Civil War, most of the focus of Soviet writings was on practical 
matters of keeping aircraft flying and basics of their employment in combat, but some 
written work discussing theory did appear. One of the earliest articles on theory appeared 
in 1918; A. 1. Kork 48 , examining the role of aircraft in modem warfare, concluded that the 
modernization of aircraft meant that there was such a thing as aerial warfare, and that 
because of this and the specialized nature of aviation training and equipment, 'Military 
aviation... is a separate ann of service, equal to infantry, cavalry, artillery, and 
engineers. '49 Therefore, just as those arms had their own specialist training and command 
structures, so should aviation. However, Kork apparently still felt that aviation was part 
of the army, noting that it was necessary to educate commanders of divisions and higher 
echelons in the use of aviation. 
48 A leading Soviet officer, and commander of the 15'hArmy under Tukhachevskii during the drive on 
Warsaw in 1920, Kork eventually rose to command the Frunze Nfilitary Academy before falling alongside 
Tukhachevskii in the 1937 purges (John Erickson, The Soviet High Command (3dedition), London: Frank 
Cass, 2001), pp. 88,202,392,463,840. 
49 A. 1. Kork, 'Rol' aviatsii v sovremennoi voine', (Voennoe delo, September 13, pp. 15-17), p. 17. 
34 
Somewhat more appeared in 1919, including the landmark 1919 Nastm, lenie po 
primeneniiu aviatsii na voine RK-KA: Proekt (Regulations on the Employment ofAviation 
in War, RKXA: Project). As noted before, it laid down the principle of concentration, 
which would become a cornerstone of the Soviet approach to air power. 50 Nonetheless, 
aviation's precise role was still in some doubt. Kork railed in 1918 at the Imperial 
Russian command for having seen aircraft as merely a form of reconnaissance and an 
adjunct to the cavalry, and the 1919 Nastavlenie included a range of tasks in its list of the 
basic missions of aviation - reconnaissance, artillery correction, signals, bombing and 
strafing, and air to air combat. However, the other articles and books published at the 
time concentrated on the reconnaissance and non-combat support roles of aircraft. 
Indeed, M. P. Stroev, the commander of the I't Cavalry Army's air group during the Civil 
War and the author of numerous articles on the Air Force, wrote as late as 1930 that 'The 
signals service is thefundamental mission of aviation during a [cavalry] raid, standing in 
the first rank along with aerial reconnaissance. ' 51 This focus on 'troop aviation', meaning 
those aircraft providing supported formations with reconnaissance, signals, transport, 
artillery correction, and perhaps a few fighters included for their defence, as opposed to 
4 combat aviation'. meaning fighters and bombers in large formations, reflected the nature 
of the work that Russian and Soviet aviation was able to perfonn during the Civil War 
and World War 1. Largely bereft of modem aircraft, and lacking large numbers of aircraft 
in any event, 'troop aviation' missions were within their power, while 'combat aviation' 
missions generally were not. Thus in 1920 Lapchinskii, a great supporter of the Air 
Force, labelled aviation a supporting arm in the Civil War, and another author, 'V. A. ', 
noted that despite the exploits of the Ilya Muromets heavy bombers described in his 
50 Nastavleniepoprimeneniiii aviatsii, 1919, p. 25, quoted in Shishov, 'Sovershenst-vovaniel, p. 33. 
51 Kork, 'Rol' aviatsii', pp. 15-16; Pliachenko, 'Trudi po teorii', pp. 82-83, which briefly discusses N. A. 
latsuk's Postanovka: ýadanii vozdushnogo rccvedke, (PU RVSR, 1919) and Shchba aeroplanov pekhoti, 
(PU RVSR, 1919); Shishov, 'Sovershenstvovanie', p. 29-3 1; quote on p. 3 1, from M. P. Stroev, A viatsfia i 
konnitsei, (Moscow, 1930), p. 38-, italics in original. 
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article, many Russian aviators were dubious of the value of heavy bombers, though V. A. 
did not explain why. 52 
Some voices were heard in favour of 'combat aviation' in the Civil War. Despite 
noting that the main missions of aviation were reconnaissance, observation, and signals, 
and recommending an aviation organization in which a ground army would command all 
of six fighters, an article by Teodori in 1920 declared the importance of air combat, 
recognizing that winning the air battle would allow friendly aviation to fly while 
preventing enemy aviation from performing its missions. If this provided a somewhat 
mixed message, the more vocal advocates of airpower were less reticent. Despite a 
variety of articles on the many problems of current practice, those looking towards the 
future expected aviation to grow into its boots. 53 
The Soviets soon articulated the need to mass airpower, which became one of the 
central tenets in their thinking on the use of the Air Force. As written by Lapchinskii in 
1921: 
There is in aviation tactics steady growth of the concept of the necessity 
of massing aviation force on the main operational axis, even if, in the event of 
insufficient force, this means starving some secondary sectors of the front. 54 
Tukhachevskii argued that even a small air force needed to mass, in order to 
concentrate on gaining local victories instead of being defeated piecemeal across the front 
-a concept to which the Soviets would return in China, and again in 194 1. Some made 
greater claims for airpower. Lapchinskii called aviation in the west 'a special form of a 
52 Lapchinskii, 'Aviatsionnii 'patriotizm", p. 10; V. A., 'Tiazhelaia aviatsiia', (Vestnik vozdushnogoflota, 
#3-4,1920, pp. 12-13). Who V. A. might be is unclear. 
53 Teodori, 'Organizatsiia aviatsiia po opitu voini', (Voennoe delo, March 29,1920, pp. 132-139); some of 
the articles highlighting problems include G. L., 'Itogi'; Lapchinskii, 'Avistsionnii 'patriotizm", 
Lapchinskii, 'Uspekhi aviatsii na Zapade', (Vestnik vozdushnogoflota, #1,1920, pp. 5-6); V. V. Khripin, 
'0 nedostatki primeneniia aviatsii na fronte', ( Vestnik vozdushnogoflota, # 1-2,192 1, pp. 6-7), Lapchinskii, 
'Gruppovoi bombardirovke'; G-ko, 'Vnimatelnii vopros', (Vestnik vo.: dushnqgoflota, #8-9,1921, pp. 38- 
40); Tukhachevskii, 'Taktika aviatsii'; A. Neznamov, 'Strategicheskoe znachenie sovremennikh sredstv i 
boevaia podgot-vka armii', (Voennaia Nauka i Revolutsfia, December, 192 1, pp. 5 8-65); N. A. latsuk, 
'Rabota aviatsii s konnitsei', (Voennaia Mysl'i Revolustiia, April, 1922, pp. 72-87). 
54 Lapchinskii, 'Gruppovoi bombardirovke, p. 14. 
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nation's armed forces, equal to the army and the navy' due to the amount of money spent 
on it, and noted the possibilities seen there for striking any type of ground or naval target, 
either independently or in conjunction with the army and navy. 55 He and N. A. latsuk 56 
foresaw battles for ownership of the air, with latsuk staking out the more extreme 
position: 
Without mastery of the air, even having superiority on land, it is difficult 
to defeat the enemy, and if the strengths are even, it is impossible.... From this 
we conclude that no matter how the Army and Navy turn to the Air Force for 
cooperation in their operations in the beginning of a war, for strikes on lines of 
communications, bases, ships, etc., it is still correct, given the existence of a 
strong enemy air force, for the war to begin with a decisive strike upon it. 
Aviation's first step on the outbreak of war should thus be an aerial operation 
against enemy aviation. This operation must be well prepared and supported. 57 
While latsuk's position would eventually be bome out in World War 11, nearly 
two decades later, it sat squarely in the realm of fantasy if applied to the small and 
struggling Soviet Air Force of the 1920s. A. Neznamov, Voennaia Nauka i Revolutsiia's 
(Military Science and Revolution) in-house expert on the French and already a noted 
military theorist before the revolution, wrote an overview of the impact of new 
technology on strategy in the beginning of a 192 1. Aviation received short shrift: he 
declared that it was unable to stop troop movements and unable to replace cavalry in the 
reconnaissance role, and would not be a major force until it eitber carried significant 
firepower, or was able to move powerful land forces into the enemy rear. Neznamov 
concluded his brief glance at aviation by stating, 'So far it has not possessed the basis to 
" Tukhachevskii, 'Taktika aviatsii', pp. 93-94; Lapchinskii, '0 vozdushnorn flote na Zapade', Vestnik 
vozdushnogoflota, # 1,192 1, pp. 247-248. 
56 N. A. Yatsuk, already a pilot before the First World War, was chosen to lead his unit after the revolution, 
swiftly rose to command of Glavvozdukhflota's (Main air fleet's) construction section, and headed the 
Tactics Department at the Air Force Academy firom 1923 until his death in 1930 (Lapchinskii, 'N. A. 
Yatsuk', Vestnik vozdushnogoflota, 5,1930, p. 36). 
57 N. A. latsuk, 0 boevom znachenii sovremennoi aviatsii, (Moscow: 192 1), p. 23; quoted in Shishov, 
'Sovershenstvovanie', p. 34. 
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even pretend to the title of 'a major arm of service'. ' The rest of his article utterly 
ignored aircraft. 
58 
Neznamov's and latsuk's positions represent the two extremes. Neznamov under- 
rated the ability of the Soviet Air Force, though his views were more relevant to its 
current capabilities than was latsuk's vision of the future. Neznamov's position was 
based on an appraisal of current abilities, in a country whose economy, devastated after 
seven years of warfare, could not be expected to create many new or powerful aircraft in 
the near future. Others looked towards a time when technological improvements and 
industrial expansion would permit the fielding of a large, powerful force of aircraft. 
latsuk appears to have felt this lay just around the comer. His was an over-optimistic 
position, but his general hope was shared by many others, including Tukhachevskii and 
the generally level-headed Lapchinskii. However, there was little unity of views on the 
nature of the force that ought to be constructed. While the most accepted statement was 
the need to mass forces on the main axis, there was little agreement on what those forces 
were to be or what they would be doing. When the missions of the air force were 
discussed, the result tended to be a laundry list of everything that an airplane or group of 
aircraft might accomplish. The deeper questions of organization, of primary missions, 
and of the ability of aircraft to perform those missions, were unresolved at the end of the 
Civil War. After a reorganization in 1921-1923, and what appears to have been a 'time 
out' in 1922, evidenced by the general lack of articles or books on airpower theory, 
debate was renewed in 1923, where solidifying definitions evidenced both a growing 
common ground and a sharpening of the lines of debate. 
In early 1923 A. N. Lapchinskii, among whose many hats was that of chief 
military aviation editor for Vestnik vozdushnogoflota, published an article in that journal 
on the nature of the Air Force. Significant sections of this article appear to have been a 
5' A. Neznamov, 'Strategicheskoe znachenie', p. 59. 
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polemic against the views of M. P. Stroev, who was then the aviation editor for the 
General Staff sj ournal, then titled Voennaia Mysl' i Revolutsiia. Stroev's main worry 
appears to have been that air units not directly controlled by ground forces would cease to 
serve the interests of ground forces, and suggested that air unit boundaries ought to 
coincide with ground unit boundaries in order to ensure that ground forces got the support 
they needed. By support, it appears he meant primarily reconnaissance and artillery 
correction, because Lapchinskii attacked Stroev for underestimating the throw-weights of 
bomber units, even when assuming 25%-33% of the unit was not flying. Lapchinskii's 
reply to the worry of lack of support for ground forces was that the Air Force needed to 
work in mass, especially given the numerical inferiority of the Soviet Air Force. Only by 
keeping the air units independent of the ground command would they be mobile and able 
to concentrate as needed. Concentrated on the main operational axis, their mass would 
enable them to try to gain at least temporary mastery of the air, despite their numerical 
weakness, and therefore they could fulfil their support tasks - also concentrated. 59 
Stroev seems to have spoken for a number of people whose understanding of 
aviation was weak, as amply demonstrated by some of his published articles, which, 
alongside some valid points, include such gems of insight as, 
The speed of modem racing aircraft has reached the limits which are 
considered lethal in shrapnel. To accomplish reconnaissance at such velocities is 
unthinkable, and thus reconnaissance aircraft must slow down... 
Aviation is a technological weapon of social revolution, called into life by 
the growth of that idea. As such, it, speaking a priori, cannot influence the actions 
of troops into directions opposing their general tendency. 60 
However, of greater interest than the points of conflict are the main lines of 
agreement. Both agreed that the fundamental mission of the Air Force was to support the 
ground forces. They disagreed on the necessary directness of that support, but it appears 
59 A. N. Lapchinskii, 'Predrassudki v taktiki aviatsii', ( Vestnik vo,: dushnogoflota, # 1,1923, pp. 9-13). 
60 M. Stroev, 'Rol' aviatsii v vopros taktiki buclushe', (Voennaia MysVi Revolutsfia, June, 1923, pp. 136- 
154), quotes from p. 137 and p. 142. 
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that the need for that support - at some level - was not in doubt. This did not preclude 
disagreement on how to organize that support, who should call for it, and exactly what 
form it was to take. 
By 1924, the New Economic Policy was revitalizing the Soviet economy, and it 
was becoming apparent that the Soviet Air Force would not remain forever a tiny air 
force, but would grow to be at least a small one; while 23 aircraft were built in 1922- 
1923,264 were built in 1924-1925.61 Since it would clearly be possible to field more 
than a few outdated reconnaissance aircraft to each Army, the debates on the 
organizational place of the air force - subordinate to the army, or parallel to it? - 
intensified in 1923-1924. It had existed earlier, but with a war to fight, and then the 
numbers of aircraft small and the budget equally so, it appears to have been less of an 
issue. The renewed debate appears to have kicked off in a speech by the Chief of Staff of 
the Air Force, S. A. Mezheninov 62 , at a conference in August 1923. In addition to less 
contentious pronouncements, such as that the Air Force should appear 'where the fate of 
the operation is decided', he also declared that the rapid growth of the Air Force was 
leading to its being a 'separate military force', equal to the Army and the Navy. 63 
As in the debate on lower levels of command, at first glance the battle line appears 
in the j ournals as M. P. Stroev in Voennaia mysl' i revoliutsiia vs. Vestnik vozdushnogo 
flota, in which Lapchinskii wrote articles blasting at Stroev. Stroev wrote a long article 
against N. A. latsuk's proposition that the Air Force was fully qualified as a separate 
service. However, the lines were messier than they at first appear. Stroev's polemic at 
latsuk, after much confusion, ended up concluding that the Air Force is in fact a separate 
" Vershinin, K., 'Voenno-vozdushnie sili', (Voenno-Istoricheskii Zhurnal, 9,1967, pp. 27-39), p. 30. 
62 Trained as an observer-navigator and a graduate of the Tsarist General Staff Academy, S. A. Mezheninov 
overcame his noble birth with a highly successful career in the Soviet military. He rose to be one of 
Yegorov's Deputy Chiefs of Staff of the Red Army, with unfortunate consequences in the purge. 
(Shumikin, Sovetskaia voennaia aviatsiia, pp. 108-109; Erickson, Soviet High Command, pp. 388,847. ) 
63 Migulin, V. I., Teoriia i praklika primeneniia sovetskikh VVS v mezhvoennii period (1921 - 1941 gg. ) 
Uchebnoeposobie, (Moscow: Voenno-Politicheskaia Akademiia, kafedra istorii voennogo iskusstva, 
1988), p. 23-24. 
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element, but one that must be subordinate to the Army at the operational level, since only 
in the battle for command of the air would the Air Force be truly independent. 
Lapchinskii and latsuk, while arguing for centralized command of the Air Force, also 
argued against the notion of independent bomber forces winning the war: the western 
debate was not miffored here. Other articles provided further nuance to this debate. An 
article by V. Khripin 64 took Aleksandr Svechin to task for suggesting in a speech that 
combined arms commanders must learn the skills of their support arms, instead of relying 
on the assigned specialists for their expertise. Yet A. Gotovtsev, S. Khorkov 65 , and A. N. 
Lapchinskii all worried about the lack of coordination between ground and air forces in 
the training and manoeuvres they ran; the complaints were best summarized by 
Gotovtsev, who wrote of a set of manoeuvres in 1924 that the air staffs on each side 
independently work out operational-tactical questions of the actions of 
combat aviation, independently analyze the situation, independently set missions 
and ftilfill them, independently write reports, independently verify, criticize, and 
study better approaches. 66 
Combined with a number of complaints that cooperation between air units and ground 
units was stressed in theory but ignored in practice, it appears that the debate on the 
overall organization of the air force - as a separate service, or organic within the army? - 
was linked to the debate, discussed earlier, on its operational subordination and the 
effectiveness of its support to ground troops. In the wider picture, the link between 
theory and practice proved a frequent point of failure for the Soviet military in the inter- 
war years, with generally sound theory poorly reflected in frequently shoddy practice that 
64 A prolific writer on Soviet air force affairs and heavy aviation expert, VasiIii Vladimirovich Khripin 
served as an army's air group commander in the Civil War. A prot6g6 of Ya. 1. Alksnis, he rose to be Chief 
of Staff of the Soviet Air Force, then commanded a Special Purpose Air Group [AOM of heavy bombers 
before falling along with his patron in the purge. (Shumikin, Sovetskaia voennaia aviatsiia, pp. 159.161, 
187,188, Voprosi strategii I operativnogo iskusstva v Sovetskikh i, oennikh trudakh 1917-1940 99., p. 648. ) 
65 Another prolific writer, S. G. Khorkov commanded various air units in the Civil War and commanded the 
Zhukovskii Air Force Academy from 1925 until 1934. ((Shumikin, Soi, etskaia voennaia aviatsiia, pp. 119, 
167. ) 
66 A. Gotovtsev, 'Opit metodiki polevoi raboti slushateli Voennoe Akademii RKKA s avlatsiei (aviaotriad 
'Ultirnatum') letom 1924 g., (Vestnik vo: 7dushnogoflota, 11,1924, pp. 12-16): p. 12. Italics in original. 
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reports on maneuvers repeatedly bewailed, and for which troops eventually paid in 
67 blood. 
The link between these debates was the dichotomy between the two 'primary 
roles' seen for the Air Force: air superiority and ground support. While not a hotly 
debated topic, A. Kozhevnikov 68 argued in 1923 that ground support was in fact the 
second mission of the air force - the primary mission being to destroy the enemy air 
force: 'The duty of Red Aviation will be to force the aerial enemy to temporarily cease 
flying over our territory at a moment necessary to us. ' 69 The main thrust of this article 
was supporting a move from aviagruppi (airgroups) with a highly variable content to 
eskadrili (squadrons) with a known organization in order to ease logistics, a shift 
completed in practice by the end of 1924. However, it also demonstrates that 
concentration of force and support for ground forces were seen as central tenets to be 
challenged. 
70 
Other authors also referred to this question of the Air Force's primary mission, 
and at times the debate seems largely semantic, given the underlying consensus that both 
missions needed to be accomplished, the aim of air superiority being to ensure support to 
the ground forces. However, the question loops back into the issue of higher 
67 Gotovtsev, 'Opit metodiki', (Vestnik vozdushnogoflota, 11,1924); A. Gotovtsev, 'Opit metodiki polevoi 
raboti slushateli Voennoe Akademii RKKA s aviatsiei letom 1924 g. (dvukhstoronnaia voennaia igra v 
pole)', (Vestnik vozdushnogoflota, 12,1924, pp. 7-12); 'Postoiannaia Voenno-nauchnaia komissiia Shtaba 
RKKA Vozdushnogo flota: N. A. latsuk, 'Kakie nam nuzhni aeroplani? ", (Vestnik vozdushnogoflota, 1, 
1923, pp. 106-108); A. Lapchinskii, 'Otvet retsenzentu zhurnala 'Voennaia Mysl' i Revolutsiia' tov. 
Stroevu', ( Vestnik vozdushnogoflota, 1,1924, pp. 14-15); Khripin, '0 'samoderzhavi' i 'konstitutsionnom 
pravlenii", (Vestnik vozdushnogoflota, 2,1924, pp. 13-14); A. Lapchinskii, 'K voprosu o voiskovoi 
aviatsii', (Vestnik vo:: dushnogoflota, 3,1924, pp. 15-16); N. latsuk, 'Taktika malikh flotov morskogo i 
vozdushnogo', (Vestnik vozdushnogoflota, 6-7,1924, pp. 1-5); S. Khorkov, 'Osnovnie printsipi letnoi 
raboti', ( Vestnik vozdushnogoflota, 12,1924, pp. 3-4); M. Stroev, 'Vozdushnii flot, kak element 
vooruzhennoi sili', (Voenaia Mysl'i Revolutsfia, March, 1924, pp. 150-162); Migulin, Teoriia ipraktika, p. 
24; Anuchin., V. V., Zdorov, 0. N., 'Zarozhdeniie i razvitie teorii boevogo primeneniia VVS (1917- 1938 
gg. )', (Voenno-Istoricheskii Zhumal, 8,1988, pp. 19-26), p. 19. 
68 A. T. Kozhevnikov commanded an air unit in the Civil War, taught at the Zhukovskii Air Force 
Academy, then rose to Chief of the Air Force in the Belorussian Military District in 1932, where his 
'combat experience and deep theoretical knowledge' ensured his success. Ver, y probably shot in 1937. 
(Shumikin, Sovetskaia voennaia aviatsfia, pp. 41,128,161. ) 
69A. Kozhevnikov, 'Organizatsionnie voprosi', (Vestnik vo.: dushnogoflota, 3,1923, pp. 4-7), quote p. 4. 
70 Kozhevnikov, 'Organizatsionnie voprosi'; Vershinin, 'Voenno-vozdushnie siti', p. 30. 
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organization. The arguments noted earlier about concentration reflect this debate over the 
primary mission of the air force, as the needs of an air superiority campaign are eased by 
the subordination of the air force to a higher level of ground command or indeed a 
complete independence, while direct subordination to a tactical unit to provides that unit 
with better support. 
The disagreement on the issue of the Air Force's primary mission is part of the 
reason that A. V. Sergeev's Strategiia i taktika Krasnogo vozdushnogoflota (Strategy and 
Tactics of the Red Air Force)71, published in 1925, was hotly debated. As Chief of Staff 
of the Air Force from 1918-1922, Sergeev's opinion carried weight. However, despite a 
favourable introduction written by Lapchinskii, noting that Sergeev had avoided the 
common problems of being insufficiently informed about aircraft and their military 
history, the book met a hot reception from reviewers. Sergeev's conclusions were in fact 
carefully argued and considered but touched on a wide number of points. Cardinal 
among them was his conviction that the Air Force existed to support the others: 
There is no aerial strategy, because there is only one strategy. The Air 
Force is a means of strategy. The entire strategy of the Air Force boils down to 
assisting the Army and the Navy, whose actions alone give us victory or defeat in 
war. 72 
However, because of his definition of air superiority, 'Mastery of the air exists when one 
side is free, relative to the other, in conducting its fundamental activity: reconnaissance. 
Mastery of the air can only be relative .... 
73-) 
, Sergeev supported a complete, separate 
command structure for the Air Force, as this alone would give it the necessary flexibility 
to mass, gain air superiority, and support the Army or Navy at the decisive point. 
74 He 
concluded with a plea for increased production, clinching the argument by demonstrating 
71 A. V. Sergeev, Strategiia i taktika Krasnogo vozdushnogoflota, (Moscow: Vestnik Vozdushnogo Sila, 
1925). In addition to serving as Chief of the Air Staff, Sergeev had been a Bolshevik since 1911, a combat 
pilot from 1916, and helped ston-n the Winter Palace (Shumikin, Sovetskaia voennaia aviatsfia, 
1917 - 
1941, P. 39). 
72 Sergeev, Strategiia i taktika, p. 3 1; reiterated in similar words on p. 41. 
73 Sergeev, Strategiia i taktika, p. 43. 
74 Sergeev, Strategiia i taktika, chapter 6. 
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the necessity of large numbers of aircraft in war with a large chart tracing the month-by- 
month strength of an air force in several sectors of combat over the course of a year, 
including average loss rates, replacements from industry, repairs minor and major, 
commitment of pre-war reserves, and breakdown rates. 75 
Sergeev refused to extrapolate beyond the current, small, capabilities of the Red 
Air Force. Despite recommending a separate command structure, he refused to consider 
it an equal to the Army and Navy, repeatedly stating that its primary capability was 
reconnaissance. This met a harsh reaction from his first reviewer, who noted that 
Sergeev's conclusions were only valid given the current state of the Air Force, failed to 
take into consideration even the most likely future developments, and 'fails to set out any 
real rights of the Air Force in the overall sum of budget outlays' - an interesting comment 
which suggests there may have been more worry on this point than is otherwise apparent. 
Nonetheless, the reviewer concluded on a brighter note, stating that Sergeev's book 
would reward attentive reading. 76 
The longest response came from Khripin, whose article discussing the book's 
conclusions spread over two issues of Vestnik vozdushnogoflota. Khripin noted two 
tendencies of thought about the air force: as an assistant force, and as a third element of 
the military overall. Sergeev fell squarely into the 'assistant' camp, stating that 
'Objectively, the Air Force has no independent missions', a position with KhriPin labelled 
one of 'deep pessimism'. 77 While Khripin agreed with Sergeev that the air force was not, 
in 1925, a third element of the military, he also accused him of failing to keep up with 
developments since the Civil War; the Soviet Union was no longer especially poor, and 
" Sergeev, Strategiia i taktika, p. 211. 
76 A. Snesarev, 'A. V. Sergeev, Krasnogo vozdushnogoflota, Moscow: 1925 g. ', (Vestnik vozdushnogo 
flota, 7,1925, pp. 61-62). 
77 V. Khripin, 'Voprosi strategii i taktiki Krasnogo Vozdushnogo Flota (po povodu truda A. V. Sergeeva)', 
(Vestnik vozdushnogoflota, 8,1925, pp. 5-8), p. 5; Sergeev quote originally from Sergeev, Strategfia i 
takfika, p. 28. 
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just as the army needed automobiles and machine guns, and would get them, it needed an 
air force overhead doing more than reconnaissance, and should get it. Furthermore, the 
air force should study not only its current situation and how to deal with it, but the 
expected future in which greater numbers would make it possible to gain not only 
temporary, but possibly complete air superiority. Thus, Khripin continued, the air force 
did have a strategy, which covered questions of preparing the air force and the country for 
aerial warfare, of the overall control of the air force, of conducting independent 
operations, and of conducting operations in cooperation with the army and navy. While 
Sergeev was unimpressed by the bombers of 1925, Khripin advocated heavy bombers 
able to destroy major enemy targets. Sergeev suggested expanding the aircraft industry - 
particularly the aircraft engine industry - in order to build 1000-1200 aircraft over the 
next 3 to 5 years, but then expected all of these to serve in roles such as reconnaissance, 
signals, and artillery correction in air units organic to ground force corps. Khripin was 
unimpressed by both the intended use of these aircraft and by their numbers, expecting 
that in the event of a war the enemy would be backed by thousands of aircraft provided 
by the West. In short, Sergeev based his arguments on what the Air Force was able to do 
in 1925, while Khripin wanted works of theory to concentrate on what the Air Force 
would be able to do once a major building program came into being. 78 
Not all the reviews of Sergeev's book were disapproving; another review praised 
it on most counts, especially its call to subordinate all Air Force units to Army units. 79 
Nonetheless, it provided a focus for debate because it touched on all the various strands 
and tried to bring them together. The size of the Air Force and the abilities of its aircraft 
directly influenced what missions it could be expected to accomplish and who should 
78 Khripin, 'Voprosi', (Vestnik vo.: dushnogoflota, 8,1925), V. Khripin, 'Voprosi strategii i taktiki 
Krasnogo Vozdushnogo Flota (po povodu truda A. V. Sergeeva) (okonchanic)', (Vestnik vozdushnogoflota. 
10,1925, pp. I 1- 14). 
79A. Grigorev, 'Kolichestvo i kachestvo (Po povodu knigi tov. A. V. Sergeeva Strategiia i taktika 
Krasnogo Vozdushnogo Flota)', (Vestnik vozdushnogoflota, 10,1925, pp. 14-16). 
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command it. Those who expected little of aircraft tended to assign them to a smaller role; 
those who expected more of aircraft, and more aircraft from industry, tended to assign 
them a larger place in the military firmament. 
An attempt at synthesizing these problems that met with far less furor appeared in 
1926. As in his other works, A. N. Lapchinskii's long experience in teaching showed in 
the clarity of exposition in Taktika aviatsii (Aviation Tactics)80. This skill probably 
helped Taktika aviatsii avoid controversy - and win the Frunze Prize for 1926 81 - as it 
enabled him to present ideas which, while often similar to Sergeev's, were better received 
since it was easier to follow both the logic of his argument and the nuances of the 
conclusions he presented. Lapchinskii carefully differentiated between conclusions based 
on a theoretical ideal from those based on practical considerations of current reality, 
enabling him to present both sides of the argument without conflating them. 
Thus, in Lapchinskii's ideal case an air force could conduct independent activity 
against an enemy air force, and also both cooperative and separate activity against enemy 
land and naval forces. Wide-ranging and fast-moving, the air force could act en masse 
for observation, cover, reconnaissance, and to 'continue the work of artillery into the 
depths'. 82 On the other hand, he also noted that the impact of the air force was often 
mostly on morale - 'The air force, like lightning, brings danger to few and fear to all 583 
and furthermore, its mobility and activity was restricted by weather, maintenance 
difficulties, pilot training, and the immobility of its bases. In theory, the air force was one 
of the three elements of military power. In practice, he wrote, no air force anywhere had 
conducted an independent operation of any value, and thus the air force had only proven 
itself as a branch of the other two services. Lapchinskii suggested that the synthesis of 
'30 A. N. Lapchinskii, Taktika m4atsii, (Moscow: Avioizdatel'stvo, 1926). 
" Pliachenko, 'Trudi po teorii', p. 86. 
82 Lapchinskii, Taktika aviatsii, p. 7-11; quote from p. 10. 
83 Lapchinskii, Taktika aviatsii, p. 11. 
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these theses lay in production: once industry was able to supply enough aircraft for the air 
force to be capable of fulfilling independent rt-ýssions, it would properly attain a status 
equal to the army and the navy. 84 
In discussing the roles the air force could play, Lapchinskii introduced 
terminology for a three-way split to typify the general nature of missions: independent 
(nezavisimii), separate (samostoiatelnii), and service (sluzhatetnii). Taktika aviatsii 
appeared in three editions, and Lapchinskii's terms entered standard use in the 1920s and 
1930s, though other theorists tended to adjust the boundaries of the definitions to suit 
their points of view. However, Lapchinskii's definitions remained the central point of the 
spread of definition. Independent missions would have at most an indirect impact on the 
battlefield, such as a campaign of bombing factories or to gain air superiority. Separate 
missions would have a direct impact on the battlefield, but were conducted by air units 
not organic to frontline combat units (though very likely subordinated, temporarily, to an 
Army or Front) -a category that included both air interdiction and close air support. 
Reconnaissance conducted on behalf of the army, signals, transport, and the like 
constituted service missions. Lapchinskii stated that only a large air force had the 
strength to conduct independent operations; a small air force could only conduct separate 
and service operations, although included in the separate operation might be an element 
tasked with gaining air superiority for a defined period of time over a defined space. 85 
From this Lapchinskii concluded that air units on service missions should be 
directly subordinate to the army and the army commanders needed to be familiar with the 
abilities of their air units; thus those air units should be organic to their army, or, 
sometimes, their corps or even division. However, the large fighter and bomber units that 
Lapchinskii hoped would eventually exist should be in their own command structure, in 
84 Lapchinskii, Takfika aviatsii, p. 9-16. 
85 Lapchinskii, Taktika aviatsii, p. 13-2 1. 
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order to enable them to mass freely. When massed on a given Front (a Soviet army 
group), they were to be under the operational control of the ground force commander. 
These aviation forces would act in the overall interests of the ground forces on that front: 
some of the missions conducted might not be direct support at the front, but the sum of 
the activity of a Front's air force should directly support goals of the Front's ground 
forces. 86 
Taktika aviatsii's synthesis did not put debate to rest. However, it highlighted the 
topics of many of the debates - including the continuing debate over command 
subordination - while also taking part in a growing discussion of air superiority, 
operational art, and, more indirectly, the role of an air force in the initial period of war. 
While the concept was being discussed under a number of names, 'operational art', a term 
coined by Svechin for a series of lectures in 1923-1924 87 , was becoming standard in the 
vocabulary of military writers by 1925 and became increasingly common after 1926 when 
his book Strategý was published. Within the next ten years this new concept would help 
redefine the Soviet approach to warfare. Its overt part in the Air Force debate was still 
small, but the references to it were growing, and the attitudes it fostered were beginning 
to show in other major discussions: of air superiority, the role of the Air Force in the 
initial period of war, and command subordination. 
Air superiority had been mentioned, in some manner, since the beginning of the 
Soviet Air Force. The Soviets wrestled with terminology for this concept, then still quite 
new. They used neither of the current Western terms, of offensive counter-air (OCA) for 
operations aimed at the destruction or suppression of the enemy air force and defensive 
counter-air (DCA) for operations aimed at protecting friendly forces from enemy air 
86 Lapchinskii, Taktika aviatsii, p. 22-24,147-149,157-158,229-233. 
87 Jacob Kipp, 'General-Major A. A. Svechin and Modem Warfare: Military History and Military Theory, 
(Aleksandr A. Svechin, Strategj,, trans. Kent Lee, Minneapolis: East View Press, 1991; originally published 
Moscow: Voennii Vestnik, 1926, Kipp's introduction pp. 23-56), pp. 37-38. 
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activity. During the 1920s, 'prevoskhodstvo v vozdukhe' (superiority in the air), and 
4gospodstvo v vozdukhe' (mastery of the air) proved the most common terms, with the 
latter gaining ascendancy in the 1930s. However, the distinctions between the 
translations of the terms are not as important as the ideas behind them. In the early years 
authors tended to refer instead to the importance of aerial combat. They rather more 
rarely linked this into a wider framework, as a 1920 article which noted that air combat's 
importance lay in winning freedom of flight for one's own side while preventing enemy 
flight. 88 The concept of air superiority existed, albeit perhaps without clear definition, 
when latsuk wrote in 1921 that it was necessary 89 ; but there appears to have been little 
early discussion of the topic, and the 1924 Vremennoe nastavlenie po primenenHu 
Vozdushnikh Sil SSSR (Temporary Regulations on the Employment of the Air Force of the 
USSR) promulgated the mildly surreal notion that air superiority constituted a form of 
suppression of enemy morale. 90 In 1925, Sergeev wrote that air superiority was a 
measure of the freedom of one side or the other to conduct its reconnaissance9l, but this 
definition was not generally accepted. Some authors seem to have been uncertain how to 
define it. For example, Shamilo wrote in 1925 that air superiority would only exist at 
defined moments and places, but in 1926 quoted with approval the Temporary Air Force 
Regulations, 'Mastery of the air will belong to the side than can force the other to defend 
its rear. 92 Shamilo's 1925 concept, however, was gaining currency. In a surprisingly 
coherent article, Stroev wrote in 1925 that 
88Teodori, 'Organizatsiia aviatsiia po opitu voinu', (Voennoe delo, March 29,1920, pp. 132-139), p. 134- 
135. 
89N. latsuk, 0 boevom -7nachenii sovremennoi aviatsii, (Moscow: 
192 1), p. 23; quoted in Shishov, 
'Sovershenstvovanie', p. 34. 
90 Anuchin, V. V., Zdorov, 0. N., 'Zarozhdeniie i razvitie teorii boevogo primeneniie VVS (1917 - 193 8 
gg. )', (Voenno-Istoricheskii Zhurnal, 8,1988, pp. 19-26), p. 21. The regulation itself 
is Vremenoe 
nastavlenie po primenenHu Vozdushnikh Sil SSSR, (Moscow: Gosvoenizdat, 1924). 
" Sergeev, Strategiia i taktika, p. 43. 
92 Shamilo, 'Odnomestnie ili dvukhmestnie istrebiteli? ', (Vestnik vozdushnogoflota, 2,1925, pp. 24-26), p. 
24, Shamilo, M., 'Vozdushnaia oborona', (Vestnik vozdushnogoflota, 6,1926, pp. 1-6), p. 6; quote cited by 
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If we surprise [the enemy] with a concentration of superior aerial forces at 
the point of the decisive ground blow, their superiority will be, firstly, conditional, 
and, secondly, of very short duration; the latter is explained by the enemy's ability 
to swiftly shift aerial strength to the threatened point from neighbouring areas. 
More or less prolonged superiority, necessary in view of the prolonged 
character of modem combat, can only be gained in the event of the aerial enemy 
already being suppressed in an aerial operation: ftom this we draw the conclusion 
that the decisive operations of the Air Force do not coincide with the decisive 
operations of the groundforces, but precede them. 
In the critical moment for the ground forces, aviation, although working at 
maximum intensity, in significant measure only exploits its [the Air Force's] 
earlier success or bewails its prior failure - in the latter instance, appearing only 
cautiously on the field of battle, where the victorious aerial enemy acts relatively 
freely. 93 
Stroev, like many writing before him, considered the fighter aircraft to be the 
source of air superiority. S. Mezheninov challenged this a year later, pointing out that all 
classes of aircraft, fighter, bombers, and reconnaissance, had a role to play in the fight, 
arguing that the best results came not from patrolling, but from aggressively attacking 
enemy airfields, though he conceded this had produced poor results from this in World 
War 1.94 However, the issue of whether to begin the air superiority operation before or 
concurrently with the opening of the ground offensive remained an issue of contention. 
Stroev considered it better to attain air superiority before the main attack, in order to 
provide maximum air support during the offensive, than to launch the air superiority 
battle during the opening stages of the offensive and thus possibly delaying the provision 
of air support, even though this might well give away the axis of the ground offensive. 95 
This issue remained a bone of contention until the second half of the Second World War, 
when Soviet superiority became great enough to permit them to launch the air superiority 
operation simultaneously with support of the ground offensive without starving either of 
combat power. 
Shamilo as from page 25 of Vr- Nastavlenie VVS; no year (or ftill citation) provided but this is probably not 
the 1924 edition. [I do not know who Shamilo might have been apart from the evidence of his xNTitingS. ] 
93 M. Stroev, 'Ocherki frontovoi organizatsii upravlenii vozdushnim flotom', (Vestnik vozdushnqgoflota, 3, 
1925, pp. 5-8), p. 6. Italics in original. 
" S. Mezheninov, 'Zametki o gospodstve v vozdukhe i istrebiteliakh', (Vestnik vozdushnqgoflota, 8.1925, 
pp. 3-5), p. 3-5. 95 Stroev, *Ocherki', p. 6-7. 
50 
In the 1920s, however, such strategic superiority remained at best a pipe dream. 
Therefore the debate of when to begin an air superiority operation was part and parcel of 
the debate on command subordination. Stroev's answer to this was twofold. On the one 
hand, the air commander was to be completely subordinate to the ground commander, 
who would be choosing the time, place, and intent of the attack. On the other hand, the 
ground commander was to give the air commander the freedom to support those goals as 
the air commander saw fit. The ground commander was not to interfere with the air 
superiority battle at all, that being outside his purview, but in the main offensive the air 
force's actions were to be determined largely by the ground commander, who would 
specify the time, location, and desired intensity of air support. Overall Stroev suggested 
that the air force should have its own command structure for training and supply, but be 
subordinate to Army and Front commanders operationally. He recommended that this 
subordination be long-term in order to facilitate good cooperation between these units. In 
effect, each Front would have its own air force, an organization theoretically in place in 
June 1941 and deployed to excellent effect in a more sophisticated form by A. A. 
Novikov in 1942.96 
These concepts were not undisputed. B. Lazarev replied, to Stroev's commentary 
quoted above, that it would be wrong at that time to make the rest of the armed forces 
conform to the Air Force's wishes, since the Air Force was yet weak, and therefore could 
not make enough of a difference to demand, say, that the Army keep its fingers out of the 
air superiority battle. Overall Lazarev agreed with Stroev's main points; writing that 
it 
was especially important for a small Air Force to mass, and for it to expect to gain air 
superiority for only a limited space and time, those being determined 
by the places and 
96 Stroev, 'Ocherki', p. 6-8; M. Stroev, 'Ocherki frontovoi organizatsii upravlenii vozdushnirn flotom 
(okonchanic)', (Vestnik vozdushnogoflota, 4,1925, pp. 8- 10), pp. 8- 10. Regarding organization: Migulin, 
Teoriia i praktika. p. 108. 
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times the Army was most in need of SUpport. 
97 A year later, A. Algazin98' writing on 
operational planning for the air force, noted that air superiority did not defme a mission: 
Ordering someone to gain air superiority is the same as ordering someone 
to win. The concept of air superiority does not define operational missions. 99 
However, by 1927-1928, a basic concept of air superiority had been accepted. 
Thus various articles in 1927 noted that air superiority could be achieved only through 
both air combat and strikes on enemy airbases and that air superiority was a tactical and 
very temporary condition, while Lapchinskii, commenting on Western theories of 
airpower, commented that the Western notion of air superiority as putting the enemy air 
force on the defensive was meaningless. 100 1928 saw even less debate. Another article 
by Lapchinskii noted that Douhet's definition of air superiority - 'To master the air 
means to be able to prevent the enemy from flying while retaining the ability to do so' - 
had proven quite difficult to put into practice in reality, and therefore it was generally 
accepted that air superiority could only be gained at a given time and space, most often by 
massed fighter aviation at the point where superiority was needed. 101 This did not mean 
the Soviets saw air superiority as pointless; it meant they believed that total air 
superiority, in which the other side was prevented from flying to any significant degree, 
was probably impossible. Assuming both sides would be able to reinforce air units 
indefinitely, they therefore concentrated on the more achievable goal of wresting freedom 
97 B. Lazarev, 'K state 'Ocherki frontovoi organizatsii upravlenii vozdushnim flotom' t. Stroevom (VVF 
3/1925)', (Vestnik vozdushnqgoflota, 7,1925, pp. 13-16), p. 13. 
98 Aleksei Sergeevich Algazin joined the Soviet military in 1925, serving as Chief of Staff in an aviation 
brigade, a term on the editorial board of Vestnik vozdushnqgoflota, and Chief of the Department of 
Operational Art at the Zhukovskii Air Force Academy, shot in 193 7. ( Voprosi strategii I operativnogo 
iskusstva v Sovetskikh voennikh trudakh 1917-1940 gg., p. 660. ) 
99 A. Algazin, 'Voprosi upravleniia vozdushnim silami', (Vestnik vozdushnogoflota, 10,1926, pp. 5-9), p. 
7. 
'00 V. Malkin, 'Deistviia aviatsii v borbe za gospodstvo v vozdukhe', (Vestnik voýzdushnogoflota, 4,1927, 
pp. 12-15), p. 12; 1. Pavlov, 'K operativnomu ispolzovaniu boevoi aviatsii 
(iz polevoi knizhki)', (Vestnik 
i, o,: dushnqgoflota, 1,1927, pp. 10- 13), p. 11; A. Lapchinskii, 'Zarubezhnie tendentsii v primenenii 
istrebitelei', ( Vestnik voý: dushnogoflota, 4,1927, pp. 6-11), p. 9. 
101 A. Lapchinskii, 'Aviatsiia na polem srazheniia', (Voina i revolutsfia, November, 1928, pp. 141-152), pp. 
143-148. 
52 
of action for themselves, and denying it to the enemy, at defined spaces and times of their 
choosing. 
Two wider issues come out of the issue of air superiority. The first is, yet again, 
that of command subordination. The air superiority battle was clearly a battle the air 
force would have to fight on its own, and thus was a ready-made case for the air force 
commanding its own units without subordination to ground forces. However, all 
commentators accepted that air superiority was not a goal in itself, but was only useful in 
the context of enabling the air force to accomplish missions in support of ground force 
operations. The latter suggested the need for subordination to ground force commanders. 
Algazin's suggested solution to this dilemma was that while situation on the ground was 
the primary factor defining the timing and extent of the mission, the air force nonetheless 
should in no way be subordinate to any ground force commander below the Army level. 
The only dissenting opinion to appear reads more like an affirmation of Algazin's 
position than a rejection of it. 
102 However, none of these authors provided any concrete 
plan for achieving air superiority beyond the notion that it would be necessary to mass 
fighters and bombers for the operation. 
Having tied the battle for air superiority to the army's decisions on where and 
when the main effort would be, some went looking for opportunities for the air force to 
act on its own initiative. They found two instances of this: in the bombing of the enemy's 
deep rear, and in the initial period of war. 
Despite initial doubts about the value of heavy bombers, early dismissal of 
bombing influencing political centres as 'slogans', and the use of the name of the World 
War One Ilya Muromets squadron's commander as an insult, the Soviets retained an 
active interest in heavy bombers. Their first Heavy Bomber Brigade began 
formation in 
102 A. Algazin, 'Voprosi upravleniia vozdushnimi silami', (Vestnik i, o:: dushnogoflota, 10,1926, pp. 5-9), p. 
8; A. Grigoriev, 'Ob operativnom upravleniie aviatsii (Otvet t. Algazinu na statiu 'Voprosi upravleniia 
vozdushnimi silami')', (Vestnik vo:: dushnogoflota, 11,1926, pp. 
3-4). 
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1926, and they also embarked on heavy bomber development, as evidenced by the 
deployment of the TB- I in 1929 and the appearance of the TB-3 in 193 0.103 Despite a 
generally negative attitude towards deep strikes on enemy cities and industry, t1he notion 
did receive some discussion. The primary supporter of such activity in the 1920s appears 
to have been S. Mezheninov, who wrote in 1926 and 1927 of the need for the Long Range 
Aviation units to strike at enemy industrial and population centers during mobilization, 
possibly as part of a fully independent Air Army, with the objective of acting as 'heavy 
super-long-range aerial artillery' to disrupt the enemy's operations or campaigns in a 
given area. However, even Mezheninov considered the Soviet Air Force too weak in the 
1920s to carry out such an operation, and his intent was much closer to air interdiction 
than a strategic bombing campaign. 104 In addition, Captain Martin Fiebig, sent from 
Germany to teach at the Soviet's Zhukovskii Air Academy in 1924, was unimpressed by 
his student's insistence on attempting a strategic air campaign in a 1926 wargame, despite 
lacking the resources to conduct it succesfully. 1 05 Against these calls for bombing the 
enemy's strategic rear must be balanced a general opposition to it, mostly based on 
examination of World War One experience. Svechin noted in Strategy that city bombing 
was 'irritating'. 106 An article by an 1. Kovalev on the mission of bomber aviation in 1928 
noted that in World War One, London suffered more damage and deaths from crime than 
from German bombing. Kovalev went on to note that the bombing had stiffened Britain's 
political will instead of breaking it, asserted that even the combined air forces of Britain 
103 V. A., 'Tiazhelaia aviatsiia', (Vestnik vozdushnogoflota, 3-4,1920, pp. 12-13); N. latsuk, 'Postoiannaia 
voenno-nauchnaia komissiia Shataba Voenno-vozdushnogo sila RKKA: 6 October', (Vestnik voýdushnogo 
flota, 1,1923, p. 106-108), M. Stroev, 'Vozdushnii flot, kak element vooruzhennoi sila', ( Voennaia Mysl' i 
Revolutsiia, March, 1924, pp. 150-162), pp. 151-156; V. A. Vasiliev, Long-Ranged, Missile-Equipped, 
(USAF Translation; originally Dal'nii, Raketonosnii, Moscow: DOSAAF, 1972), pp. 17-18; Boyd, Soviet 
Air Force, p. 26. 
'0' S. Mezheninov, 'Voprosi strategii v prilozhenii k vozdushnim silam', (Voina i revolutsiia, 1-2,1926, pp. 
108-120), pp. 108-110; S. Mezheninov, Vozdushnie sili v voine i operatsii, (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe 
izdatelstvo voennoi literaturi, 1927), p. 7-8. 
105 James Corum, The Luffit, affe: Creating the Operational Air War, 1918-1940, (Lawrence: University of 
Kansas Press, 1997), p. 75. 
106 A. Svechin, Strategy, p. 160. 
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and France were insufficient to break a city's morale, and pointed out that even if Soviet 
bombers were able to reach the projected enemy's factories in the West, the bombs 
dropped would fall on the Soviet's natural class allies: the workers! Therefore, Kovalev 
argued that independent bombing operations were 'not in the order of the day' and 
bombers were to concentrate on closer, more directly military, targets. 107 Interestingly, 
Kovalev did not consider that bombing railroads would also largely attack railroad 
workers, possibly due to the militarization of railroads in the Soviet Union. 
Thus, even the supporters of independent strategic bombing operations admitted 
that the Soviets did not possess the force to accomplish such a mission, and most had 
serious reservations as to the mission's effectiveness or even desirability. Moreover, the 
mission itself ran against the grain of Soviet thinking, which remained focused on the 
need for massed, concentrated strikes, preferably on the axis of decision for the ground 
forces: the air force acting to help ensure the victory on the ground, instead of gaining 
victory through independent activity. Soviet concepts of air superiority reinforced this 
bias: if air superiority could only be achieved for a limited time over a defined area, then 
that time and space ought to coincide with the period in which the ground forces could 
make the best use of the opportunity of air support and air cover. The development of 
heavy bombers, however, was neither paradoxical nor purposeless; just because the 
Soviets did not want to conduct a strategic bombing campaign did not mean that long 
ranges and heavy bombloads were not desirable features in bombers! Heavy bombloads 
are useful against any target. Long range was seen to increase flexibility and improve 
ease of basing, as longer-ranged bombers could be based towards the rear (freeing up 
space at bases near the front for shorter-ranged aircraft) and could strike at a wider 
section of the front. Proposed targets for these bombers ranged from railroads to enemy 
107 1. Kovalev, 'Zadachi bornbardirovochnoi aviatsii', (Voina i Revolutsiia, May, 1928, pp. 39-47), pp. 39- 
41 (quote on page 4 1). 
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airbases. However, much of the discussion took place in the context of one particular 
type of operation, itself largely independent, which was foreseen and widely discussed: 
the operations of an air force in the initial period of a war. 
In the 1920s, the Soviets expected the next war to be against some combination of 
western powers. Poland and Romania were essentially considered givens, albeit as 
puppets of the western Great Powers at some level, with variants ranging from the lesser 
powers fighting as proxies, through to those nations providing territory from which the 
western powers could launch their own armies. The Baltic states and Finland also figured 
as possibilities. In the 1920s the Soviets seem to have felt no particular threat from the 
south or east, though as Japan turned militant in the 1930s, its place in their estimations 
would grow. ' 
08 
The question of the missions of the air force in the initial period of war was first 
broached in 192 1, but lay dormant until 1926, and the discussion only heated up in 1927. 
There are probably two reasons for the timing of this. The first is that by 1926 and 1927 
the notion of operations was beginning to pervade the Soviet military establishment. The 
second, to be discussed later, was the knowledge of the impending First Five Year Plan's 
emphasis on military production. 
The first mention of the actions of an air force in the initial period of war was 
quite early, but latsuk set the tone for those that followed: 
Without air superiority, even having superiority on land, it is difficult to 
defeat the enemy, and if the strengths are even, it is impossible.... From this we 
conclude that no matter how the army and fleet turn to the air force in the 
beginning of a war for cooperation in their operations, strikes on lines of 
communications, bases, ships, etc., it is still correct, given the existence of a 
strong enemy air force, that the war should begin with a decisive strike on it. On 
108 For a specific discussion of possible war scenarios, see: Tukhachevskii, M. N., editor, Budushchaia 
voina, (RKKA Staff 4hDirectorate, 1928), glava 1, especially section 
4, 'Varianti budushchei voini', pp. 
23-29. The variants mentioned in it are much the same as those assumed by the authors of the articles in the 
Soviet professional journals (Vestnik voýdushnqgoflota, Voenaia misl'i revolustiia. Voina i revolutsda, 
etc. ) 
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the outbreak of war, aviation's first step should thus be an operation against 
enemy aviation. This operation must be well prepared and supported. 109 
latsuk's comment, regardless of its theoretical value, was a fantasy for the Red Air 
force in 192 1. Sergeev paid it no particular attention in 1925, probably because of his 
conviction that the Air Force needed to concentrate on its basic service missions. 
In 1926, V. Markevich raised the topic again in an article analyzing the role of 
aviation during mobilization. Markevich dealt first off with the size of the air force, 
declaring that even a small air fleet, 'given conditions of manoeuvrability and flexibility' 
could be a ma or threat to a capitalist country because of the latter's internal j 
contradictions. Mobilization, by any country, was assumed to proceed in several stages. 
The first stage, pre-mobilization, would be secret, and hidden under various pretexts, and 
thus immune to aerial attack. At some point, mobilization would be announced, and since 
this would in effect be the declaration of war, the Air Force would begin to engage in 
combat. 110 
During mobilization, the Air Force had a number of roles to play. It had to protect 
friendly forces from enemy interference, disrupt enemy mobilization, and cooperate in the 
combat actions of borders units and cavalry reconnaissance forces. Fighters would 
provide cover. Strikes on the enemy's mobilization, directed especially at railroad 
stations and yards, were a good idea in principle, but Markevich noted that the Soviets 
lacked the heavy bomber aviation necessary to conduct such strikes in 1926, and also that 
World War One experience showed that light bombing raids were of little impact if the 
troops being bombed were disciplined. While all of this was going on, the Air Force 
itself would be mobilizing and concentrating its main forces towards the border. 
"' 
`9 N. latsuk, 0 boevom --nachenii sovremennoi aviatsii, 
(Moscow, 192 1), p. 23, quoted in Shishov, 
ýSovershenstvovanie', p. 34. 
"' V. Markevich, 'Deistviia aviatsii v period mobilizatsii, sosredotocheniia i razvertivaniia armn', (Vestnik 
va: dushnogoflota, 7,1926, pp. 3-6), p. 3. 
... Markevich, 'Deistviia aviatsii', pp. 3-4. 
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The Soviets expected mobilization to be followed by a concentration and 
deployment phase as the armies moved up to the border according to prewar plans. This 
phase, and the initial period of war, would end when mobilization, concentration, and 
deployment were complete, and therefore when fully mobilized forces began to enter 
combat. In the concentration and deployment stage, the Air Force retained the missions 
from the mobilization phase, though the bombing of rail yards and stations took on added 
importance, using massed bomber strikes. Reconnaissance was to identify the main 
enemy groupings, order of battle, and probable direction of the main blow. In addition, 
the enemy air force would also have completed mobilization, and thus the air war would 
be in full swing, with fighters and bombers from both sides attempting to destroy the 
enemy air force. Markevich foresaw this causing considerable losses, and cautioned that 
it was necessary to retain a reserve to be committed on the main axis of the main blow 
when the main engagement began. In addition, he felt that the air force, because of the 
intensity of its work, must not waste effort on patrolling or attempts at continuous 
bombing or reconnaissance; units should be committed in mass so that they could 
produce maximum effect for effort expended. ' 12 
Markevich's conclusions were perhaps not surprising given the rest of his article: 
the Air Force had to mobilize fast, and its first requirement was covering the 
mobilization9 concentration, and deployment of friendly forces. He noted that a small air 
force probably could and would avoid air combat, and thus it would be necessary to 
engage such an air force with escorted bomber strikes on its bases. He doubted that 
bombing could bring mobilization to a halt though, even so, such attacks had value. He 
reiterated the requirement that the Army or Front Air Force commander not wear out the 
Air Force during the mobilization and concentration period, because it would be needed 
in the main engagement. Markevich did not draw conclusions about the consequent value 
I" Markevich, 'Deistviia aviatsii', pp. 4-5. 
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of reducing the length of the mobilization and concentration period, presumably because 
this was a goal that all branches of the military strove for in any event. However, prior 
concentration of resources at forward airbases was suggested in order to speed Air Force 
mobilization and improve their ability to sustain themselves in the initial period of war. 
Finally, Markevich noted that the aircraft industry, and pilot training, needed to be 
operating at full speed from the outbreak of war to replace expected losses. ' 13 
About a year later, S. Mezheninov Published Vozdushnie sili v voine i operatsii 
(The Air Force in War and Operations), which began with a study of the initial period of 
war and moved from there to consideration of aerial operations in general. Mezheninov 
expected mobilization to last about 2 weeks, in which time small forward groups of 
troops would move forward to seize key pieces of enemy territory and disrupt enemy 
deployment. While acknowledging the need for the Air Force to cover friendly 
deployment, Mezheninov felt its primary mission was to strike the enemy, hitting at both 
close and deep targets to break up enemy mobilization and gain air superiority. If 
friendly forces planned an immediate offensive, the Air Force should concentrate its 
efforts on that axis in order to neutralize the enemy and pave the way for the Army's 
offensive. Mezheninov recommended that the Air Force needed to be maintained at full 
wartime readiness, with major reserves of kit and extra airfields prepared in peacetime in 
order to enable it to strike with maximum power as soon as possible. He put forward the 
British Fleet in 1914 as a model, stating that, being well-prepared for mobilization, it 
completed its mobilization as the British Army's mobilization began. Likewise, the Air 
Force had to complete its mobilization and go to war in the shortest time possible, to 
cover the mobilization of the other services. 114 
Markevich, 'Deistviia aviatsii', pp. 5-6. 
S. Mezheninov, Va: diishnie sili v voine i operatsii, (Moscow: Gosudarstvennoe izdatelstvo voennoi 
'10-33. literaturi, 1927), pp. 4-7, ý 
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In connection with the large strikes he foresaw in the initial period of war, 
Mezheninov argued in favour of producing the heavy industry necessary to provide heavy 
bombers in large numbers. He believed that their defensive armaments would enable 
them to fly deep into enemy territory, causing severe morale damage while they bombed 
cities, factories, concentration sites, and railroads. While these heavy bombers could 
range deeper, he nonetheless expected the primary zone of air activity to lie within 200 
kilometres of the frontier, in which zone both sides could expect to face systematic 
bombing from the enemy air force. From this, Mezheninov turned to considerations of 
aerial operations, both in general and in support of ground troops. ' 15 
In keeping with the growing consensus on air superiority, he wrote that it would 
need to be regained at the beginning of every operation, although he felt it was best to try 
to gain air superiority and begin the ground operation simultaneously, which would, 
naturally, require a large air force such as he repeatedly called for. That large force 
should still be massed to act on the main axis of the ground offensive - the 'concentration 
of force on the main region should have an exact relation to the planned ground 
operation' and support the operation's intent. Just as cavalry served as light 
reconnaissance when spread across the front, but formed a major strike force when united 
into a corps, so he felt aviation must concentrate for maximum effect, though he noted 
that this concentration could be achieved by flying to the target area as much as by basing 
adjacent to it. Due to inevitable maintenance difficulties and losses, this concentration 
would occur not only in space but also in time. Commanders would need to plan for 
minimal use of the Air Force before an operation, to allow the air units to come to 
maximum readiness. At the outset of the operation, all air units could then begin to 
operate at maximum intensity, but as losses and mechanical failures mounted, the 
possible intensity would steadily drop off, a pattern that commanders would have to 
"' S. Mezheninov, Vozdushnie sili, pp. 6-8,35-39. 
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accept and work with. A slower, sustainable rate of utilization was not suggested, 
presumably because it would conflict with the intent to mass for greatest effect at the 
decisive place and time. ' 
16 
Mezheninov concluded with a look at general command structures. He favoured 
an independent air force. The general goal of the Air Force in a given operation would 
align with the intended result of land operations, but the Air Force needed independence 
because of both its long range bombers and because the immediate goals of its operations 
would depend on the air situation. Nonetheless, he stated that the ultimate goal of all air 
activity was to influence the situation on the ground. ' 17 In a further article that year, 
Mezheninov considered the problems of concentrating the Air Force, writing that, 
'Manoeuvre by air forms the fundamental operational activity of aviation. It constitutes 
concentration on airbases and the flight from those airbases to the combat zone to be 
saturated by aircraft. ' Much of the article was concerned with techniques for maintaining 
secrecy while deploying aircraft to forward airbases in order to achieve surprise. " 8 
Neither of these works caused comment in the Soviet j ournals, even the call for 
heavy bombers and an independent air force. Nonetheless, they mark the first major 
works to appear in which air force activity was discussed explicitly as an operation, for, 
while Mezheninov did not defme the term 'operation' in either work, the sense of 
operations was clearly there, with many units cooperating in varied missions orchestrated 
to achieve an overarching goal. More debated, and more explicitly discussing operational 
art, was A. S. Algazin's book Obespechenie vozdushnikh operatsii (Securing Aerial 
Operations), which appeared in 1928.119 
"' S. Mezheninov, Va: dushnie sili, pp. 9-25,57-75; quote from p. 59. 
117 S. Mezheninov, Vozdushnie sili, pp. 7-8,74-75. 
118 S. Mezbeninov, 'Manevr v vozdushnoi srede'. (Vestnik vozdushnogoflota, 11,1927, pp. 4-7). quote 
from p. 4. 
119 A. S. Algazin, Obespecheniie va: dushnikh operatsii, (Moscow: Gosizdat, 1928). 
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In theory, Algazin wrote about the means of ensuring the security of various types 
of aerial activity, and a fair proportion of the book is, in fact, dedicated to discussing 
various tactical expedients. However, the more original sections - and the ones that 
generated controversy - dealt with the issue of aerial operations, and, flowing Erorn them, 
issues of goals, air superiority, and command subordination. Algazin began by discussing 
the defmition of an aerial operation, and proposed that it was 'the totality or system of 
actions of the air force directed to the accomplishment of a single goal'. Some operations 
might be sub-operations of other, larger operations: for example, the British at the Somme 
launched a massed fighter operation in order to gain air superiority, which was then used 
to conduct unopposed reconnaissance, fire correction, and bombing strikes. ' 20 
Algazin saw 4 basic goals for air operations: reconnaissance, bombing (both close 
air support and deeper strikes), air to air, and political (leaflet-dropping and similar 
activity). These goals existed within a framework of three types of air operation. Closely 
following Lapchinskii's delineations from Taktika aviatsii, these were independent, 
cooperative, and service operations. Independent missions - the Air Force seeking to 
accomplish the aims of strategy on its own - were possible only in theory, as it was 
unlikely that nations would face each other only in the air, and not on the land or sea as 
well. Cooperative operations covered a huge range of possibilities. Examples included 
Army and Front level reconnaissance, battles for air superiority, and strategic raids such 
as those the Germans had launched at London in World War One. More simply, 
cooperative operations were those that assisted the ground forces, but did not fall into the 
service category. That last category covered the activity of 'everyday' service to the 
army - close reconnaissance, artillery correction, signals, transport, and the like. 
121 
120 Algazin, Obespecheniie, pp. 3-25. 
12 1 Algazin, Obespecheniie, pp. 30-37. 
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Because of the improbability of an independent air war, and the lack of sufficient 
aircraft in the near future to conduct one, Algazin concluded that the Air Force was a 
resource of the army or Front commander. Aircraft would be divided into two types: 
troop aviation and reserve aviation. Troop aviation would be controlled at the corps and 
division level as an organic asset and conduct service missions. Reserve aviation, held at 
the army, Front, and Stavka level, was to conduct cooperative missions: air superiority 
and bombardment. These reserve air units could be reassigned to mass in a given sector, 
and in this respect Algazin's proposed system is quite similar to Novikov's successful 
1942 reforms. Given the necessity, and the difficulty, of securing their operations, he 
maintained that the air force must only commit to goals that were both possible and 
worthwhile, the latter defined as being a goal of real use to the army. ' 22 
An operation was feasible, in Algazin's eyes, if the Air Force had 'the ability to 
complete the mission regardless of the resistance of the aerial enemy'. 123 The main 
source of opposition would be enemy fighters, and while large aircraft's defences would 
probably serve to protect them, nonetheless security from enemy fighters would normally 
come from friendly fighters. Algazin offered a spirited defence of the notion that 'air 
superiority can only be gained through massive numerical superiority and for a very short 
time', slamming notions of total air superiority as flawed analogies from naval warfare. 
Furthermore, Algazin rejected the notion that air superiority was the primary goal of the 
Air Force: all operations must eventually be connected to the situation on the ground, and 
air superiority was but a means to an end. As a result, it air superiority was best 
considered as a subset of any given operation: something that made it possible without 
losing sight of the actual goal. In addition to a lengthy discussion of the tactics, and 
sometimes sub-operations, by which various forms of fighter support might ensure the 
122 Algazin, Obespecheniie, pp. 38-47. 
123 Algazin, Obespecheniie, pp. 47-49; quote from p. 49; italics in original. 
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security of aerial operations, Algazin concluded by declaring that all the operations of the 
Soviet Air Force needed to act together in one 'successive-operations system', each 
operation laying the groundwork for the next. 124 
Algazin's book was clear and generally well-argued, but this did not prevent it 
from drawing criticism. Lapchinskii, reviewing it for Vestnik vozdushnogoflota, praised 
Algazin for his in-depth examination of an important and hitherto largely unstudied topic, 
and for the stress Algazin laid on the importance of the unity of air and ground 
operations. However, Lapchinskii was less happy with Algazin's definition of operations. 
It covered almost anything done in the air -a single reconnaissance flight might count as 
an operation. Furthermore, Lapchinskii disliked the looseness of the defmition of support 
operations, feeling that these should be restricted to operations conducted in support of a 
given ground operation, arguing that without this addition, the bombing of London - not 
an operation which a ground forces Army commander could order - could be counted as 
a support operation. Lapchinskii also warned against 'Air Force separatism' arising from 
an excessively loose definition of support operations - an interesting comment in view of 
Algazin's repeated declaration of the need for the Air Force to support ground operations. 
Lapchinskii went onto suggest his own definition of aerial operations: ' 
25 
Reconnaissance, bombing, and the like are all tactical actions, a number of 
which, in connection with the tactical actions of ground troops, form an operation. 
[ .... ] An aerial operation occurs when, 
in addition to the actions of aircraft in 
relation to the ground, there is a purely aerial axis to the work of aviation. All the 
originality of the question lies in the fact that aviation always has two directions of 
view: on the ground and in the air. [ .... ] That a pilot 
is doing operational 
reconnaissance does not make his flight an operation. 
126 
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Nonetheless, Lapchinskii recommended the book, declaring it 'required reading for every 
member of the Air Force, because it forms a new stage in the development of our aerial 
thoUght. -) 127 
Whatever complaints may be laid against Algazin's or Lapchinskii's definitions of 
aerial operations, they did represent a new stage in Soviet theory, alongside the other 
articles from 1928 dealing with operations in connection with the missions of heavy 
bombers. One further article deserves mention. Vestnik vozdushnogoflota tended to 
have a number of articles every autumn analyzing the results of the summer manoeuvres. 
In 1928, in addition to the usual complaints about the difficulties of air-ground 
cooperation and poor tactics, along with corresponding notes on new methods attempted 
to cure these problems, V. Khripin noted in respect to the year's manoeuvres: 
Freedom of manoeuvre not only for aerial, but also for ground echelons, is 
attained through superiority over the enemy.... This manoeuvrability and all that 
flows from it in terms of missions, control, and material supply, was the first and 
fundamental operational theme. 
The actions of units and combined units of aircraft over a large radius in an 
organized air defence system on a dispersed base was the second fundamental 
theme. 128 
This was the first reference to operational art in the reports on manoeuvres, if a 
somewhat veiled one. While providing little detail beyond this note on themes, Khripin's 
article indicates that the wider problems of air force organization and orchestration were 
working into a new, operational, context in the minds of the Air Force's officers. Ten 
years before, problems of wider organization had been largely pipe dreams next to the 
immediate problems of the Civil War. Five years before, they had been largely subsumed 
under desperate attempts to maintain a stock of flyable aircraft - the easing of which 
problem appears to have been the main impact of the German-Soviet exchanges on the 
Air Force, there being no other trace of them in the public debate. 
127 Lapchinskii, 'Review: Obespecheniie vo.: dushnikh operatsiP, p. 46. 
128 V. Khripin, 'Itogi manevrov i nashi zadachi', (Vestnik vozdushnogoflota, IL 1928, pp. 11-14), p. 11. 
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The Soviets put their emerging thinking on the nature of warfare into doctrine 
with the Polevoi ustav RKKA 1929 (PU-29,1929 RKKA Field Regulations), outlining the 
concepts of deep battle upon which they would build deep operations concept during the 
next decade. On the role of aviation, PU-29 says: 
Aviation - cooperates with ground troops in the accomplishment of combat 
tasks, attacking enemy troops from the air and protecting them [friendly troops] 
from enemy air attacks through battle with the aerial enemy; it paralyzes the 
enemy rear; conducts aerial reconnaissance of the enemy; serves the command 
and troops with reconnaissance, observation of artillery fire, and communications; 
and fulfills separate [samostoiatel'nii] operational missions. ' 29 
In battle, aviation's directed missions were: 
a) aerial reconnaissance, observation, communications, and service to the 
commander; 
b) combat actions against ground targets (immobile and mobile); 
c) combat actions against the enemy in the air. 130 
PU-29 divided aircraft into troop and army aviation. Troop aviation remains 
undefined and little discussed in PU-29,, beyond a note that it should discern the enemy's 
operational groupings "to a depth of four marches", while its battlefield reconnaissance 
efforts discovered the enemy's forces and movements. Army aviation constituted those 
"bombers, close support, and fighter" aircraft fon-ned into an Air Group and subordinated 
to an army for combat against the enemy in the air and for support of ground forces. In 
providing this support, "Cooperation between aviation and ground forces is to be 
achieved through close agreement and subordination of aviation's actions to the overall 
operational concept" and reinforced through excellent communications between the air 
and ground command staffs. 
131 
While PU-29 did not directly specify who would control air units, it did direct the 
specialized arms (such as artillery) and supporting services (such as signals) assigned to 
formations of division or larger size should be commanded by an officer from the 
129 polevoi ustai, RKKA 1929, (Moscow: NKO SSSF, 1929), p. 14. 
130 PU-29, p. 84. 
131 PU-29, p. 41,84, quotes on p. 41,84, and 84, respectively. 
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appropriate branch and attached to the formation as a member of its command staff. 
Thus, specialists commanded their own units, but were themselves subordinate to the 
needs to the combined-arms formation. In theory, this ensured both coordination between 
different branches and the presence of knowledgeable staff to advise on vtheir capabilities 
and limitations. Reading between the lines, the Air Group, while not required to place its 
commander at the main headquarters of its assigned army, would be wise send a senior 
representative as a liaison officer. 
132 
PU-29 directed combat aviation of all types to act in mass, both for self-defence 
and for offensive power. Close support aircraft were directed to utilize low altitude flight 
("shaving flight") to close on targets, in order to ensure surprise, while fighters were 
directed to use formations permitting the commander's will to be exercised, while 
permitting maneuver for simultaneous attack on enemy air units. Interestingly, PU-29 
also laid out "characteristic" altitudes for reconnaissance, fighters, combers, and close 
support aircraft. 
133 
In meeting engagements, PU-29 specified the use of fighters to cover the 
deployment of the main force and the work of other types of aviation - the latter being 
tasked with pinning the enemy, ensuring their inability to deploy in useful terrain. On the 
offensive, bomber aviation tasked with supporting ground units was expected to attack 
enemy artillery, headquarters, supply dumps, and airbases, wile attriting enemy strength. 
Close support aircraft received the same mission list, minus the airbases, while fighters 
were directed against enemy reconnaissance and combat aviation operating over the 
battlefield. On the defensive, reconnaissance was to provide ample warning of enemy 
movements through reconnaissance, again 4 marches deep, while other aircraft were 
reserved for attacks against the attacking enemy, with bombers attacking tanks and all air 
132 PU-29, p. 22-23. 
133 PU-29, p. 84-85, quote p. 85. 
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support preferably coming simultaneously with attacks by other arms in order to break the 
attack. 
134 
In the words of the review of PU-29 in Vestnik vozdushnogoflota, it 'solidified 
the place of aviation in general tactics, in close connection with actions on the ground. ' 
The consensus in the Air Force on the principle of mass, and the need to support the land 
forces, shows clearly in PU-29. However, PU-29 contains few specifics on how the Air 
Force should conduct its actions. While fighter aviation is directed to secure the 
battlefield from enemy air activity (defensive counter-air), offensive counter-air missions 
receive little mention. The general mission of aviation mention paralyzing the enemy's 
rear, but the specific tasks outlined rarely run deeper than the enemy's tactical formations. 
Interdiction of railroads, let alone attacks on deeper targets, gain no mention at all in this 
manual devoted to the Army's activity, unless it is the note that aviation conducts 
separate missions in addition to the other listed. 135 
Few Soviet Air Force officers would have contested the need to mass airpower for 
maximum effect. ) whether the air force were small or large. Equally, few would have 
contested the need to coordinate the Air Force's actions with the needs of the land forces; 
even the actions in the 'separate' category amount to air interdiction in support of the land 
forces. The division of aviation into troop and army aviation, and their intended roles, 
corresponds fairly closely to Algazin's division of aviation into troop and reserve, though 
the PU-29 variant lack the inherent flexibility of Algazin's proposal. Consensus was 
building around the notion that air superiority was a temporary thing in time and space, to 
be seized by the application of massed airpower. Support of the army, the temporary 
nature of air superiority, and massed employment would remain cornerstones of Soviet 
thinking. 
134 PU-29, p. 102,131-132.164,168-169,174. 
135 A. Lapchinskii, 'Review: P. U. 29, Gosizdat, Moscow, 1929', (Vestnik vazdushnogoflota, 10- 11,1929, 
pp. 103-105), P. 105. 
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However, the Air Force was beginning to move beyond PU-29 in its thinking 
about command relationships, as shown in Algazin's proposal to use reserve aviation to 
mass air units at critical sectors, and PU-29 left the issue of priorities of aviation's work 
unclear: should gaining air superiority take precedence over providing ground support? 
Was air interdiction more important than close air support? While bombers, close support 
aircraft, fighters, and reconnaissance each had its own 1929 field regulations, these were 
criticized by Lapchinskii as incompletely worked through, and for being separate instead 
of a combined manual because it complicated the problem of figuring out how they were 
to work together. The fighter manual specified that the battle for air superiority coincided 
with the ground battle, but defined air superiority as "the condition in which relative 
freedom of action has been secured for our air force, and the activity of the enemy air 
force is limited", focusing on the use of fighters for defensive counter-air by using them 
to deny airspace to the enemy. The Soviets were coming to grips with the issues they 
needed to tackle, but had not come to consensus on the methods for doing so. ' 36 
During the interwar years, the Soviets were kept informed of developments in 
foreign thinking about the use of air power. Vestnik vozdushnogoflota periodically 
printed translations of foreign articles on airpower, though this practice became less and 
less common as the 1920s continued, with only an article or two per year during the 
1930s. In addition, various major foreign works were translated and published, including 
Douhet, Liddel-Hart, and Fuller. The Rapallo exchanges with Germany placed German 
instructors in the Soviet Air Force Academy from 1924 until 1933 in addition to the 
training and experimentation airfield at Lipetsk. 
Elsewhere in Europe, two essential responses to airpower emerged. On the one 
hand, charismatic or outspoken advocates of airpower's potential such as Giulio Douhet 
136 A. Lapchinskii, Review: B. U. 1. Av - 29 Gosizdat, Moscow, 1929, ( Vestnik vo: dushnogoflota, 10- 11, 




in Italy, Hugh Trenchard in Great Britain, Pierre Cot in France, and William Mitchell in 
the United States, advocated independent actions by heavy bombers against the enemy's 
forces, cities, industry, and morale. The second, less provocative, response advocated an 
air force operating in close connection with ground and naval forces, with the capability 
of providing both close air support, air interdiction, and counter air operations. The 
precise mechanism by which these ideas played out in each country depended in part on 
contingency. In Italy, Douhet lost the debate to Amadeo Mecozzi, who advocated a 
support role, while in France, air force advocates of strategic bombing could not 
overcome the Army's grip on doctrine. Germany seemed poised to pursue strategic 
bombing as well as supporting the ground forces, but failed to develop a viable heavy 
bomber during the earlier 1930s, then lost political support in the face of Ernst Udet's 
interest in dive bombing. The Royal Air Force achieved its independence and pursued 
strategic air warfare in part to justify that status, while in the US aviation remained part of 
the US Army, but its officers used arguments similar to the RAF's in its pursuit of 
organizational independence and a strategic air war. Yet, for all the contingency involved 
in the results, a striking pattern emerges. Those western powers with a peer competitor 
on a land frontier, Germany, France, Italy, and the Soviet Union, for all the differing 
paths of their internal debates, consistently placed support for the ground forces as the 
central role of airpower. The United States and Great Britain, western powers without a 
peer competitor on a land frontier, also engaged in extensive internal debate on the role of 
airpower, but overall leaned towards strategic airpower. This pattern strongly suggests 
that geographic reality provided a strong driver in these debates. In those nations where 
losing the ground war would lead to national defeat, supporting the ground forces 
remained a priority. Those nations not facing a mortal ground threat did not prioritize 
ground support. 
137 
137 Philip S. Meilinger, 'Trenchard, Slessor, and Royal Air Force Doctrine before World War H', 
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As the Soviet Air Force emerged from the Civil War, and the Soviet economy 
slowly revitalized, wider and wider issues of organization came to the fore. It seems 
likely that the Army theorists led the way on operational art, but the Air Force was not 
long behind them. Earlier it was noted that one reason for the appearance of debate on 
operational topics, and independent operations in the initial period of war, was the rise of 
operational theory in the Army. The second probable reason was economics, for by 1927 
it became increasingly clear that one of the most basic ground rules of the debate was 
about to change. 
The Soviet's national economic planning agency, Gosplan, began working on 
long-range planning in 1925-1926. In December 1927, the 15 th Party Congress approved 
their draft concept, and the resultant first Five Year Plan was officially approved by the 
16 th Party Congress in April 1929.138 The First Five Year Plan capitalized on an 
industrialization drive already underway by 1927 by adding in a major military 
rearmament whose outlines were finalized in July 1928 and then increased at the 16 th 
Party Congress a year later. Given Tukhachevskii's advocacy of an increase in military 
production while Chief of the General Staff (1925-1928) and in the secret 1928 threat 
study he edited, Budushchaia voina (Future War), it is extremely unlikely that any of the 
senior military staff were unaware, first, of the possibility of a major plan to increase 
industrial capacity, and second of the probability that this would include an increase in 
military production. ' 39 Until this time, one of the givens in the debate was that in reality, 
(Meilinger, ed., The Paths ofHeaven, pp. 41-78); Mark A. Clodfelter, 'Molding Airpower convictions: 
Development and Legacy of William Mitchell's Strategic Thought', (Meilinger, ed., The Paths o Heaven, )f 
pp. 79-114); James Corum, 'Airpower Thought in Continental Europe between the Wars', (Meilinger, ed., 
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(Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 1997); Tami Davis Biddle, Rhetoric and Reality in Air Warfare, 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2002). Japan, where aviation remained strictly subordinate to the 
Army and Navy, appears to be the exception to the rule. 
138 Robert McNeal, Stalin: Man & Ruler, (New York: New York University Press, 1988), pp. 114-115: 
Chris Ward, Stalin's Russia, (London: Arnold, 1993), pp. 76-77. 
139 James Schneider, The Structure of Strategic Revolution: Total War and the Rise of the Soviet Warfare 
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the Soviets would have a small air force backed by a weak industrial sector, quite 
possibly facing the combined might of the nations of the industrialized West. With the 
advent of the first Five Year Plan, the prospect of a fully industrialized Soviet economy 
pouring out thousands of aircraft could no longer be dismissed as a fantasy of the far 
future. Between this and the flowering of debate about operational art, the time of 
assuming that a realistic scenario required a small Soviet Air Force with limited means 
was over. The mass of aircraft to provide the material for aerial operations was on the 
horizon, and within the next ten years it would arrive. 
demonstrates the problems and directly calls for more and newer aircraft p. 732; David Glantz, The Motor- 
Mechani: ation Program ofthe Red Army During the Inter- War Years, (Fort Leavenworth: SASO, 1990), 
pp. 9- 10; Jacob Kipp, Mass, Mob ilitY, and the Red Army's Road to Operational Art, 1918-1936, (Fort 
Leavenworth: SASO, year unknown), pp. 21-22; Ward, Stalin's Russia, pp. 77-8 1; Lennart Samuelson, 
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In the 1920s, Soviet Air Force theorists were approaching consensus around 
several basic issues. Key amongst these were that the air force existed to support the 
ground war, and it would be small: both in absolute terms, and smaller than its likely 
enemies. With the advent of the Five Year Plan one of these key assumptions became 
void. The Soviet Air Force underwent massive expansion in numbers in the early 1930s. 
Unsurprisingly, the debate over large or small air forces suddenly came to a close, and a 
large air force well supported by heavy industry was soon a fundamental assumption. 
At the same time, the early 1930s saw a steady change in the capabilities of the 
aircraft. New designs coupled with new engines drove aircraft faster, higher, and with 
larger payloads than previously possible. This helped to reopen debates on the role of the 
air force and the missions it ought to perform, especially in the middle 1930s when it 
appeared the heavy bomber might be taking the lead as the pre-eminent form of aircraft in 
the sky. 
However, the debates were cramped by politics. On several occasions, debate 
came to a near- standstill. Stalin's 1928 denunciation of wreckers, including non- 
Communist specialists, brought officers without strong ideological credentials under 
increasing pressure. The Communist Academy's Section for the Study of Problems of 
War, formed in 1929, led this process, trying to rival the Frunze Academy as a source of 
military knowledge due to their use of Marxism-Leninism. To his discredit, 
Tukhachevskii used this as a platform for his disagreements with Svechin, taking part in a 
blistering attack on Svechin in April 193 1.140 In doing so, Tukhachevskii assisted in the 
140 Protiv reaktsionnikh teorii na voenno-nauchnomftOnte: kritika strategicheskikh I voenno-istoricheskikh 
1,.: g1jadov prosveshcheniia (Moscow: Gosvoenizdat, 193 1) provides the published version of the public 
session. See also Jacob Kipp, 'General-Major A. A. Svechin and Modem Warfare: Military History and 
military Theory', (in Svechin, Strategy, pp. 23-56), pp. 48-50. 
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politicization of debate inside the Soviet military, playing an active role in the process 
that led to both his own and Svechin's death during the purge that began 1937. 
Combined with the Party's internal cleansing of its ranks, known as the chistka 
(cleansing) because it claimed to be the recall of all Party identification cards into order to 
verify them, produced a dampening of debate in military affairs in 1932. The chill 
manifested itself in Soviet military theory j ournals through a spate of thoroughly anodyne 
articles. For instance, Vestnik vmdushnogoflota, previously a source of intense debate, 
shifted its focus to stunningly innocuous topics, such as a series of articles on basic flight 
proficiency, and for much of 1932 it largely ignored all questions above the smallest and 
most technical tactical scale, apparently printing nothing that could possibly get the 
editors into trouble. 
Nonetheless, debate in print eventually resumed. Points of consensus were not 
many in the debates of the time. While a consensus appeared to be evolving in the early 
1930s around the primacy of close air support and air interdiction in support of ground 
operations, changes in the perception of the abilities of heavy bombers initiated a debate 
over the possibility and desirability of heavy bomber strikes on the enemy's deep rear. 
The degree to which Soviet officers were convinced of the deep strike case can be 
overstated, because while the supporters of deep strikes were vocal, a strong and steady 
undercurrent for operational ground support ran through the works of even the deep strike 
advocates. Ultimately, the heavy bomber debate was overtaken by events, not only the 
purges in the Soviet Union, but also the civil war in Spain, where the Soviets began to get 
hard data on the combat effectiveness of aviation. 
Spurred by increasing failures of the NEP economy, the Soviet government 
diverted resources into industrial production on a grand scale and, in doing so, created a 
sea change for Soviet aviation theory. The first Five 
Year Plan, which officially ran from 
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1929 to 1932, involved a high degree of chaos with constant bottlenecks and ever- 
increasing production targets. Nonetheless, it did produce a great deal of industrial 
expansion, and a concurrent growth in the Air Force. In 1928, the Soviet Air Force had 
914 aircraft. By 1932, this had more than doubled to 2,097, and totalled 8,043 in 1936, 
by which time the Soviets were producing over 4,000 aircraft a year. 14 1A small Soviet 
Air Force was no longer a valid assumption, and, unsurprisingly, the 1920s debate about 
the validity of assuming large-scale production of aircraft 'sometime in the future' 
disappeared as the Five-Year Plan got underway. 
Alongside the growth in numbers, two types of qualitative changes occurred. The 
first, into which we will not go in detail, was in the capabilities of the aircraft, which were 
able to fly significantly higher, faster, and with larger payloads than before. Heavy 
bombers' payloads began to be measured in the thousands of kilograms, and in the mid- 
1930s exploration of the stratosphere began as well. Equally, however, the balance of 
types of aircraft in the air force began to change. 
In 1928, the Soviets had 914 aircraft. Of these, 532 (58%) were reconnaissance 
and communications aircraft, 176 (19%) were fighters, 26 were trainers, and 168 (18%) 
were bombers of some variety, including 16 TB- I heavy bombers. 142 This force, oriented 
towards reconnaissance, communications, and artillery spotting, was not particularly 
capable of significant close air support, let alone the longer-range air interdiction support 
('separate') or independent operations of which some theorists had written. The intent to 
accomplish larger tasks than reconnaissance, communication, and artillery spotting was 
there, however, and in the next few years the intent was translated into aircraft. 
By 1932, the Soviets had 2,097 aircraft, of which 330 were heavy bombers, 487 
were fighters, and 1,135 were 'light bombers, close attack aircraft, and reconnaissance'. 
141 Shumikin, Sovetskaia voennaia aviatsiia, pp. 86,157,180,183. 
142 Shumikin, Sovetskaia voennaia aviatsiia, pp. 90. 
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On 23 February 1933, Voroshilov stated that the ratios of aircraft types - roughly equal 
between heavy bombers, light bombers, fighters, and reconnaissance - were those that 
should be maintained. By January 1,1937, the Soviet aircraft park had grown (and the 
ratios had changed), to number 2,443 heavy and fast bombers, 1,779 light, close attack, 
and torpedo bombers, 2,255 fighters, and 1,662 reconnaissance aircraft, for a total of 
8,139 aircraft. The ratios had changed from roughly equal to about 30% each for heavier 
bombers and fighters, and about 20% each for lighter bombers and reconnaissance. 
Production was even more weighted towards the heavier aircraft and fighters, as 
reconnaissance aircraft and close air support aircraft (shturmoviki) tended to be outdated 
fighter aircraft at that time. 143 
To support this growing force, not only was direct pilot education expanded, but 
civil training was enlarged as well. The OSOAVIAKFHM (Society for Chemical and 
Aviation Defence), begun in the late 1920s, was well funded throughout the 1930s. Over 
the course of that decade, it claimed to have trained hundreds of thousands of parachutists 
and tens of thousands of aircraft mechanics and pilots, including two of the top Soviet 
World War Two aces, 1. Kozhedub and A. Perishing. The critical importance of this 
reserve, however, was not seen until the Second World War, when it provided the Soviets 
with a large base of manpower with at least some basic training already in hand from 
which to rebuild their shattered forces. 144 
The intended employment of this rapidly expanding and increasingly well-funded 
force was the subject of much debate, however. While there had been some debate in the 
1920s on the role of the Air Force, arguments in favour of a wider role had been tangled 
in doubts about the ability of the Air Force to possess enough aircraft to accomplish 
missions wider than tactical air support and reconnaissance. The dramatic expansion in 
143 Shumikin, Sovetskaia voennaia aviatsiia, pp. 180-183. 
144 L. Borisov, 'Oborono-massovaia rabota OSOAVIAKIHIMA (1927-1941 gg. )', (Voenno-Istoricheskii 
Zhurnal, 8,1967, pp. 40-5 1). 
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aircraft numbers left the field open for a complex debate combining attitudes about air to 
air armament and air superiority, which in turn informed debate on the proper role of the 
air force. All were characterized by a lack of hard data from experience - experience the 
Soviets would eventually begin to gain by flying over Spain. (While 66 aircraft were 
used in combat against the Chinese during the Chinese Eastern Railway conflict in 1929, 
the Chinese did not put up any aerial resistance, and virtually all of the air activity was 
reconnaissance and tactical bombing. 145) In general, however, the debate can be seen as a 
series of questions nested like a matrioshka doll. Concepts of the nature and effectiveness 
of aerial combat and bombardment necessarily inform debates over how and if an air 
force can gain air superiority, and what the latter means. In turn, concepts regarding the 
means of gaining air superiority inform the ability of the air force to perform any other 
mission. 
Thus, underlying much of the debate was a fundamental disagreement on the 
nature of aerial combat, which itself mirrored debates elsewhere in the world. Would the 
single-seat fighter continue, as in World War 1, to hold tactical superiority over other 
aircraft, and thus be the primary aircraft killer in aerial combat? Had improvements in the 
speed and payload of multi-crew aircraft made possible heavier, faster-firing defensive 
heavy machine guns and light automatic cannons whose accuracy, range, and wide arcs of 
fire would render the single-seat fighter obsolete? Was it time to develop heavy 'cruiser' 
aircraft, similar in design to heavy bombers, but carrying heavy antiaircraft weapons? Or 
would the ability of the fighter to carry some of the same weapons, and to manoeuvre to 
choose its time and method of attack, leave larger aircraft still vulnerable? 146 
145 V. M. Zaretskii, A. G. Pervov, Boevie deistviia Sovetskoi aviatsii v lokalnikh konfliktakh i voinakh 1921- 
1941 gg.: Lektsiia, (Monino, Voenno-vozdushnaia akademiia, 1991), pp. 6-7. 
146 See, for example, F. Arzhenukhin, 'Vozdushnii boi tiazhelikh bombardirovshchikov', (Vestnik 
vozdushnogoflota, 8-9,1932, pp. 8-11). 
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Sharp arguments arose over the nature of aerial combat, notably in a 1935 
review 
147 
of Lapchinskii's Vozdushnii boi (Air Combat) 
148 by lonov, Shcherbakov, and 
Chaikin. 149 Lapchinskii had the temerity to write that single seat fighters could defeat 
even turret-armed multi-seat fighters and to suggest that heavy bombers would need 
extensive armouring to survive the attacks of single-seat fighters. The review - polemic 
would be a better term - took Lapchinskii sternly to task for this point of view, attacking 
everything from his conservative calculations of probable bullet impacts, to his assertion 
that pilots could fly aircraft in part by feel. Indeed, in 1935-1936, the tide of opinion 
seemed to be running strongly in favour of multi-seat fighters; but experience in Spain 
soon brought the single-seat fighter back into favour, so only limited design work was 
ever attempted on multi-seat fighters. ' 50 The scale of the debate can be overstated; except 
when debating the specific issue of fighter design and tactics, most authors tended to 
assume that fighters would act as interceptors, and be capable of downing, with some 
degree of loss, the targets they were sent after. Equally, however, while we cannot know 
where the debate might have ended without experience in Spain, opinion appeared to be 
moving steadily against the single-seat fighter until the Battle of Madrid. 
Alongside this debate on air to air combat was a growing notion that the greater 
bombloads of newer aircraft, particularly heavy bombers, had made aircraft a much more 
potent threat to ground targets of all types. Much of this conviction rested on simplistic 
assumptions about bomber's accuracy, bomb effectiveness, and the ability of aircrew to 
find targets. As in the debate on fighters, the dissenting voice was Lapchinskii. His 
Bombardirovochnie rascheti (Bombardment Calculations), published in 1935, began his 
147 Ionov, Shcherbakov, Chaikin, 'Review: A. N. Lapchinskii, vozdushnii boi, Gos. Voen. lzdat, 1934. ', 
(Vestnik vozdushnogoflota, 7,1935, pp. 46-53). 
148 A. Lapchinskii, Vozdushnii boi, (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1934). 
149This may be the same Colonel Shcherbakov who commanded 50ffi Army's air group during the Battle of 
Moscow. Chaikin is not identified. (Fetzer, Soviet air Force in World War 2, p. 77. ) 
150 The change of opinion appears in: 1. Kovalev, 'Rol' i zadachi sovremennoi istrebitel'noi a,., iatsii', 
(Vestnik voý: dushnogoflota, 5-6,1937, pp. 100-135), who considered 1935 the low point in the single-seat 
fighter's fortunes. Regarding abortive development of heavy fighters, see Boyd, Soviet Air Force, p. 62. 
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critique of the accuracy of high-altitude bombing, and it was carried forward in his 
subsequent books and articles. 15 1 These works met with surprisingly little direct 
resistance, despite such pointed commentary on high-altitude bombing as, 'saving itself in 
the skies from enemy fighters and anti-aircraft artillery [through staying at high altitude], 
152 an airplane at the same time "saves" its target from its bombs' . Other authors were 
apparently content to assume accurate bombing without challenging Lapchinskii's 
analysis, and A. Algazin, a staunch advocate of strategic bombing by the mid-1930s, went 
so far as to assert in a 1936 primer on aviation that new sighting devices made heavy 
bombers very accurate from high altitudes - while, in the acknowledgements, thanking 
Lapchinskii for technical advice! 
153 
Just as the majority of writers seem to have assumed, as part of their 'mental 
furniture'. that fighters could take on bombers, so they also tended to assume that 
bombers were fairly accurate regardless of altitude, target, and attack profile. These two 
assumptions and debates, paired with the increase in the size of the Soviet Air Force and 
the technical capabilities of its aircraft, formed the underlying material for interconnected 
discussions on four topics centred on the role of the air force in a future war: 'separate' 
and 'independent' operations by the air force, air superiority, the role of aviation in the 
initial period of war, and strategic bombing. Since the issue of 'separate' and 
'independent' missions underlies the others, it forms a logical starting point. 
As seen in the previous chapter, in 1926 Lapchinskii introduced terminology for a 
three-way split that had become standard for typifying the general nature of missions: 
independent (nezavisimii), separate (samostoiatel'nii), and service (sluzhatelnii). Service 
15 1 A. N. Lapchinskii, Bombardirovochnie rascheti, (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1935); A. N. Lapchinskii, 
Bombardirovochnaia aviatsiia, (Moscow: Voenizdat, 193 7); A. Lapchinskii, 'Osnovnie voprosi 
sovremennoi aviatsii', (Voina i revolilitsiia, No. 3-4,1937, pp. 85-95). 
152 A. Lapchinskii, 'Osnovnie voprosi sovremennoi aviatsii', (Voina i revoliutsii No. 3-4,1937, pp. 85- 
95), p. 90. 
153 A. Algazin, Aviatsiia i, sovremennoi voine, (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1936), p. 3 (acknowedgernents), 112 
(accuracy of heavy bombers). 
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missions included reconnaissance, artillery spotting, and signals missions - activity in 
direct service of the Army. Separate missions were those that had a direct impact on the 
ground battle, but were conducted by air units not organic to frontline divisions or corps; 
this category that included everything from operational interdiction of rail lines and air 
superiority to close air support. Independent missions were conducted against the 
enemy's deep rear, bombing factories or cities. 154 
While this terminology gained wide currency, and the book in which it was 
promulgated, Taktika aviatsii, went through three editions, use of the terminology was not 
always quite along the lines of Lapchinskii's definitions. 'Service' missions underwent 
no changes in terminology. However, the term 'separate' (samostoiatel'nii) was 
sometimes used to refer to bombing the enemy deep rear, as we will see below, and thus 
was often a blanket term for any large-scale aerial activity not engaged in direct support 
of ground operations. This probably occurred because the term 'samostoiatel'nii' means 
'independent' as much or more than 'separate' ('separate' has been used in this work in 
order to distinguish 'samostoiatel'nii' from 'nezavisimii', which also translates to 
'independent', but was used in reference to missions undertaken with no reference at all 
to the ground forces' situation. ) All agreed with Lapchinskii's original caveat that 
missions beyond 'service' ones required a large air force, but given the industrial 
expansion of the Five Year Plans, this no longer applied a brake to the possibilities of the 
Soviet Air Force. 
Nonetheless, while debate on the term was not sharp, some evolution of view did 
occur. The simpler half of this evolution was structural and can be traced through official 
changes to doctrine and organization. PU 1929 (1929 Field Regulations) divided 
aviation into 'Troop' and 'Army' aviation; the former mostly subordinate to Corps HQs 
and consisting of service aircraft, while the latter was subordinate to Army HQs and had 
154 Lapchinskii, Taktika aviatsii, p. 13-21. 
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combat aircraft. 155 Four years later, on 23 March 1932, the Revolutionary Military 
Council declared that aviation had moved from a support arm to a separate branch of the 
military, with divisions between service, Army, and Front aviation. In 1933, the VVS 
formed a special corps, intending to unite all heavy bombers and cruisers (large aircraft 
armed for air to air combat as long-range bomber escorts), and make them directly 
subordinate to the Chief of the Air Force, lakov Alksnis. In 1936, they formed the first of 
the Special Purpose Air Armies (AON [sic], Aviatsionnie Armii Osobogo Namacheniia), 
directly subordinate to the High Command, commanded by Khripin, and containing two 
heavy bomber brigades, a light bomber brigade, and a fighter brigade. Vremennoi polevoi 
ustav RKKA 1936 (PU-36,1936 RKKA Temporary Field Regulations) defined aviation as 
engaging in both separate [samostoiatel'nii] actions and ground support. 156 Thus, 
structurally, by the time of the Spanish Civil War the Soviet Air Force had formations 
capable, in theory, of conducting deep independent missions, along with an official 
doctrinal license to do so and strong support from Khripin. He, as Chief of Staff of the 
Air Force (second only to lakov Alksnis in the chain of command), could and did 
influence Soviet construction priorities in favor of bombers until his arrest in 1937. The 
debate behind this doctrine, however, forms a more complex stew. 
The most basic of the separate missions, and one on which there was broad 
agreement regarding necessity if not methodology, was the need to gain air superiority. 
Before the Five Year Plan, the reality of a small air force meant that most Soviet theorists 
thought air superiority was a temporary, tactical phenomenon, gained by fighters massed 
to control a limited airspace for a limited time, possibly with the support of bombers 
striking enemy airbases. This was also the official point of view, reflected in both the 
Boevoi Ustav Istrebitel'noi Aviatsii 1929 (1929 Fighter Aviation Combat Regulations) 
155 Polevoi ustall RKK4 1929, pp. 84,131-132. 
156 Shumikin, Sovetskaia voennaia aviatsiia, pp. 180-182; Nfigulin, Teoriia ipraktika, pp. 25-28,38. 
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and in the PU-29, both of which emphasized that the battle for air superiority took place 
at the times and areas designated by the Army. 157 
However, because of the increasing abilities of bombers, both real and perceived, 
theorists paid increasing attention to the role of bombers in gaining air superiority by 
striking enemy airbases, as opposed to the use of fighter patrols to destroy enemy aircraft. 
The concept of gaining air superiority through strikes on airbases is essentially the same 
as the modem concept of offensive counter-air (OCA), though the Soviets did not use the 
term. The use of fighter patrols bears some similarity to the modem concept of defensive 
counter-air (DCA), though the Soviets typically saw the air combat route to air superiority 
as involving aggressive patrolling, not the defence of friendly forces and sites. 
Khripin, for example, a supporter of heavy aviation, noted that in the 1929 
manoeuvres at Bobruisk, air superiority was hotly contested by both sides, and that, 'The 
experience of this work showed yet again the absolute superiority of active measures on 
enemy aerodromes over all other methods of aerial combat. ' 158 This came about because 
defensive patrols reduced fighter strength to one third of its potential at any one time, 
while an attacker could bring all of his fighters to bear at the moment of battle and could 
guarantee a fight by attacking the airbases, forcing the other side to defend them. Khripin 
went on to emphasize the importance of reconnaissance of enemy airbases, and the need 
to act quickly on the data gained; details which, as the Soviets would discover in Spain, 
made the airbase attack concept more difficult than they supposed. 159 
The topic lay dormant for the next few years. As the numbers of heavy bombers 
in the Air Force rose, the issue began to crop up again. In 193 1, Khripin criticized the 
third edition of Lapchinskii's Taktika aviatsii for claiming that 'only fighters can provide 
157 A. Lapchinskii, 'Review: Boevoi Ustav Istrebitel'noi Aviatsii - 1929, Gosizdat, Moscow, 1929', 
(Vestnik va: dushnogoflota, No. 10-11,1929, pp. 105-106), p. 106; Polevoi ustav RKKA 1929, pp. 84,132. 
158 V. Khripin, 'lz opita Bobruiskikh manevrov', (Vestnik vozdushnogoflota, 10-11,1929, pp. 4-8), p. 4. 
159 Khripin, -1z opita Bobruiskikh manevrov', p. 4-5. 
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air superiority. ' 160 In his own primer on the Air Force, written in the same year for a very 
general audience, Khripin assigned heavy bombers the pride of place in gaining air 
superiority because of their ability to bomb airbases. However, he cautioned that the need 
for repeated strikes on enemy airbases, and the large number of enemy airbases, meant 
that the struggle for air superiority would be lengthy, and absolute superiority probably 
impossible. 161 
In his 1932 book Vozdushnie sili v boiu i operatsii (Air Forces in Battles and the 
Operations), Lapchinskii defined air superiority as a spectrum of the ability of one side or 
the other to interfere with enemy ground operations. Lapchinskii presumed that air forces 
would be able to reconstitute their front-line strength relatively rapidly from rear areas. 
Therefore, to gain complete air superiority, as opposed to temporary air superiority, it 
would be necessary not only to shoot down enemy aircraft and destroy their bases, but 
also to destroy the factories at which they were made. Complete air superiority, he said, 
was gained 'not through a blow or battle, but through a system, which is complex and 
lengthy. ' In this attritional framework, camouflage of friendly airbases and the detection 
of enemy airbases would play a significant role, since bombing airbases was the most 
efficient means of destroying active enemy aircraft. Lapchinskii assigned bombers 
primarily to these airbase strikes. His scepticism regarding the ability of bombers to hit 
factories and their ability to survive deep raids without escort probably precluded 
suggesting factory bombing as the bomber's primary mission. 162 
160 V. Khripin, 'Review: A. Lapchinskii, Taktika aviatsii i voprosiprotivovozdushnoi oboroni, (Vestnik 
vozdushnogoflota, No. 5-6,193 1, pp. 87-89), p. 87-88 (quote on page 88). The title of Lapchinskii's book 
was apparently expanded for this edition (see p. 87 for assertion it is the third edition. ) 
161 V. yMpin, Vozdushniiflot: voenno-politicheskii obzor organizatsfi, voortcheniia i pfimeneniia, 
(Moscow: Molodaia gvardiia, 193 1), pp. 62-65. 
162 A. Lapchinskii, Vozdushynie sili i, boiu i operatsh, (Moscow, Gosizdat, 1932), pp. 68-69,90-97, quote 
on p. 97. His scepticism of bombers' high altitude accuracy was thoroughly explored in 
Bombardirovochnie rascheti, (Moscow: Voennaia akademiia im. Frunze, 1935) and it is not unreasonable 
to suppose he already had the notion. 
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P. lonov 163 wrote the most thorough examination of air superiority. He was 
convinced that current technology required a re-assessment of the prevailing idea that 
fighters provided air superiority by 'securing relative freedom of action for one's own air 
force and constraining the actions of the enemy's'. lonov broke down the air superiority 
battle into tactical, operational, and strategic levels. At the strategic level, he saw a battle 
for quantitative and qualitative superiority, and thus suggested heavy bombing raids on 
factories - if the quality of night piloting and bombing accuracy was up to the task. Ionov 
defined 'tactical superiority' as superiority within 6 to 8 kilometres, a severely limited 
zone defined by the distance at which he expected a single pilot to be able to detect 
enemy aircraft. 164 Ionov defined operational air superiority in terms of land operations: 
To gain air superiority in a given operation means to gain, for the entire 
period of the operation, freedom of action for one's own air force and to exclude 
or significantly constrain the activity of the enemy air force in supporting its 
ground forces. Thus this superiority will be temporary (for the time of the 
conduct of the operation) and local (in the region of active operations). It can be 
achieved through massed air power, at the cost of weakening other less important 
axes. Falling short of the enemy in the battle for strategic air superiority, 
concentrated force on selected axes at the time of the operation makes it possible 
for the weaker side to gain air superiority. The frontage of such a superiority will 
be approximately that of an Army having an active mission and can be calculated 
at 30-50 krn. The depth of such a superiority is defined by the radius of necessary 
combat work by the Air Force in support of the Army, that is, 200-300 km. 165 
Arguing, as had Khripin and Lapchinskii, that attacks on airbases were the best 
means of attaining operational air superiority, Ionov specifically suggested attempting 
attacks on enemy airbases the night before a major ground operation. However, fighters 
had a significant role to play, and he also suggested making fighter bases the primary 
163 Despite his visibility as a writer in the 1930s, P. P. Ionov (who also apparently signed works as lonov 
and P. lonov) remains a remarkably shadowy figure - especially because his only known posting came in 
August 1941, when Major-General (Aviation) P. P. lonov was appointed Chief of Staff of the Red Army's 
Airborne Troops. Beyond this and his written work, his origin, career, and fate are unknown. (Erickson, 
Road to Stalingrad, p. 65. lonov is completely absent from Glantz's History of Soviet Airborne Forces, 
possibly due to its focus on the Army, not the Air Force. ) 
... P. lonov, 'Bor'ba za prevoskhodstvo v vozdukhe', (Vestnik vozdushnogoflota, No. 4,1932, pp. 6-8), pp. 
6-8. 
165 lonov, 'Bor'ba za prevoskhodstvo v vozdukhe', p. 7. 
84 
targets of the initial attacks, in order to ease subsequent stages in the battle for oPerational 
and tactical air superiority. 
166 
Despite the slowly growing debate over the ability of fighters to defeat bombers, 
A. Kozhevnikov displayed no doubts that fighters had a role to play in his textbook 
Taktika istrebitel'noi aviatsii [Tactics ofFighter Aviation], published in 1933: 167 
The battle for [tactical] air superiority is obtained by: 
1) the massed and sudden entry into action of all types of aviation, 
especially fighters, in order to gain initial success in seizing air superiority over 
the entire depth of the developing operation with a minimum of effort, and to 
prolong its retention; 
2) the organization of close cooperation between fighter aviation and other 
types of aviation and means of air defence, in the interests of cooperation in 
battling the aerial enemy over the territory of both sides; 
3) the use of fighter aviation throughout the depth of the most important 
operational axis in greater strength than the enemy deploys (a 2: 1 superiority in 
numbers). By means of fighter aviation superiority can be gained only for a 
relatively small piece of land (20 - 30 km) and for a time, limited to that time in 
which the fighters are present. 168 
Kozhevnikov wrote that operational air superiority could only be gained by 
bombing enemy airfields, however, and strategic superiority required bombing factories: 
lonov's delineations were coming into use. 169 
Kozhevnikov had also noted the importance of the role of bombers along with the 
role of fighters. This idea of the importance of bombers gained more support as a result 
of the Air Force wargames run in March 1934 by lakov Alksnis, Chief of the Air Force. 
These wargames served to confirm that air superiority could be won through strikes, 
particularly by heavy bombers, on enemy airbases during the initial period of a war. "0 
While the model used to resolve the effect of bomber attacks is unclear at seventy year's 
remove, it presumably proved convincing to the participants. 
166 Ionov, 'Bor'ba za prevoskhodstvo v vozdukhe', pp. 7-8. 
167 A. Kozhevnikov, Taktika istrebitel'noi aviatsii, (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1933); and A. Kozhevnikov, 
Taktika istrebitel'noi aviatsii: uchebnik dlia letnikh shkol VVS RKKA, (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1933). The 
former is softcover, and shorter, while the latter is hardcover and has more text plus far more illustrations. 
The material covered is largely the same, but the text is not quite identical. 
168 Kozhevnikov, Taktika istrebitel'noi aviatsii, p. 19. 
169Kozhevnikov, Taktika istrebitel'noi aviatsii: uchebnik, pp. 5-7. 
170 Migulin, Teoriia i praktika, p. 29,36. 
85 
During increasingly strident debates in 1935, advocates of bomber self-defence 
appear to have begun to win their argument against advocates of fighter's manoeuvre 
superiority. As a result, the power of the bomber came very much to the fore. Absolute 
air superiority - called 'mastery of the air' (gospodstvo v vozdukhe) by the bomber 
advocates, in imitation of Douhet (whose Command of the Air was translated into 
Russian as Gos odstvo v vozdukhe in 1926)- also came to the fore as the primary mission P 
of the air force. 
171 
On one end of the spectrum of bomber advocates, Khripm argued that air 
superiority was the primary mission of the air force, but only as a means to an end, those 
ends being the operational and tactical support of ground forces. ' 72 The most vocal and 
radical of the bomber advocates, however, was A. Algazin. Algazin's previous work, 
such as Obespechenie vozdushnikh operalsii (Securing Aerial Operations, 192 8) 173 , and 
Aviatsiia v reide MMS (Aviation in the Raid by Motor-Mechanized Forces, 1933)174 had 
been firmly grounded in reality. His work on the textbook Taktika bombardirovochnoi 
aviatsii (Tactics of Bomber Aviation, 1934) 175 and work on light bomber formation 
defensive tactics against fighters' 76 , combined with the republication of Douhet into 
Russian, appear to have changed his mind. (While Douhet's Mastery of the Air appeared 
in Russian in 1926, and The War of 19xx in 193 1, the 1926 edition of Mastery of the Air 
was criticized as a poor and severely abridged translation, while The War of 19xx had 
been translated from a German translation, not from the original Italian. At the end of 
171 A. Algazin, 'Dzhulio Due "Gospodstvo v vozdukhe"', (Vestnik vozdushnqgoflota, 6,1936, pp. 14-24), 
p. 14. 172 V. y 
"ýPin' '0 kharaktere boevikh deistvii aviatsii', (Voina i revoliutsfia, No. 1,1935, pp. 63-73), pp. 
63-73. 
173 A. S. Algazin, Obespecheniie vozdushnikh operatsii, (Moscow: Gosizdat, 1928), and examined in the 
previous chapter. 
174 A. Algazin, Aviatsfia v reide MMS, (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1933), and a prior article, A. Algazin, 
'Aviatsiia v reide MMS', (Vestnik vozdushnogoflota, No. 10- 11,193 1, pp. 14-34); these will be examined a 
bit later in the section on ground support. 
175 The publication of this work was announced in Vestnik vozdushnogoflota, No. 10,1934, p. 60. 
176 A. Algazin, 'Boi legkobombardirovochnoi aviatsii s vozdushnim protivnikom', (Vestnik i, o,: dushnogo 
flota, No. 3,1934, pp. 3-15), A. Algazin, 'Boi legkobombardirovochnnoi aviatsii', (Vestnik voidushnogo 
flota, No. 6,1934, pp. 5-10). 
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1935, a combined volume was published based on an Italian Defence Ministry selection 
of Douhet's works published in 1932, edited by Khripin and entitled again Mastery of the 
Air. )' 77 
In 1935 Algazin reviewed P. lonov's Obshchaia taktika voennikh vozdushnikh sil 
(General Tactics ofAir Forces), published the previous year. 178 Only tangentially a 
review of lonov's book, the article served largely as a platfonn for Algazin to propound a 
Douhet's views on aerial warfare. Algazin argued against Lapchinskii, who, among 
others, had not supported the notion of mastery of the air. While Ionov supported the idea 
in principle, Algazin took him to task for failing to treat it as not only eminently possible, 
but extremely desirable. He foresaw the day of the heavy bomber gaining mastery of the 
air through the destruction of both enemy airbases and factories, and confidently 
predicted gigantic 'fortress aerodromes' would have to be built near factories in the deep 
rear protected by belts of flak, fighters, and ground troops (to protect against deep raids 
and aerial assault). These would serve as bases for the decisive arm of aviation, heavy 
bombers, to sally forth and win mastery of the air, presumably by trying to attack similar 
bases in the enemy rear. ' 79 Algazin's conversion to Douhet had temporarily far-reaching 
results in the Soviet debate on airpower, and brought air superiority, bomber 
survivability, the actions of the air force in the initial period of war, and strategic 
bombing into one combined argument. Before continuing to examine Algazin's new 
views and their impact, we will shift backwards and look at the debate on the initial 
period of war and strategic bombing up through 1935. 
In the previous chapter, we saw that the Soviets thought the Air Force could have 
a distinct role to play in the initial period of war, given sufficient bomber strength: that of 
177 A. Algazin, 'Dzhulio Due "Gospodstvo v vozdukhe"', (Vestnik vozdushnogoflota, 6,1936, pp. 14-24), 
p. 14. 
17' A. Algazin, 'Review: P. lonov, Obshchaia taktika voennikh vozdushnikh sil, Voengiz, 1934', (Vestnik 
va: dushnogoflota, No. 8,1935, pp. 49-55. ) 
179AIgazin, 'Review: P. lonov, Obshchaia taktika', pp. 52-53. 
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conducting operations to disrupt enemy mobilization and deployment. In the 1920s, the 
heavy bombers needed for this were lacking. In the 1930s, the bombers were becoming 
available. Even in 1929, some writers were looking forward to the results of the Five 
Year Plan and a larger Air Force. In an article the editors of Vestnik vozdushnogoflota 
noted was supported by 'purely theoretical' points, S. Mezheninov called for the Air 
Force to concentrate on a limited 150 to 250 km sector of the European front in the initial 
period of a war, covering the other 750km of the front with a screen of fighters and air 
defence artillery. On this axis, part of the Air Force would cooperate with the cavalry 
screen, light bombers would disrupt enemy railroads, and a strategic air group of heavy 
bombers would strike repeatedly at enemy air bases to gain air superiority. Having 
gained air superiority, disrupted enemy deployment, and protected friendly deployment, 
the Air Force would continue to direct its actions to ensure the success of the ground 
operation. 
180 
Mezheninov's article was radical only in proposing that the Air Force might 
conduct the separate operations with light and heavy bombers, instead of restricting its 
activity to direct combat support of border forces. Despite being the most vocal exponent 
of separate Air Force operations, 181 Mezheninov still concentrated on providing support 
for the ground war. Lapchinskii actually went further in 1929, suggesting that in the 
initial period of war, the Air Force had to be considered an independent element of the 
military, because of its three missions in the initial period, deep strike, defence, and 
supporting units at the border, only the latter was directly connected to ground forces. 
The need to coordinate these efforts meant that the Air Force command needed to be 
concentrated at the level of military districts or Fronts. This concept for command 
180 S. Mezheninov, 'Boevaia aviatsiia', ( Voina i revoliutsiia, No. 1,1929, pp. 14-3 1), pp. 27-3 1. Quote 
from editors on p. 14. 
18 1 Editor's comment on: S. Mezheninov, 'Boevaia aviatsiia', (Voina i revoliutsiia, No. 1,1929, pp. 14-3 1), 
p. 14. 
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arrangements seems to have been little debated beyond a single article criticizing 
Lapchinskii (and thus, implicitly, Mezheninov) for diverting effort from ground support, 
but neither were they acted on. ' 82 
The topic popped up again briefly in 1932, despite the chistka. Again, the main 
thread was that of supporting the ground forces, but opinion had shifted away from direct 
support to support through disruption of the enemy's mobilization, concentration, and 
deployment. In essence, Mezheninov's proposals of centering the actions of aviation on 
separate operations in the initial period of war had become the standard view. These 
separate actions, however, were expected to have a fairly direct impact on the course of 
the ground war. In Vozdushnie sili v boiu i operatsii (The Air Force in Battles and 
Operations), Lapchinskii examined the prospect of launching a total war 
(besposhchadnaia voina, literally 'merciless war') by bombing enemy cities. The book's 
editors criticized the notion of city-busting, noting that bombing cities 'as cities' was 
4 politically absolutely impossible' because it would mean striking the Soviet Union's 
working-class supporters. Even Lapchinskii seems to have included the discussion 
largely to deride it; he saw it as useful only in the event that the bombardment could 
actually force the enemy to surrender, prevent the enemy from entering into the war, or as 
retaliation for similar strikes by the enemy. Furthermore, Lapchinskii noted that very 
powerful bomber aviation would be needed, and concluded: ' 83 
At the current stage of the development of air forces, it is more sensible to 
set oneself the more concrete goals connected with strategic concentration and 
deployment, taking as the main mission the slowing of the enemy's concentration 
and deployment. Thus we turn from this short analysis of the possibility of total 
war to the more realistic questions of our time, connected with the use of aviation 
in the initial period of war. ' 84 
182 A. Lapchinskii, 'Deistviia aviatsii v nachalnom periode voini', (Voina i revoliutsiia, No. 6,1929, pp. 55- 
66), pp. 55-57,66. Rebuke: Viktor Novitskii, 'Deistviia aviatsii v nachalnom periode voini', (Voina i 
revolizasiia, No. 9,1929, pp. 23-3 1). On organization, Migulin, Teoriia i praktika, pp. 106-107. 
183 1. Vilin, 'Osnovnie printsipi raboti shturmovikov', (Vestnik vozdtishnqgoflota, No. 5,1932, pp. 16-17), 
p. 16 discusses the role of the Air Force in the initial period of war; A. Lapchinskii, Vozdzishnie sili v boiu i 
operatsii, (Moscow: Gosizdat, 1932), pp. 113-122; comment by editors, p. 121. 
184 A. Lapchinskii, Vozdushnie sili v bohi i operatsfi, (Moscow: Gosizdat, 1932), p. 122. 
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Lapchinskii directed the main strike mission in the initial period of war against the 
enemy's railroad network and airbases to provide the greatest results in disrupting the 
enemy's deployment. The 'maximal program' included an aerial war against the enemy's 
morale and economic system, but even in this case, the primary target was the enemy's 
railroads, and closely connected to success on the land. Lapchinskii's conclusion to the 
entire section on the air force in the initial period of war was: 'On the background of this 
aerial war we create favourable conditions for air-ground operations on the land war 
front. ' 185 
The question of 'strategic bombing' -a term the Soviets very rarely used - had 
been under some debate before Algazin's sudden and vocal conversion to Douhet. Prior 
to this, Douhet had been routinely dismissed as a fantasist and the value of bombing 
factories or cities generally denied. Intertwined into the debate were the attitudes, 
discussed above, about aerial combat, bombing accuracy, air superiority, and the actions 
of the air force in the initial period of war. Furthennore, as noted above, Soviet 
terminology was somewhat imprecise in this field, with the term 'separate operations' 
often covering a wide variety of activities ranging from close air support to air 
interdiction campaigns only loosely tied to ground operations. 
While some called for heavy bomber attacks on factories, this often occurred in 
the context of a laundry lists intended to defme the potential targets of bombers as widely 
as possible in order to emphasize their versatility, without drawing any distinctions 
between the importance or priority of the classes of target. However, in 1929 Algazin 
suggested that factories, railroads, and airbases were the primary targets for heavy 
bombers. 1 86 More directly in favour was Mezheninov, who suggested the formation of a 
4 strategic group of combat aviation', consisting of 40 heavy bombers (each with 2000kg 
185 Lapchinskii, Vozdushnie sili v boiu i operatsii, p. 122-13 8; quotes on p. 13 8. 
186 A. Algazin, 'Voprosy dislokatsii aviachastei', (Vestnik iozdushnogoflota, No. 9,1929, pp. 8-12), p. 11. 
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of bombs), 18 cruisers, and 110 light bombers, and capable of penetrating 500km. This 
strategic group would bombard targets vital to supplying the war effort, such as electrical 
power plants, or that were vital to the development of land operations. This independence 
was tempered, however, by Algazin's requirement that any of these separate actions must 
be conducted 'in the spirit of the ground campaign'. Thus, his strategic air group would 
pound enemy airbases in the initial period of war in the interests of the war effort as a 
whole. If the strategic group were then to turn to destroying factories, he argued it would 
be necessary to figure out when the bombing activity was likely to have an impact on 
ground operations, as it would be worthless if it would not. ' 87 
Eyeing the development of heavy bombers and theories such as Douhet's in the 
West, the Soviets feared Western bombing of the Soviet Union. In 1929, Alksnis 
predicted that the Soviet Union would face heavy bombardment west of a line along 
Archangel - Moscow - Kharkov, with consequent disruption of command centres, 
railroads, mobilization centres, and possibly cities. ' 88 However, as noted above, there 
were consistently calls against the bombing of cities, usually on political grounds! 
89 
Moreover, there were doubts, notably from Lapchinskii, about the ability of bombers to 
actually hit their targets, 190 and, more importantly, doubts that the enemy's factories and 
cities should be the primary targets of heavy aviation. Thus even Khripin, no enemy of 
heavy aviation, stated in 1931 that, 
187 S. Mezheninov, 'Boevaia aviatsiia', (Voina i revoliutsiia, No. 1,1929, pp. 14-3 1), pp. 15-20,25-3 1; 
quote on p. 26. 
188 Ia. Alksnis, 'Nachal'nii period voinii', (Voina i revoliutsfia, No. 9,1929, pp. 3-22), pp. 18-20. 
189For example: Viktor Novitskii, 'Deistviia aviatsii v nachalnom periode voini', 
(Voina i revoliutsiia, No. 
9,1929, pp. 23-3 1), p. 24; and editorial comment in the book: Lapchinskii, Vozdushnie sili v 
boiu i 
operatsii, comment by editors, p. 12 1. 
190 A. Lapchinskii, 'Operativnii raschet bombardirovaniia zheleznikh dorog', (Vestnik vozdushnogoflota, 
No. 1,1930, pp. 10-14), p. 10; and an extended argument in A. Lapchinskii, Bombardirovochnie rascheti, 
(Moscow: Voenizdat, 1935). 
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All types of offensive aviation (bombers, attack, and fighters) should seek 
to destroy enemy air power by various means, with the primary work being 
attacks on enemy airfields and air bases. ' 91 
Air superiority remained a priority in 1934 when Khripin and Tartarchenko wrote on 
'Aerial War': 
The combat activity of the air force is organized and conducted in the 
overall interest of the war, being directed to the accomplishment of the following 
concrete military missions: 
1) by means of suppressing the aerial enemy and air defence in the theatre 
of military activity and in the depths of the enemy countries, create conditions 
easing the freedom of action of one's own air force, army, and navy; 
2) by offensive actions and by organized defence of the most important 
regions in friendly territory, ensure aerial security for the population of the 
country; 
3) attack enemy population centres from the air to impede the supply of 
the combat front, reduce the morale of the resisting population, and speed up the 
growth of class war; 
4) speed up the defeat of the enemy military by combined actions with the 
army and navy. 192 
Yet this relatively radical beginning, listing cooperative activity last, and the first 
three objectives being directed towards activity that would be classed as separate or even 
independent and suggesting the bombing of cities, was not entirely supported by other 
parts of the article. After describing Western aerial doctrines (categorized as Douhet and 
Fuller advocating of direct action on the enemy populace, while Nissel and Seekt favored 
destruction of the enemy's military forces), they introduced the 'Air Army' or 'Separate 
Air Force' as the main strike arm of the Air Force. Containing the bulk of the Air Force's 
combat power, it would conduct separate and independent missions against three sets of 
targets, in order of importance: the enemy air force; enemy lines of communications; and 
enemy land and sea targets of military, political, or economic value. In discussing these 
target sets, the destruction of enemy railroads out to 250km from the front line was 
'91 V. Khripin, 'Ocherednie zadachi boevoi podgotovki VVS', (Vestnik vo.: dushnogoflota, No. 1,193 1, pp. 
2-3), p. 2. 
192 V. Khripin, E. Tartarchenko, 'Vozdushnaia voina', (Vestnik va: dushnogoflota, No. 4,1934, pp. 4-7), pp. 
4-5. The article was pre-published in Vestnik vozdushnogoflota for comment, but intended for publication 
in the Soviet Military Encyclopedia (see editor's note, p. 4. ) 
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considered very important. After briefly noting the necessity of a detailed target study if 
deep strikes on the enemy economy were to have an effect, they moved to discussing 
operations in support of armies and fleets. 193 Thus, the independent, or 'strategic 
bombing' aspect of the mission seems to have been relatively less important. This was 
fully in keeping with other articles written at about the same time. For example, at the 
end of 1934, F. Arzhenukin 194 extolled the virtues of heavy bombers (and included a 
vitriolic polemic against Lapchinskii for doubting their ability to defend themselves 
against fighters), but nonetheless considered the main mission of heavy aviation to be 
gaining air superiority through strikes on enemy airbases and called Douhet's works 
195 'fantasy' . The emerging consensus position was probably closest to that expressed 
by 
Khripin at the beginning of 1935, that the Air Force 'should not desert the army', but had 
to be fully prepared to engage in separate and independent actions as well, since the 
outcome of the ground war depended on the success of the battle for mastery of the air. 196 
Into this emerging consensus, Algazin's article of August 1935 seems to have 
come as a bombshell. Ostensibly a review of lonov's Obshchaia taktika voennikh 
vozdushnikh sil, the bulk of the review was a polemic by Algazin regarding independent 
actions by air forces. Ionov's book concerned itself with the tactics of large air force 
units, considering general tactics to be the link between air force operational art and 
tactics. Algazin used the topic as a springboard. Commenting that Soviet literature had 
mostly looked at aviation within the limits of ground operations or direct support, he 
declared [all emphases in original in the following quotes]: 
'9' Khripin, Tartarchenko, 'Vozdushnaia voina', pp. 5-6. 
194 Fyodor Konstantinovich Arzhenukin graduated from flight school sometime in the 1920s. Posted to 
command the the Air Force Command and Staff Academy (Monino) 
in October 1940, by the outbreak of 
war in 1941 had risen to be one of three Air Force Chiefs of 
Staff, at which point he disappears, but may 
well have been shot in the summer of 194 1. (Shumikin, 
V. S. , 
Sovetskaia voennaia aviatsiia, pp. 126,224, 
23 1; Zolotarev, V. A., et al., Materiali soveshchaniia 23-31 dekabria 1940 g., p. 376). 
195 F. Arzhenukin, 'Deistvitel'no li burzhuaznie armii otkazivaiutsia ot tiazhelikh bombovozov', (Voina i 
revolizitsfia, No. 11-12.1934, pp. 
61-63); polemic p. 63; 'fantasy' p. 62. 
196 V. Khripin, '0 kharaktere boevikh deistvii aviatsii', (Voina i revoliutsii No. 1,1935, pp. 63-73), p. 73. 
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... independent operations of the airforce are now primary and 
decisive, 
requiring the greatest attention in the study of newforms of the combat 
employment of the airforce. 197 
Ionov called on the Air Force to work out the tactics of deep independent 
operations, and Algazin complained that Ionov had not gone far enough because lonov 
had not undertaken a detailed study of the problem. Given Algazin's contention that 
* .. the 
fundamental nature of aviation - its ability to penetrate deep into 
the enemy disposition -for landing blows on the population centres of the enemy 
country.... ' 98 
Algazin argued that lonov therefore 
should have made a more concise and sharp conclusion - not that 
independent operations are possible, but that theyform the main and decisive link 
in the combat em loyment of airforces, especially in the initial period of war, that 
air forces are now numerically and qualitatively sufficient and will in the next few 
years be fully capable of such actions (which all the same will in no way make it 
the sole means of warfare), that strikes should be directed on political centres or 
economic objects in dependence on the concrete situation, that the choice of target 
of these strikes will be the most important and iveak links in the system of the 
enemy country, that the stronger the enemy is in political, economic, and military 
terms, the wider should be the extent of these actions, and finally that independent 
operations only bring results when they are conducted on a massive scale - by 
powerful aerial armies - to which, as it happens, the capitalist governments are 
moving, first and foremost Germany. 199 
Algazin also argued the need to accept the concept of mastery of the air. While 
lonov thought mastery of the air was probably impossible to gain, Algazin argued that it 
was not only both desirable and possible, but that its scale must be defined on an area 
much wider than that of the ground operation lonov mentioned, instead defining it by the 
abilities of the opposing air forces. By dividing mastery into tactical, operational, and 
strategic levels, lonov drew Algazin's comment that 'only through gaining strategic 
197 A. Algazin, 'Review: P. Ionov, Obshchaia taktika voennikh vozdushnikh sil', Voenigiz, 1934', (Vestnik 
vozdushnogoflota, No. 8,1935, pp. 49-55), p. 49, emphasis in original. 
198 Algazin, 'Review: P. lonov, Obshchaia taktika', p 50, emphasis in original. 
199 Algazin, 'Review: P. lonov, Obshchaia taktika', p. 5 1, emphasis in original. 
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mastery can operational mastery be gained' and Algazin went on to speculate about the 
'fortress aerodromes' which we have discussed earlier. 
200 
The theorist who came in for the most knocks after Algazin's review was 
Lapchinskii, though Algazin's criticism of Lapchinskii was relatively gentle. Algazin 
treated Lapchinskii's Vozdushnie sili v boiu i operatsii as representative of older views, 
201 but Algazin also claimed that Lapchinskii had changed his mind . Perhaps Algazin's 
criticism was muted because they were friends, hinted at in Algazin's thanks to 
Lapchinskii for assistance in preparing a second edition of his book Aviatsiia v 
sovremennoi voine (Aviation in Modern War) printed in 1936; certainly they were 
colleagues at the Zhukovskii Air Force Academy, and had worked together on the 
editorial board of Vestnik vozdushnogoflota. In any event, Arzhenukin's criticism of 
Lapchinskii in the 1934 article noted above was much harsher; and in July of 1935, a trio 
of authors lead by lonov wrote a scathing review of Lapchinskii's 1934 book, Vozdushnii 
boi, railing against Lapchinskii's arguments that single-seat fighters were still a threat to 
bombers and concluding that it had been a grave mistake to print the book without 
editorial comment indicating that parts of the book that were doubtful, arguable, or 
'contradictory to the actual state of the Air Force'. 202 However, the tendency towards 
personal attacks did not continue, and Lapchinskii continued both to publish and to 
disagree with much of what other theorists were writing. 
Algazin's conversion to Douhet marked the start of the time of strength for the 
advocates of heavy bombers in the USSR, a high point lasting though 1936 and into early 
1937. Tukhachevskii, in 1934, had claimed that '... any country, possessing strong 
200 Algazin, 'Review: P. Ionov, Obshchaia taktika', pp. 52-53, quote p. 53, emphasis in original. 
20 ' Algazin, 'Review: P. Ionov, Obshchaia taktika, pp. 49,5 1. Lapchinskii's Taktika aviatsii also comes 
in for criticism (p. 49). 
202 Ionov, Shcherbakov, Chaikin, 'Review: A. Lapchinskii, Vozdushnii boi, Gos. Voen. Izdat, 1934', 
(Vestnik vozdushnogoflota, No. 7,1935, pp. 46-53), quote on p. 53. 
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aviation, can break the strategic concentration of the enemy', 203 and the first of three 
Special Purpose Air Armies (AON, Aviatsionnaia armiia osobogo naznacheniie) was 
formed in 1936, directly subordinate to the High Command and commanded by Khripin. 
Over the next two years, another two of these formations were created, each comprising 
150-170 heavy bombers, 50 light bombers, and 50 fighters, intended to provide a strike 
force for separate operations. 204 PU-36 specified that aviation was to conduct both 
ground support and separate operations, and the Tem orary Instructions on the Separate p 
Actions of the RKKA Air Force instructed that both Front and High Command aircraft 
were to be used in separate strikes. 205 The 1936 manoeuvres, in which over 700 aircraft 
from the Special Purpose Air Army and several military districts took part, demonstrated 
that the struggle in the air would require that several Fronts work together, with overall 
direction and reinforcement from the High Command. Therefore, the AON were to be 
used to reinforce Fronts on the main axis. 206 The AON were thus the first Soviet Air 
Force operational formations, providing the Soviets with the ability to shift their forces 
across the entire front to create points of maximum effort, a concept Novikov would 
revive in 1942. On a practical level the activity of these formations remained connected 
to the Army, but on the theoretical level, some in the Air Force moved farther afield. 
Part of the process was a renewed official interest in Douhet, evidenced by the 
1935 publication of a volume of his work under the title Mastery of the Air (Gospodstvo v 
vozdukhe). Khripin, then the Air Force Chief of Staff, praised Douhet for writing works 
of great practical and theoretical interest, both edited the Soviet edition and wrote its 
introduction. Reviewing this conlPilation, Algazin began by asserting that, 'We must 
203 Migulin, Teoriia ipraktika, p. 29, quoting from M. N. Tukhachevskii, IOiarakterpogranichnikh 
operatsii, (TsGASA, fond' 37977, opis' 3, delo 604, list 332). 204 MigUlin, Teoriia ipraktika, p. 25. Vasil'ev, Long-Ranged, Missile Equipped, p. 20, claims Khripin is 
the first commander. 
205 Migulin, Teoriia ipraktika, pp. 35 (Temporary Regs) and 38 (PU-36). 
206 1. V. Timokhovich, Operativnoe iskusstvo Sovetskikh VVS v Velikoi Otechestvennoi voine, (Moscow: 
Voenizdat, 1976), pp. 15,242-243. Timokhovich cites the multi-front conclusion from: Arkhiv MO SSSR, 
fond 3 5, opis' 293 72, delo 16, list I 10. 
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study and know Douhet. ' Algazin declared Douhet's work fundamentally correct, albeit 
needing interpretation to avoid 'vulgar' understanding, and in spite of flaws in Douhet's 
poor appreciation of practical problems, his tendency to 'overpolemicise', and his 
overoptimism regarding the possibility of winning the war in a single blow. 207 
The growing faith in the effectiveness of bombers folded into the ongoing debate 
on how to gain air superiority. The preferred method was strikes on enemy airbases, and 
studies began to appear with specific recommendations on how these strikes might be 
conducted. Most expected a massive operation, involving fighters, bombers, and 
sometimes, close attack aircraft. Some, such as Arzhenukin and lonov, saw the problem 
largely in terms of bombers and tended to assume that detection of enemy airfields would 
be relatively simple. They also assumed, like Algazin, that bombers were accurate and 
that the results of strikes would be difficult to repair. They therefore suggested that one 
key method of defence would be continual shifting of aircraft to different airbases, so that 
the enemy could not manage to target the relevant airbases in a timely manner. 208 Others 
worried more about the problem of reconnaissance, noting that manoeuvres both in the 
Soviet Union and abroad had demonstrated that camouflaged airbases were difficult to 
find, but still tended to assume that once discovered, the bases could easily be effectively 
engaged from the air. 209 All, however, tended to agree that fighters were not the primary 
means of gaining air superiority, though some did argue in favour of the ability of massed 
207 A. Algazin, 'Dzhulio Due, 'Gospodstvo v vozdukhe", (Vestnik va: dushnogoflota, No. 6,1936, pp. 14- 
24), pp. 14-24; quotes from pp. 14,19, and 24 respectively. 
208 F. Arzhenukin, 'Aerodromnii manevr', (Vestnik vozdushnogoflota, No. 4,1936, pp. 23-27); F. 
Arzhenukin, 'Deistviia tiazheloi bombardirovochnoi aviatsii po aviabazam protivnika', (Vestnik 
va: dushnogoflota, No. 9,1936, pp. 5-7); P. Ionov, 'Gospodstvo v vozdukhe', 
(Voina i revolizasiia. No. 5-6, 
1936, pp. 74-87). 
209 Pestriakov, '0 bor'be za prevoskhodstvo v vozdukhe', (Vestnik vozdushnogoflota, No. 4,1935, pp. 6-7); 
Zhigarev, 'Bombardirovochnie deistviia po aerodromarn protivnika', (Vestnik vozdushnogoflota, No. 7, 
1936, pp. 9-12). 
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fighters to ward off attacks. 210 In early 1937, V. Kuznetsov argued that the generally 
accepted primary role of the Air Force was: 
The main area of combat activity of modern aviation is the independent 
aerial operation, directed to the attainment of mastery of the air and to the 
breaking of the resistance of the enemy nation by means of destroying population 
centres, the disruption ofsystems of military supply of land, naval, and airforces, 
and the destruction of troops andfleetsfarftom the battleftont. The 
accomplishment of these missions is laid on the aerial army [vozdushnaia armiia], 
subordinated to the high command, the main strength of which is heavy bombers 
and cruiser aviation. 211 
Kuznetsov's assertion that this was generally accepted is debatable; but on the 
whole there was increasing agreement that the Air Force was to make a concentrated 
blow, on the outbreak of war, against the enemy's air force, attempting to bomb the 
enemy air force at its bases, thereby damaging it sufficiently to gain air superiority. 
Views diverged on how this blow was to be mounted, how much force would be required 
to make it work, and what should be done with the subsequent superiority. As we have 
seen above, some supported the notion of bombing enemy factories and cities. Others 
seem to have largely avoided the issue, sticking close to the formulations of various field 
regulations, which called for separate actions in support of ground operations. 
Nonetheless, the Soviets were moving towards a modem understanding of offensive 
counter-air operations. As will be discussed in the next chapter, poor results from 
offensive counter-air in Spain caused the Soviets signifcant doubts about the validity of 
this approach, and their debate on the topic continued until the Germans provided a direct 
practical demonstration in 1941. 
The main voice against bombing cities and factories was Lapchinskii, whose 
continued and dogged pursuit of his own point of view, fairly self-consistent over the 
years, indicates either considerable personal courage or faith in a patron, given the 
2 '0 Nikitin Sokolov, 'Otrazhenie naleta VS protivnika na nashu territoriu v nachale voini', (Vestnik 
vozdushnogoflota, No. 4,1936, pp. 27-28). 
211 V. Kuznetsov, 'Sovremennie vozdushnie vonizheniia', (Voina i revoliutsiia, No. 2,1937, pp. 60-74), p. 
63. Emphasis in original. 
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fortunes of the Soviet military in the 1930s: a small purge in 1930, the party chistka in 
1932, and the purge of 1937, each of which produced a distinct temporary reduction in 
212 the number of articles that were in any way controversial . Regardless of the cause, 
Lapchinskii was a lone voice in continuing to suggest that bombers were not especially 
accurate, particularly from high altitudes: 'From the stratosphere, it is doubtless possible 
to hit the ground. ')213 He also suggested that 
... attacks on objects in the state rear will cause the enemy certain losses, but in such situations it is possible to find targets whose destruction will produce 
more meaningful results. 214 
He asked specifically in this regard about a reprise of 1914: with the Germans 
advancing on Paris, was it better for the French Air Force to bomb German factories, or to 
provide the French Army with direct support? -a question perhaps prescient, in view of 
the doctrinaire refusal of the RAF, in May 1940, to divert Bomber Command away from 
a planned campaign against the Ruhr to attack the German crossing at Sedan. 215 
Lapchinskii argued that the fundamental principle of Air Force activity was, 'Ground 
forces must not be deserted by aviation in their day of need'. 216 Given this, and the 
impossibility of bombing everything, he argued that bomber aviation should concentrate 
on enemy logistics, command, and mobility, and Lapchinskii devoted a large part of 
Bombardirovochnaia aviatsiia (Bomber Aviation) to an analysis of an aerial operation 
212 Regarding the purge in 1930, see: B. V. Sokolov, Krasnaia anniia v mezhvoennii period (1921 - 1941 
gg. ), (Moscow: Znanie, 1990; the 7/1990 issue of Zashchita otechestva); -5,000 officers were arrested, and 
most later released. 
213 A. Lapchinskii, , Osnovnie voprosi sovremennoi aviatsii', (Voina i revoliutsiia, No. 3-4,1937, pp. 85- 
95), pp. 90-9 1; A. Lapchinskii, Bombardirovochnaia aviatsiia, (Moscow: Voenizdat, 193 7), pp. 54-99,23 1, 
430-43 1; quote p. 430. 
214 Lapchinskii, Bombardirovochnaia aviatsiia, p. 45. 
215 Lapchinskii, Bombardirovochnaia aviatsiia, p. 45; Roderick MacLeod & Denis Kelley, eds., The 
Ironside Diaries, (London: Constable, 1962), p. 304, Terraine, Right of the Line, pp. 13 7-14 1. My thanks to 
Bill Buckingham for information on the May 1940 decision. 
216 Lapchinskii, Bombardirovochnaia aviatsiia, p. 47. Emphasis in original. 
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designed to prevent railroad traffic over 700km of track in an area 120km wide and up to 
400km deep as the best means of fulfilling the basic mission of bomber aviation. 217 
Attitudes towards heavy aviation, fighters, and strikes on enemy airbases 
underwent significant changes at the start of the Spanish Civil War, then just beginning. 
Attitudes towards ground support, and its necessity, did not. Everyone agreed on the 
necessity of supporting the ground war in some manner, from Lapchinskii, quoted above, 
to Algazin, who, even in his polemics in favour of bombing the deep rear, agreed that the 
Air Force's movement towards independent operations 'cannot in any way call for the 
slightest reduction in the numbers of combat aviation in armies and corps. 218 However, 
there was not a unity of views on the methods of supporting ground forces. The debates 
concerning the use of aircraft in support of ground operations fall into two categories: the 
tactical and the operational. While the tactical debates will largely be ignored below, one 
aspect of them is important enough to warrant a look. The operational level was less 
discussed, but involved some key concepts. 
The tactical argument of note concerned the means of controlling air support, as 
exemplified by the issue of radios. The debate on radios was in many respects simple. 
Radios were expensive to produce, and relatively heavy. Did they produce a tactical 
effect commensurate with the costs in money and aircraft performance? 
This appeared most often in discussion of the actions of close attack aircraft 
(shturmoviki). It was generally accepted that these would attack en masse, at low level. 
How, then. ) were they to 
find their targets? P. Zhigarev expressed a common opinion in 
1932: a reconnaissance aircraft would fly out, detect an approaching column of enemy 
troops, and note its rate and direction of march. Then the aircraft would fly back to its 
base, present a report., and the shtunnoviki would fly out, go to the projected location, and 
217 Lapchinskii, Bombardirovochnaia aviatsfia, pp. 42-53,426-437. 
218 Algazin, 'Review: P. Ionov, Obshchaia taktika', p. 5 1. Emphasis in original. 
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bomb the target, two hours after its initial detection. 219 This method presented some 
obvious problems. If the enemy did not follow the projected path, the aircraft would have 
to re-conduct the reconnaissance in order to find the target, and the faster the target could 
move, the worse the problem of detection would be. Additionally, the strike might 
overfly the target while searching, thereby giving the target warning of the incoming 
attack and negating the surprise which (along with accuracy) was seen as one of the 
cardinal advantages of low-level attack. 
To the modem eye, radio provides the obvious solution to this problem. While 
proposed, radio did not gain universal acceptance, and the methods suggested for its 
employed varied. Some simply stated radio was a solution: an accurate but unhelpful 
observation. Others presumed that radio would be used so that ground forces could 
communicate with their headquarters, where an air force representative would be 
stationed, who could in turn communicate with the aircraft via radio . 
220 Others presumed 
that aviation would be acting deep enough to be outside the observation of ground forces, 
and proposed that the reconnaissance aircraft guide in the strike via radio, but this notion 
was rare. 221 Even more rare were suggestions for direct coordination by radio between 
ground and air; Kukhsha is unique in having suggested this in a detailed article outlining 
methods for cooperation between tanks and aircraft, utilizing the aircraft to suppress or 
destroy anti-tank batteries designated by the tanks, with two-way communication by radio 
222 223 
and use of signal flares and smoke by the tanks. While Lapchinskii agreed, the 1935 
219 p. Zhigarev, 'Ataka shtunnovikami motomekhanizirovannoi kolonni', (Vestnik vozdushnogoflota, No. 
5,1932, pp. 8-14. ) 
220 A. K. Mednis, Taktika shturmovoi aviatsii: Uchebnik dlia letnikh shkol i stroevikh chastei VS RKKA, 
(Moscow: Voenizdat, 193 5), pp. 64-66; Algazin, 'Aviatsiia v reide MMS', pp. 22,27; Algazin, A viatsiia v 
reide MMS, p. 90, V. KhriPin, 'lz opyta Bobruiskikh manevrov', (Vestnik vozdushnogoflota, No. 10- 11, 
1929, pp. 4-8), p. 6. 
221 M. Smimov, 'Vzaimodeistvie shtunnovogo soedineniia s razvedivatel'noi aviatsii', (Vestnik 
vozdushnogo flota, No. 6,193 3, pp. 10- 11), p. 11. 
222 Kukhsha, 'Vzaimodeistvie tank-ov DPP i DD s aviatsiei i artileriei pri prorive oboronitel'noi polosi 
protivnika v manvrennoi voine', (Voina i revoliutsiia, No. 1,1932, pp. 1-12), pp. 7-8. 
101 
textbook on close attack aviation ignored radio. 224 In addition, several calls for two-way 
radios in aircraft, which laid out the significant tactical advantages in aerial combat, were 
225 largely ignored and on some occasions disputed . Regardless, radios continued to be 
uncommon in Soviet aircraft, forcing continued reliance on flags and hand signals for 
communications with both other aircraft and ground units. 
The above discussion also covers much of what was written regarding the 
provision of direct battlefield support. Soviet theorists recognized close air support was 
possible, and possibly even desirable, as in the case of the postulated anti-tank gun 
suppression above. However, they seem to have concentrated on assistance further from 
the battlefield for two reasons. One, less certain, is simply that battlefield coordination 
was difficult; reports on manoeuvres usually noted tactical coordination as an area 
needing work. More to the point, they were of the opinion that aircraft had better things 
to do. 
We emphasize the notion that aviation, as a rule, extends artilleryfires' 
depth [of the enemy's positions - JS], but does not replace them.... 226 
In western parlance, the term 'flying artillery' is usually derisive. The Soviets felt 
that 'flying artillery' was a fine description of air support: a means of delivering fire to 
greater depth, and potentially with greater accuracy, than was possible with artillery. 
Thus a 1930 article called for long-range artillery to fire out to 7.5 km from the front line, 
223 A. Lapchinskii, 'AG v nastupatel'nom boiu korpusa', (Voina i revoliutsiia, No. 3,1932, pp. 43-66), pp. 
63-64. 
224 Mednis, Taktika shturmovoi aviatsh. 
225 A. Korotkov, 'Radio - istrebiteliu', (Vestnik vozdushnqgoflota, No. 2,1933, p. 46), p. 46, is an 
impassioned plea for radios in fighters; it was ignored. V. Soldatov, 'Vozdushnii boi shturmovikov v 
veroiatnikh polozheniiakh', (Vestnik vozdushnogoflota, No. 6,1936, pp. 13-14), made the case for radios in 
aerial combat. A rebuttal, E. Kharitskii, 'Tochka zreniia na stat'iu t. Soldatov 'Vozdushnii boi 
shturmovikov v veroiatnikh polozheniiakh' (VVF No. 6,1936)', (Vestnik vozdushnqgoflota, No. 9,1936, 
pp. 7-8), denied that radios were any use at all in aerial combat due to their weight and their difficulty of 
use, eliciting a defense of radio in Riabtsev, 'Na st. t. Soldatova 'Vozdushnii boi shturmovikov v 
veroiatnikh polozheniiakh' (VVF No. 6i9 za 1936 g. )', (Vestnik vozdushnogoflota, No. 2,1937, pp. I I- 
13). 
226 Khripin, Jz opyta Bobruiskikh manevrov', p. 7. Emphasis in original. 
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while close attack aircraft struck targets deeper in the enemy deployment. 227 However, 
many writers were not very specific about the targets that actually ought to be struck, 
content to present a laundry list of conceivable targets. Specific proposals tended to fall 
into three categories: troop columns, railroads, and direct support of major mechanized 
breakthroughs. Interestingly, however, Soviet interest in direct battlefield support rose 
steadily as they gained combat experience. 
The 1929 Field Regulations were remarkably vague regarding the doctrinal use of 
aviation, except in pursuit, where it noted that close attack aircraft and light bombers 
would attack retreating enemy columns, either covered from aviation by the fighters, or 
with the fighters assisting by strafing. 228 The 1936 Field Regulations went to the other 
extreme, presenting a fairly wide-ranging laundry list of targets ranging from battlefield 
support to interdiction strikes and attacks on enemy command systems for close attack 
aircraft, and all of the above save battlefield support for light bombers. 229 The 1937 
textbook Taktika shturmovoi aviatsii (Close Attack Aviation Tactics) presented a similar 
IiSt. 230 However,, in all of these doctrinal publications, the least common use was direct 
close air support. Doctrine largely directed aviation to conduct air interdiction, barraging 
targets in the enemy's tactical rear or deeper: artillery positions, command and control, 
reserves (either concentrated or in motion), airbases, railways, and supply dumps. 
Modem air theory also emphasizes interdiction over close air support; though the Soviets 
would reverse the weighting in the Second World War. 231 
The question of bombing troops in motion was inextricably bound up with the 
problem of reconnaissance and reporting the data thus gained in a timely manner. As 
227 A. Tsiemgal, 'Boevaia rabota shturmovikov s diviziei', (Vestnik vozdushnogoflota, No. 2,1930, pp. 9- 
14), p. 13. 228 Polevoi ustav RKKA 1929, p. 153. 
229 'Principles of Command and Control (PU-36, ch. 5)', chapter 14 of. Simpkin, Deep Battle, p. 200-201. 
230 Mednis, Taktika shturmovoi aviatsii, pp. 61,72-74. 
231 See, for example, Warden, The Air Campaign, chapters 6&7, summarized as "The weight of 
history, as well as logic, falls on the interdiction side. " (p. 134). 
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noted above, the Soviet solution tended to revolve either around accepting a relatively 
long lag time or around moderately controversial proposals for using radio to guide in the 
strike aircraft. No resolution of this question had occurred by the time aircraft were sent 
to Spain. 
Operational railroad interdiction was widely suggested, and two leading theorists 
suggested it as the main task of the air force in supporting the ground forces. In 1930, 
Aleksandr Svechin suggested strikes on enemy railroads (and possibly trucking) as the 
answer to the problems of preventing the 'artillery ram' under which it was expected 
armies would advance. He expected that a force of 500 light and heavy bombers could 
shut down the railroads on a given axis by destroying the stations and their associated 
unloading facilities. 232 Lapchinskii argued strongly in favour of bombing railroads a few 
years later, approaching the question from a slightly different angle. Beginning with the 
twin assertions that only ground forces can occupy territory and that the air force exists as 
a means of dropping bombs, he argued against close support because artillery could do 
the job better, and against strategic bombing because the results would not be 
commensurate with the effort. Thus the proper role of the air force lay in separate 
operations - operations that, while not in direct tactical support, took place in the tactical 
and operational context of supporting major ground operations. 233 
Because ground combat activity required movement, supply, and command, and 
because the air force would never be powerful enough to bomb everything, Lapchinskii 
argued that it was necessary to find a carefully selected set of targets in one of those three 
systems which would produce the most effect: 
234 
The mission of bomber aviation, in the final analysis, is to hinder the 
development of the ground and air actions of the enemy. Aviation conducts this 
232 A. Svechin, 'Aviatsiia i massi', (Vestnik va: dushnogoflota, No. 2,1930, pp. 3-7), pp. 3-6. 
233 Lapchinskii, Bombardirovochnaia aviatsiia, (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1937), pp. 7-8,42-47. 
234 Lapchinskii, Bombardirovochnaia aviatsiia, pp. 47-53. 
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basic mission through the destruction in separate missions of enemy movement, 235 supply, and command, and air forces to the greatest possible depth. 
Because troop columns would be difficult to catch, and command assets difficult 
to spot, Lapchinskii was convinced that the best target was railroads, whose destruction 
and the consequent lack of supplies would lead to grave problems for the enemY in the 
operationa sector. 236 Lapchinskii's suggestion lined up with the doctrinal emphasis on 
air interdiction shown above; but neither he, nor the various manuals and textbooks, 
argued for railroad interdiciton exclusively or dicussed it in detail with any frequency. 
Equally often alluded to, and equally infrequently discussed in any detail, was the 
business of supporting a major mechanized formation during a breakthrough. 
Algazin wrote two works on this topic, an article he expanded into book with little 
in the way of new opinions. These covered the actions of aviation in support of a 'raid' - 
a strike against some (unspecified) target 100- 15 Okm deep in the enemy rear by a major 
motor-mechanized formation and lasting 3-5 days. 'Raid' may not be the best term, since 
it is unclear in Algazin's writing if this was truly a force that would go out and back or a 
force acting as the spearhead of an operational offensive. Algazin's most controversial - 
and utterly ignored - suggestion was that the aviation commander ought to command the 
raid. Most of his recommendations were rather more conventional. A group of 400 or 
more aircraft was to be assembled to support the raid, with at least 50 service aircraft, 80 
fighters, 125 strike aircraft (a few heavy bombers and a lot of close attack aviation), and 
15 transport aircraft acting to support the raid directly, while an additional mixed group of 
135 fighters and bombers attacked enemy aviation. The mechanized formation would 
break through the front lines with the assistance of yet other aviation elements and heavy 
artillery support. The elements of the aviation group directed against enemy aviation 
would work to gain air superiority throughout the operation. As the mechanized 
235 Lapchinskii, Bombardirovochnaia aviatsiia, p. 53. 
236 Lapchinskii, Bombardirovochnaia aviatsiia, pp. 426-436. 
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exploitation began, long-range tanks and aviation would move to neutralize the enemy in 
front of the mechanized formation's main columns, and aviation would also attempt to 
isolate the area of the breakout from enemy reserves, possibly with assistance from 
parachute assaults. 
237 
Along the way to the objective, the ground force would seize several small to 
moderate-sized airfields, and leave detachments to guard them. These would be used 
both for resupply of the mechanized formation from the transport aircraft and as forward 
bases for the main aviation support group. This, in turn, would ensure air support was 
close enough to the deep objective to provide massed fire support when the ground force 
attacked the objective. The aircraft would then stage back out of these airfields as the 
ground force returned from its objective if such a return were part of the intended 
operation. 
238 
What is remarkable about Algazin's examination of the problem is not all of its 
specifics, but the manner in which it combines many of the threads of Soviet thought 
about air power in the era into an implied system. In his vignette, air superiority is 
certainly necessary, and a very important aspect of air force activity, but it is a means to 
an end. Heavy bombers are useful machines, but their key characteristics are their heavy 
bombloads, and their ability to be based far from the area of the operation, easing local 
basing problems. Aircraft exist to support the ground forces in a broad sense, but do so in 
their own special way, carrying their bombloads to targets that other arms cannot reach; 
thus they are a separate arm of the military, with their own organizational and command 
concerns. While these concepts underlie Algazin's writing, he did not state them as 
explicitly as they are here, and indeed a few years after 1933 (when the book version of 
the above thoughts on raids was published), probably would not have agreed with some 
237 Algazin, 'Aviatsiia v reide MMS', pp. 14-27; Algazin, Aviatsiia v reide MMS. 
238 Algazin, 'Aviatsiia v reide MMS', pp. 27-34. 
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of the cardinal points due to his sudden conversion to Douhet. Before 1935, however, his 
underlying assumptions would not have been very controversial amongst Soviet air 
officers; even though there was not a complete consensus amongst Soviet theorists on 
airpower. 
In 1935, this began to change. As signalled by Algazin's conversion, heavy 
bombers and independent operations suddenly became the rage amongst theorists, at least 
those whose work was published. Significantly, however, while the potential of heavy 
bombers was much ballyhooed in journal articles, the field manuals and textbooks did not 
follow suit. Why the surge in enthusiasm for heavy bombers occurred is not clear, but 
there are several probable factors. Bomber's range, speed, and payloads were increasing 
rapidly. In addition, a growing number of theorists, not just in the Soviet Union, were 
convinced that heavy aircraft, using large-calibre, fast-firing, turret-mounted weapons, 
had the upper hand in aerial combat, and therefore heavy bombers could get through to 
targets despite opposition from single-seat fighters. Air Force Chief of Staff Khripin's 
enthusiasm for heavy bombers helped ensure the growing numbers of heavy bombers in 
the Soviet inventory (though fighters were hardly being neglected). Overestimating the 
accuracy of high-altitude level bombing and the destructive power of bombs, a vocal 
group advocated that heavy bombers were the main striking power of the air force. 
Because they expected airbases to be easy to find, and they were convinced of the need 
for air superiority, it necessarily followed that the primary activity of the air force on the 
outbreak of war must be major strikes against enemy airfields. This enthusiasm for heavy 
bombers and offensive counter-air found reflection in doctrine. 
In 1932, the Red Army's Chief of Staff, A. 1. Yegorov, 239 wrote a study entitled 
"Taktika i operatsiia Raboche-Krestianskaia Krasnaia Armiia na novom etape- ("Tactics 
239 Aleksandr lliich Yegorov rose to regimental command during World War 1, was arrested in 1917 for 
criticising the Provisional Government, joined the Soviets in 1918, and served with Stalin and Voroshilov 
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and Operational Art of the Worker's and Peasant's Red Army at a New Stage"), which 
formed the core of the 193 3 manual Vremennie ukazaniia po organizatsii glubokogo boia 
(Temporary Instructionsfor Organising Deep Battle). Tactically, Yegorov laid out the 
concept of deep battle concisely, directing that new, powerful aviation, armor, and 
artillery should!, 
240 
... paralyze the fire of all defensive means, independent of their depth of deployment, isolate one part of the enemy from the other, disrupt communication 241 between them, and destroy them piecemeal . 
Yegorov understood the need for robust signals to coordinate efforts and effects in 
the kind of rapidly moving battles he foresaw, and expected communications problems to 
be "formidable". However, Yegorov also saw the solution: "Reliable communications 
are required between ground and air forces, between commands on the ground and 
airborne aviation; obviously, here only radio can provide control. " Yegorov's 
endorsement of radio is interesting both in light of the ongoing debate inside the Soviet 
Air Force about the utility of radio, and also in light of the Soviets' failure to follow 
through on this concept by producing the necessary radios. 242 
Operationally, Yegorov tasked the Air Force's longer-ranged units with 
interdiction of railroads to a depth of 400-600 kilometers, attacking enemy air and naval 
forces, destroying logistics bases, and providing direct support to key ground forces. As 
the war developed, "heavy combat aviation" such as Khripin championed, concentrated at 
the High Command level, would take on the deep missions including operations against 
enemy political and economic targets, while "light combat aviation" would be 
during the Russian Civil War. He rose to be Chief of Staff the Red Army in 193 1, but his association with 
Stalin during the Civil War (including being with the V Cavalry Army, and thus being on Stalin's side of 
the dispute with Tukhachevskii over the failure of the 1920 invasion of Poland) was insufficient to save 
Yegorov in the purges. Demoted then arrested in 193 7, he was shot in March 194 1. (Erickson, Soviet High 
Command, 72,847. ) 
240 A. 1. Yegorov, "Tactics and Operational Art of the Worker's and Peasant's Red Army at a Neu, Stage", 
(The Evolution of Soviet Gperaitonal Art Vohime 1, pp. 315-328), pp. 315-316; Erickson, Soviet High 
Command, p. 847. 
241 Yegorov, "Tactics and Operational Art", p. 318. 
242 Yegorov, "Tactics and Operational Art", p. 318-320, quote p. 320. 
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subordinated to the armies and Fronts to support the ground forces. This formulation 
describes a campaign for air and naval superiority, combined with an air interdiction 
campaign against enemy logistics and transportation, while continuing to support the 
mechanized spearheads with close air support. The Soviets were beginning to construct 
the heavy bomber aviation units, held by the High Command, and working on designs for 
dedicated close air support aircraft as well. Yegorov shared the theorist's interest in 
supporting the ground war, but took more interest than many in the opportunity to strike 
enemy strategic targets. His focus on railroad interdiction mirrors that of a number of 
theorists, including Lapchinskii. Yegorov retained the Soviet tenets that air power must 
be used in mass, on the decisive axis, and in support of the objectives of ground 
operations. 
243 
In 1936, the Soviets published PU-36 (Polevoi Ustav RKKA 1936,1936 RKKA 
Field Regulations), a new capstone manual replacing PU-29. Edited and in part directly 
by Deputy Director of Military Operations G. S. Isserson , under Tukhachevskii's direct 
supervision, PU-36 proved to be the peak of Soviet codification of theory into doctrine in 
the 1930s. While written by some of their finest minds, PU-36's status rests not on its 
perfection, but on the fact that it appeared a year before the purges swept most of those 
minds away and prevented further development. According to PU-36,244 
Air formations, as well as carrying out independent operations, act in close 
conjunction with all-arms formations at operational and tactical levels. They 
undertake missions against enemy columns, troop concentrations and support 
elements (ground-attack aircraft and light bombers); bridges (bombers); and 
enemy aircraft and airfields (fighters, ground-attack aircraft, light bombers). They 
also cover friendly forces and dispositions. 245 
Air power, PU-36 directed, should be used beyond the range of other anns, "in 
mass, concentrated in time and space, and against targets of the highest tactical 
243 Yegorov, "Tactics and Operational Art", p. 320-327. 
211 Simpkin, Deep Battle, p-44. 
245 Simpkin, Deep Battle, p. 180. 
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importance". Thus, PU-36 carried forward the Soviet tenet of massed employment on the 
decisive axis, and sought to do so through air interdiction against enemy movements and 
transportation, offensive counter-air. The word "also" implies that providing defensive 
counter-air was secondary to these other tasks. 246 
While PU-36 stressed the importance of signals to ensure coordination between 
air and ground forces, it did not stress the importance of using radio for the purpose, 
unlike the Temporary Instructionsfor Organizing Deep Battle. However, it did require 
ground force commanders to find and prepare airstrips as their forces advanced, a concept 
to which the Soviets would return in 1944 in order to ensure their rapidly advancing 
forces would not outstrip their air cover. Being focused on the ground forces, PU-36 did 
not comment on the Air Force's separate actions, though the emphasis on air interdiction 
of transportation implies that Soviet doctrine had not changed from the Temporary 
Instructionsfor Organi. 7ing Deep Battle. 247 
Perhaps the Soviets would have moved towards an air force based around heavy 
bombers in the later 1930s if their thinking had proceeded without interruption. 
However, in 1936-1937, two events occurred which put the heavy bomber movement to 
rest. First, in 1936, the Spanish Civil War broke out. Stalin sent Soviet forces, including 
significant numbers of aircraft, to assist the Republicans. Reports from the front did not 
support the heavy bomber supremacy fad. Second, in 1937, Stalin initiated the major 
purge of the military. Most of the theorists mentioned up to this point were arrested and 
shot; the major exception appears to have been Lapchinskii, who may have died a natural 
death in May 1938.248 The combination of new blood and hard evidence changed the 
path of the Soviet Air Force. 
246 Simpkin, Deep Battle, p. 199-200. 
247 Simpkin, Deep Battle, p. 199-202. 
24' Reina Pennington, 'From Chaos to the Eve of the Great Patriotic War, 1922-194 1', (Robin I-ligham, 
John Greenwood, and Von Hardesty, Russian Aviation and Air Pou, er in the Tit, entieth Century, 
(London: 
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Frank Cass, 1998), pp. 37-6 1), pp. 46-47,50-5 1, suggests Lapchinskii died a natural death in 1938. M. 
Irtiuga, 'Kombrig A. N. Lapchinskii', (Voenno-Istoricheskii Zhurnal, No. 7,1972, pp. 122-125), states (p. 
125) Lapchinskii died on May 2,1938, without suggesting in any way that he was arrested. Lapchinskii's 
final book, Vozdushnaia armfia, was published posthumously in 1939 and signed for printing after his 
death. On the other hand, Vestnik vozdushnogoflota failed to run an obituary for him, as might be expected 
for a major, undisgraced, figure. 
III 
Chapter 3 
Small Wars, 1936-1940 
In the years 1936 through 1940, the Soviets involved themselves in a succession 
of small wars in Spain, Mongolia, China, and Finland. These small wars provided both a 
laboratory, in which the Soviets could look for validation of their theories, and a testing- 
ground in which the ability of the VVS to put these theories into practice was tested. 
Some theories quickly fell by the wayside, such as the fantasies concerning a bomber's 
ability to ward off fighter attacks with ease. Other theories continued to be hotly debated, 
such as the effectiveness of airbase strikes, even after the Luftwaffe's firepower 
demonstrations in Poland (193 9) and France (1940). 
These wars demonstrated increasingly glaring weaknesses in the Soviet Air 
Force's ability to convert theory and lessons learned into practice. While it put in a good 
showing over Spain, using carefully picked pilots, and did reasonably well in China, 
initial combats in Mongolia showed poor results only rectified by a crash program in 
which veterans from other wars were brought in. Finland, the largest of these wars, was 
also the worst showing for the Air Force. Committed in numbers that prevented it from 
calling in other units to cover for deficiencies, initial problems were crippling, and only 
partially solved by the end of the war. 
The poor showing in Finland reflected a doctrinal problem in the Air Force. 
While there was a broad consensus that the overarching mission of the Air Force was to 
support the ground forces, there was far less agreement on what missions this translated 
into, and what the priorities between these missions might be. Furthermore, the Air Force 
had grave difficulty training new officers for a variety of reasons, one of which being the 
lack of consensus on methods. 
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Spain 
On 18 July 1936, elements of the Spanish armed forces began what they hoped 
would be a rapid coup d'etat against the Spanish government. They failed to achieve 
complete success, thus plunging the country into nearly three years of war. While the 
politics preceding and during the war are quite complex and beyond the scope of this 
work, the insurgents, generally backed by conservatives and the Spanish Phalange, are 
generally known as the 'Nationalists', while the Spanish Government, largely backed by 
left-wing and centrist groups, is usually labelled the 'Republicans'. 
One of the keys to victory in the war turned out to be foreign aid: in general, the 
Nationalists were free to trade and procure arms while the Republic was not. Before 
beginning their coup, the Nationalists had lined up support from Italy and also expected 
support from Germany. This assistance soon proved of great importance. The coup left 
the most battleworthy formation of the SPanish Army - the Army of Africa, commanded 
by General Francisco Franco - in Morocco. The insurgents needed it for operations in 
Spain, but the Republican Navy controlled the Straits of Gibraltar. Aircraft provided by 
Italy and Germany were instrumental in speeding up the transport of the Army of Africa 
to Spain, both through the first large-scale airlift in history and by bombing the 
Republican Navy. The latter effort, plus the arrival of two German warships, permitted 
the escort of the remainder of the Army of Aftica on surface transports. Italian and 
German support to the Nationalists remained significant and unimpeded throughout the 
war. 
The Republic swiftly turned to France for assistance. The French government was 
favourable, but needed to keep in the good graces of Britain, which was deeply divided 
over the Spanish conflict. The resultant political manoeuvring between France, Britain, 
113 
Germany, and Italy resulted in the checkmate of any Spanish Republican hopes for 
Western assistance while leaving the Gennans and Italians free to assist the Nationalists 
as they desired. 
This presented Stalin with a dilemma. The Spanish Republic had a Popular Front 
government, friendly to the Soviets, and he did not wish to leave it in the lurch. On the 
other hand, the Soviets were worried by resurgent militarism in Germany, and to 
counterbalance Germany, Stalin wished to remain on good terms with France and Britain. 
As a result, the Soviets went along with the various diplomatic 'Non-Intervention' 
measures taken in the first few months of the war. As it became obvious that these were a 
sham, the Soviets began to sell large amounts of military equipment to the Republic, 
including their latest tanks and aircraft, and shipped them there along with numerous 
military advisors and crews. This supply of anns and advisors slumped in 1937 as the 
blockade of Republican ports by the Nationalist and Italian Navies made it increasingly 
impractical to continue. By October 1938, the Soviet advisors had departed and the 
Spanish Republic was on its own. 
249 
The Spanish Civil War is often treated as a dress rehearsal for World War 11, and 
in some respects this is true. It did involve clashes of tanks and aircraft, and the 
ideological battle-lines were similar. However, as suggested by James Corum, it is better 
viewed as the first major modem limited war. However total a war it was for the 
Spaniards, the outcome was determined by the levels of foreign assistance provided, and 
that assistance was never provided free of charge, without restrictions or strings. All of 
the ma . or intervening powers had interests outside of Spain, which helped to dictate their j 
249 The discussion of the politics of the Spanish Civil War is based on: Jackson, Gabriel, The Spanish 
Republic and the Civil War, 1931-1939, (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1972), 'Momas, Hugh, The 
Spanish Civil War, (London: Penguin, 1986), Preston, Paul, A Concise Histotý, of the Spanish Civil War. 
(London: Fontana Press, 1996). 
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policy towards, and inside of, Spain . 
250 Thus the Gennans held the Condor Legion to 100 
aircraft, the Italians persistently tried to take the glory for various conquests, and the 
Soviets tried to drive the Republic into becoming a Soviet satellite - the latter two policies 
leading not only to friction amongst the respective allies, but also to disaster for the 
reputation of Italian arms, and the disintegration of Republican internal stability which 
hastened its demise. 
Turning more specifically to the air war, a few brief aircraft introductions are in 
order. While both sides used a mix of aircraft, several are of import to this study. 
Unsurprisingly, the Italians, Germans, and Soviets provided these aircraft. The Italian 
Fiat 51 C. R. 32 and the German Heinkel 51 were reasonably good fighters in the early 
stages of the war but were outclassed by the Soviet 1- 15 and 1- 16 fighters which began to 
arrive in October 193 6. The 1- 16 was in turn outclassed by the Me- 109, which began to 
arrive in July 1937 to restore the honour of the Condor Legion. The Soviets also 
provided the SB-2 medium bomber, faster than most fighters of the day (the Me- 109 
being the important exception), while the Gennan Ju-52 was extensively used as both a 
transport and a bomber. In addition, the Condor Legion tested the Ju-87 Stuka, Do-17, 
and He- III in Spain. 
Two specific incidents from the war in Spain deserve mention because of their 
dramatic impact. The first of these occurred in late 1936, virtually as soon as Soviet 
fighters entered combat. Until this time, those Soviet theorists (such as lonov) who had 
been arguing that fighters were powerless before bomber defences had seemed to be 
ascendant. Then Soviet-built (and partly Soviet-flown) fighters appeared over Madrid in 
November 1936 and promptly caused much trouble to the Nationalist aircraft, primarily 
250 CorUM, James S., 'The Luftwaffe and the Coalition Air War in Spain, 1936-1939', The Journal of 
Strategic Studies, 1,1995. 
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Ju-52s, which were attempting to bomb the city. On 29 December 1936, Pravda noted 
that, 
Thanks to the experience of combat over Madrid, the opinion that the 
greater flight speed of bombers and the great power of their armament made them 
untouchable by fighters has been completely broken. 251 
Debate would continue over the relative power of fighters to bombers. A few, 
notably Ionov, would continue to argue that fighters were not especially useful; but theirs 
was no longer a majority opinion. It is not too dramatic to state that on 5 November 
1936, when I- 16s and 1- 15 s first turned back a Nationalist bombing raid, they won the 
interceptor a place in Soviet air theory and doctrine. With 'our fighters' clearly beating 
'their bombers' - regardless of the mismatch in capabilities - it was both patriotically and 
politically difficult to continue to argue the case for the impotence of fighters. 
Six months later fighters won a wider role at Guadala ara, a famous and somewhat i 
misunderstood battle. The popular notion of Guadalajara boils down to an Italian Corps 
being destroyed by airpower alone. This overstates the case and distorts the more 
ambiguous and complex reality. Airpower did indeed play an important role in the battle, 
but it did so under peculiar conditions and other anns were also vital. 
The battle was initially conceived as a means of taking Madrid. Previous efforts, 
directed closer to the city, had failed. The Nationalist command thought that a strike 
down the axis of the good road from Siguenza towards Madrid would meet with success, 
especially since the initial assault would take the highest ground and the attack would roll 
downhill from there. 50,000 troops were assembled (of which 30,000 were Italian), along 
with 250 tanks, 180 guns, and around 20 trucks for every 650 soldiers. A 
large, well- 
equipped force, it was expected to roll over the Republican 
defence, take Madrid, and win 
the war. 
251 B. Ageev, 'Protivovozdushnaia oborona Madrida', Pravda, 29 Dec 1936 (No. 318), quoted in 1. 




The offensive did not go quite according to plan. It jumped off on 8 March 193 7 
and initially went well; the heights were taken and the Republican defence appeared to be 
broken. The Italians insisted on taking the lead and began driving their corps down the 
road. On II March, a combination of events overtook them. First, the Republican 
defence in front of them solidified. Second, the on the I& the weather had changed to a 
mix of heavy rain, snow, and sleet, while low clouds blanketed the area. This turned the 
roadsides to mud, preventing vehicles from leaving the road. It also Prevented Nationalist 
aircraft from flying. However, Republican aircraft were able to fly from the II th 
onwards, though at some hazard due to the low cloud ceiling. 
As a result, Republican aviation was able to attack a stationary target exposed in 
column on a single road, utterly devoid of air cover. The column's anti-aircraft defences 
were soon broken, and only the weather provided any real deterrent to the 114 aircraft (84 
fighters, 20 fast bombers, plus 10 recon aircraft pressed into a strike role), which 
proceeded to bomb and strafe the column while Republican forces went onto the 
offensive. While unarmoured close support aircraft took heavy losses, the air support 
materially assisted in shattering the Italian column and allowing Republican forces to 
repel the Italian offensive. 
252 
These dramatic events demonstrated that, under nearly optimal conditions, the 
impact of airpower could be immense. This was further demonstrated in the Nationalist 
campaign against Bilbao, where they enjoyed complete air superiority and utilised 
it to 
good effect, as the Soviets were well aware - though their attention 
focused on the actions 
of their own forces. 
253 Close air support had confirmed its place and would be tried again 
in the future. The Soviets learned a number of lessons. The importance of close co- 
252 S. Liubarskii, 'Nekotorie vivodi iz opita voini v Ispanii. Nastuplenie. ', (Voennaia mysl', 
10,1938, pp. 
12-3 1), pp. 24-26; V. Chemetskii, 'V nebe Ispanii', (Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal, 
8,1976), pp. 89-92; P. 1. 
Samoilov, Gvadalakhara: Rccgrom Italianskogo ekspeditsionnogo korpusa, 
(Moscow: Voenizdat, 1940). 
253 S. Liubarskii, 'Nekotorie vivodi iz opita voini v Ispanii. Nastuplenie., ( Voennaia mysl', 
# 10,193 8, pp. 
12-3 1), pp. 25-26; Voina v Ispanii, #3, Boevie deisti, iia aviatsii, 
(Moscow: Gosvoenizdat, 1937), p. 10. 
117 
operation between air and ground forces had been made clear, though the means of 
achieving it less so. Suggested solutions usually revolved around better staff work, the 
attachment of an air staff officer to the ground staff, and better use of pyrotechnic signals. 
Radio, for reasons that will be discussed later, did not prove itself on the Republican side 
in Spain and was not thought workable. As a result, what would prove the best and most 
254 flexible means of controlling close air support remained largely unexamined . Equally, 
the Soviets noted the need for repeated strikes, either by sending a stream of small strikes 
to the battlefield (as the Nationalists did) or by using several concentrated strikes (as the 
Republicans did). 255 
The question of attaining air superiority remained fresh, with theories pitted 
against the realities observed in Spain. Prior to the war in Spain, there had been a 
growing consensus that the best means of attaining air superiority lay through bombing 
enemy airbases. This was predicated, in part, on the assumption that the fighter was 
increasingly powerless against the bomber. The Spanish War soon showed the latter to be 
groundless, but both sides in the war made attempts to bomb each other's airbases, with 
some initial claimed success. Nonetheless, as a 1937 report noted, bombing airbases was 
soon discovered to be 'a much more difficult matter than had been anticipated in 
peacetime-). 256 Frequent basing changes, good camouflage, and false airbases made it 
difficult to discover enemy airbases in the first place, or then to arrive with sufficient 
surprise to catch enemy aircraft on the ground, let alone bomb them with enough 
accuracy to do any damage. Nonetheless, Soviet analysts believed that with improved co- 
ordination between reconnaissance units and strike units, the use of low-altitude 
approaches, and repeated systematic strikes, bombing airbases could be an important 
254 B. Teplinskii, 'Osnovi vzaimodeistviia mezhdu aviatsionnimi i obshchevoiskovimi shtabami', (Vestnik 
vozdushnogoflota, No. 2,1939, pp. 31-36), pp. 31-34. 255 p. 1. Samoilov, Guadalakhara, pp. 141-142. 
256 Voina v Ispanii, #3, Boevie deistviia aviatsii. p. 13. 
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technique against enemy airpower. This attitude remained despite its near-complete lack 
of success in Spain once both sides had dispersed and camouflaged their bases after the 
initial months of the war. 
257 
However, one question mark remained above Soviet experience from the war: was 
Spain actually representative? The Soviets were not sure, because the numbers of aircraft 
involved were small. S. Liubarskii's 258 estimate, that the Spanish War only employed 5- 
8% of the aircraft that could be expected in a major European war, was typical. However, 
the Soviets learned that they needed new aircraft. The SB and 1- 16 began to enter service 
in 1935-1936 and were among the best in the world when they entered combat in Spain in 
193 6. Nonetheless, when the Me- 109 entered combat in 193 8, it outclassed them. The 
Soviets ramped up their development programs in early 1939. As a result, a newer 
generation of aircraft began to enter service in 194 1. Ironically, in this manner the 
Luftwaffe's victories in Spain ultimately played a role in strengthening the Soviet's 
ability to fight back in World War 2.259 
China 
Japan attacked China in July 1937, rapidly developing a full-scale invasion. Stalin 
could hardly ignore this development, especially since it might tie down Japan in an 
extended war in China and thus weaken the threat of of a two-Eront war posed by the 
German-Japanese Anti-Comintem Pact. The Soviets sent extensive assistance to the 
Nationalist Chinese; various Soviet sources claim this amounted to at least 600 aircraft (a 
mix of, at least, 1- 15 and 1- 16 fighters, SB bombers, with TB-3 bombers used for transport 
257 Voina v Ispand, #3, Boevie deistviia aviatsii, p. I 1- 14; Voina v Ispanii: boevie 
deistviia aviatsii (s 
nachala miatezha), pp. 25-26; Migulin, Teoriia ipraktika, p. 63; RKKA, 
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aviatsii (s nachala miatezha), pp. 25-26. 
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from the USSR on at least some occasions), 100 guns, equipment for 24 divisions 
including 8,300 machine guns, $450 million (USD) in loans, and 3,665 military advisors, 
including pilotS. 260 At least two of the advisors were air force specialists, and the Air 
Force was subordinated to the Military Advisor, Chinese Army, via an air committee. 261 
The scale of the forces sent to China is striking. Equally striking is the dearth of 
information on the activity of those forces. Several factors probably account for this. In 
works written after 1949, the Soviets probably considered it embarrassing that their 
support had not gone to the Chinese Communists, and levels of information in post-war 
works correlate well with the political climate towards China at their time of Printing. 
Before 194 1, a European bias might come from considering Germany the greatest 
potential threat. The war in Spain, where the numbers of aircraft were roughly equal, 
may have seemed a better laboratory for future war than China, where the Japanese Air 
Force generally outnumbered the Chinese. Regardless, the quantity of articles published 
about the war in China was dwarfed by those written about the war in Spain; and often 
authors would write that 'experience in Spain and China shows' - but then use examples 
exclusively from Spain. 
Nonetheless, some did discuss Chinese lessons. Close air support, by fighters as 
well as bombers, was seen to be of great value. The Soviets saw the Japanese using it to 
make up for weaknesses in their artillery and preceding every major offensive with 
massive airstrikes in concert with a steady stream of smaller strikes. Experience in the 
engagement at Lake Khasan, where the Soviets used heavy air support without Japanese 
aerial opposition, also confirmed this. The main problem, as in Spain, was co-operation 
260 A. 1. Cherepanov, 'Itogi Ukhan'skoi operatsii', (1u. V. Chudodeev, Na Kitaiskoi zemle, Moscow: 
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between the ground forces and the aircraft. Japanese air-ground co-operation appeared to 
be fairly good, and it is implied that Chinese co-operation was fairly poor. 262 
Lessons on counter-air operations mostly related to force protection. Chinese 
strikes on Japanese airbases seem to have been rare. While claims of success with 
occasional surprise raids on Japanese airbases are probably broadly correct, other claims 
of successfully bombing Japanese airbases from high altitudes - over 7,000 meters - are 
probably not. 263 In any event, more of the discussion concerned means of avoiding the 
Japanese strikes on Chinese bases. These were tied up with the changes in how the 
Chinese fought the air war. 
In 1937, the Chinese tried to oppose the Japanese Air Force directly, defending 
their airbases from attack and taking part in ground battles. However, the close air 
support achieved little in the face of Japanese numerical superiority. Moreover, the 
Japanese conducted a relentless bombing campaign against Chinese airbases within 
I OOkm of the front, intense enough that even frequent shifting of bases and the use of 
numerous deception airbases proved ineffective countermeasures. In the end, this 
forward-basing strategy threatened the Chinese Air Force with extinction despite inflows 
of Soviet aircraft. 264 
Therefore, in December 1937, the Chinese adopted a new strategy. The Air Force 
was pulled into the deep rear, at several large airbases 450-700km from the front. At 
these bases, anti-aircraft guns and fighters could be concentrated for defence. Missions to 
the front would stage from a rear base to a forward base, where the aircraft would be 
an-ned and refuelled, then conduct their missions. While wearing on the aircrew, this kept 
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the main bases mostly beyond Japanese range. Also, when aircraft were caught at the 
forward bases, they could more easily fly away to the relative safety of the bases in the 
rear. Japanese raids on the rearward bases had to use larger formations and occurred only 
1-3 times per month instead of daily. The large rear bases also eased the centralization of 
command and the concentration of units for strikes. Moreover, the greater depth provided 
longer warning times of Japanese strikes on the bases and thus eased base defence. 265 
Experience in China was also seen to confirm earlier theories about the actions of 
a small air force against a larger. As predicted by Tukhachevskii in 1920, an inferior air 
force could use evasion into depth and concentration on important missions and axes for 
local superiority in order to provide effective support and maintain its continued ability to 
resist. Chinese resistance was effective despite the change of tactics for 1938; the 
Japanese Air Force took significant losses in the battle for Wuhan, Xuzhou, and Kaifeng, 
hindering the advance of the Japanese Army. 266 
Thus, Practical experience in Spain and China provided several lessons. Fighters 
won their place by demonstrating that they could inflict serious losses on bombers. Close 
air support was widely used, and though some still debated whether this was a good idea, 
a steady stream of examples of the effectiveness of such support, combined with the 
Soviet proclivity for the idea of supporting the ground forces, left the issue in little doubt. 
The star of heavy bombers as the agents of an independent air war, rising before the 
Spanish war, waned in the face of effective fighter resistance, ineffective city bombing, 
and the questionable politics of city-busting. Raids on airbases were found effective 
when the target did not take appropriate countermeasures of camouflage, dispersal, and 
defence - but thought relatively powerless when the target took these measures, Japanese 
successes in China notwithstanding. Experience in China validated the overall thinking 
26' A. Alimov, 'Operativnoe ispol'zovanie VVS', pp. 20-2 1. 
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from the 1920s on the actions of small air forces in the face of a superior foe, such as the 
use of deep airbases and concentration on single operational missions to achieve aerial 
parity or superiority for a short period of time. Finally, many Soviet aircrew gained 
combat experience against the Japanese and the Germans, then seen as the most 
threatening foreign nations and, in fact, nations against which the Soviets would shortly 
be at war. 
Thus it would seem that in early 1939 the Soviet Air Force should have been in a 
good position to handle the challenges to come. Much ink had been spilled on the 
experiences and lessons of the war in Spain and a trickle on China. The Soviet aircraft 
inventory included reasonably good aircraft and newer aircraft were on the design boards 
and testing fields to outclass the German aircraft met in Spain. The small war about to 
take place against Japan at Khalkin-Gol, however, um-nasked serious problems that went 
largely uncorrected until 1942 despite later experience in Finland and observed actions in 
the West. 
Perhaps the most significant missed opportunity in Soviet aviation was radio. 
With hindsight, radio is the obvious solution to many problems of command, control, and 
co-ordination. Indeed, some Soviets were great fans of radio, noting in 1938 the 
(enormous superiority' that radio communications granted. Moreover, the Soviets were 
aware of the developments in tactics that radio made possible, and appear to have made 
some attempt to emulate them in Spain. 267 Yet what seems obvious in hindsight was less 
obvious at the time. Radio in the 1930s was in a state comparable, perhaps, to the efforts 
to digitise the battlefield at the turn of the 2 I't century: a potentially powerful tool, but a 
new and not necessarily reliable one. Aircraft in Spain were initially equipped with 
radios, but the radios were heavy and slowed the aircraft down, thus reducing their 
267 Starikh, 'Radio kak sredstvo upravleniia istrebitel'iami', (Vestnik vo,: dushnogoflota, 10,1938, pp. 26- 
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survivability in combat. Moreover, external antennae either broke or slowed the aircraft, 
while internal antennae had to be supported by hand in order to function -a difficult task 
when flying in combat. Because of these difficulties, the Soviet Intelligence Directorate 
reported in 1937 that, 'The fighter aviation of the Republican Army, in conducting its 
combat sorties, never once used its radios in the air, as a result of which they were 
removed. )268 Some theorists liked radios; but in practice they were not yet light and 
reliable enough for their usefulness to be entirely clear. In this, the Soviets were not 
alone. Japanese pilots cut radio masts from their aircraft well into the Second World 
War, while a Luftwaffe signals officer's memoir fumes over the contempt Luftwaffe 
veterans of the Spanish War held for radios in particular and signals in general, quoting 
Adolf Galland as saying, '... it would be best to throw out all of these damned radios! 
We don't need them. We didn't need them in Spain and without them we could fly 
higher and faster! 9269 
Khalkin Gol 
In May 1939, Japanese and Mongolian units clashed along the disputed border 
between Manchukuo (Japanese Manchuria) and Mongolia, which was a Soviet client 
state. Events rapidly escalated. The reinforced Japanese 23 rd Division conducted a series 
of offensives in June and July that nearly carried it across the Khalkin-Gol ('Halha 
River'). Both sides reinforced over the summer with a view towards an offensive. Soviet 
commander Georgii Zhukov struck first, in late August, nearly obliterating the opposing 
Japanese forces in a mechanized encirclement battle. 
From the Air Force's point of view, this undeclared war was important because, 
for the first time since 1921, the Soviet Air Force met an enemy in the air while inside its 
268 Rý, Voina v Ispanii: boevie deistviia aviatsii (s nachala miatezha), pp. 109-110. 
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own military structure (as opposed to the combat it engaged in with pilots seconded to, 
and aircraft sold to, another Air Force, as in Spain and China. ) While the Soviet 
performance was reasonably sound after a shaky start, the fact of the shaky beginning 
showed an important weakness in the Soviet Air Force's process for turning war 
experience into doctrine and training. 
In the initial aerial fighting, in May, the Soviets suffered heavy losses, losing, by 
their own account, 15 Soviet aircraft for every Japanese aircraft shot down. After a 
disastrous attempt to attack a Japanese airbase on 27 May, in which thirteen 1- 15 fighters 
sortied, but only one returned, the Soviets stopped flying for nearly a month in order to 
try to sort out their problems. They knew how they ought to gain air superiority, but 
incapable of accomplishing the mission. 270 
Two days later, on 29 May, a group of 48 pilots and engineers flew in, summoned 
by Zhukov. Most had combat experience in Spain and China, and lakov Smushkevich, 
then the Representative of the Chief of the Air Force Directorate, headed the group. 
Debriefing and analysis revealed numerous Soviet tactical flaws. These included a near- 
complete lack of co-operation between aircraft, a consistent failure to try to get altitude or 
positional advantages before entering combat, misuse or misunderstanding of the 
strengths of the 1- 16 and 1- 15 fighters relative to the Japanese 1-97 (the 1- 15 was better at 
angles fighting, the 1- 16 better at the energy battle), a dearth of experienced pilots, and 
Japanese use of radio communications. Three weeks of intensive training followed 
before the Soviets took to the air again. 
271 
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The Soviets next entered combat on 22 June. The training showed; both Japanese 
and Soviets agree the Soviet performance was much improved. The Japanese, in order to 
try to retain superiority, struck at the Soviet airbases on 27 June, destroying at least 16 
aircraft. Smushkevich's team identified and corrected weaknesses in the early warning 
systems, tightened up air base defence, and instituted dispersal and camouflage of the 
aircraft and bases. (The Chinese lesson of deep basing was not utilised because the 
Soviets aimed for air superiority at Khalkin-Gol, not force preservation. ) The Soviets 
claim not to have been caught napping after this. 272 
Striking back, the Soviets raided the Japanese bases on 3 and 4 July, and lost 9 of 
150 aircraft, mostly to ground fire. Again, Smushkevich and his team analysed the 
combat, concluding that fighter-bomber co-operation had been poor and that the bombers 
had conducted no evasive manoeuvres to evade anti-aircraft fire. A repeat raid on 5 July 
took no losses. 273 Put together, these steady improvements resulted in Soviet air 
superiority by the end of July. 
274 
Despite hard fighting in the air on both sides, the Soviets maintained enough of an 
edge to blunt the Japanese attacks in July, and to maintain the security and secrecy of 
their own deployments for Zhukov's shattering attack in August. Communications and 
air raid warning systems steadily improved. The Soviets also began an extensive airbase 
construction program, raising their numbers from 2 in May to 63 by the end of July - 
making possible dispersion that rendered Japanese strikes on Soviet bases fruitless. Air 
units attached members of their command staff to the staffs of supported ground units to 
improve ground support, and all aircrew worked on improving co-ordination in the air. 275 
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All told, the Soviets engaged on a crash course in making their doctrine actually 
work, and this crash course was partly successful. While theory and doctrine called for 
offensive counter-air as the primary means of gaining air superiority, doctrine did not 
specically designate a preferred method, and the Soviets made greater use of defensive 
couter-air measures at Khalkin-Gol, launching only three strikes against Japanese airbases 
in the later summer. Theory and doctrine called for air interdiction, but the Soviets 
appear to have ignored it in favor of close air support. They relied more on defensive 
counter-air measures than offensive, as shown by the three strikes launched against 
Japanese bases in the later summer. 
Analyzing their experience at Khalkin-Gol, the Soviets noted the importance of 
radios for organized group combat by fighters, resulting in an official requirement for a 
light, reliable radio for all fighters. The Soviets also learned, as in Spain, that speed was a 
prime requirement for fighters. Combat proved biplanes to be ineffective, despite having 
a tighter turning radius, so the Soviets slowed their production, beginning the process of 
phasing them out of service. Conversely, the Soviets accelerated aircraft development 
programs begun on the basis of Spanish experience. The Soviets also noted that fighters 
needed to be based close to the areas they were to protect and needed to be supported by 
strong command, control, and warning systems. 276 
Analysts also drew a number of incorrect conclusions from Khalkin-Gol. 
Machine-gun armed fighters got more kills due to their lighter weight and the very light 
armour on Japanese aircraft, as a result of which the Soviets under-rated cannon 
armament. They failed to note the SB bomber's faults: a small bombload, easily ignited 
fuel tanks, and weak to non-existent defences. They did not address flaws in the conduct 
of group battle, navigation, and aerial combat that had appeared. Combined, these 
failures to learn tactical lessons cost the Soviets dearly in Finland and 1941, limiting their 
276 Novikov, Boevie deistviia na IGialkhin-Gole, p. 159-160,177-178. 
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ability to accomplish missions successfully. Perhaps most importantly, G. P. 
Kravchenko, 
l 
277 commander of the 22 d Fighter Regiment at Khalkin-Gol, came away 
convinced that strikes on enemy airbases were ineffective as a means of gaining air 
superiority. We shall meet Kravchenko again, in December 1940, when, as commander 
of the Baltic Military District Air Force, he still held this opinion. 278 
One particularly important lesson seems to have been missed: it is strange that any 
of these lessons needed to be learned at all. The same lessons had been learned in Spain 
and, to a lesser degree, in China. They had been written up, published, and distributed to 
Air Force units. But the use of experience is a two-way street. Not only must experience 
be gathered and analyzed; it must also be disseminated and understood. The effectiveness 
of Smushkevich's group in turning around the air war at Khalkin-Gol is noteworthy, and 
in a direct sense, he certainly earned his second Hero of the Soviet Union, awarded for his 
activity at Khalkin-Gol. Yet in another sense the award was undeserved. Why were the 
two aviation regiments in Mongolia in May 1939 so unprepared for combat? 279 
It is possible that the regiments were in a backwater location, poorly supplied and 
poorly trained. Indeed, the pilots were green, and half of the 70th Fighter Regiment's 
aircraft were out of service for repairs in May 1939. Yet those units were rapidly 
280 
reinforced with other units in better shape, and the situation did not change. In the 
aftermath of the Finnish War, the reason for these troubles came out in the Central 
Committee's review of the Finnish War on 14 - 17 April 1940. The discussion moved to 
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the problem of officers not reading the analyses provided by the intelligence bureau, and 
eventually moved to the heart of the matter: 281 
PROSKUROV: [ ... ] Facts related to the study of intelligence materials: 1. People at the administration of the air force do not read literature produced by 
the 5th Office, including strictly aviation material. For instance, the German 
experience of the use of aircraft in the Polish campaign, the field manual of the 
French air force, the German air force field manual, etc. The air force chief of 
staff did not even see all the literature available; it is kept by some minor official 
and not reported. Department chiefs, people who should keep abreast of all 
foreign innovations, do not, as a rule, read this material either. 
2. Take the Artillery Administration; department chiefs here do not read 
intelligence reports on foreign techniques. These reports, having been made 
known to the chiefs of information departments in the Administration, are sent to 
the secret library. These books stay in the secret library without any movement. 
Books like: The German Army Artillery, or The French Army, have been read by 
only four persons. 
MERETSKOV: These books are classified, I cannot take a book home, and I 
cannot read it at work,, I've work to do, therefore, these books lie untouched, 
unread. I may not take a book home, because it is considered sensitive 
information. A regimental commander will never borrow this book. 282 
None of the participants in this discussion were being entirely honest. Proskurov, 
head of the Intelligence Directorate, was being set up as the scapegoat for the Red Anny's 
failures in Finland. Yet it is interesting that Meretskov, who had good reason to want 
somebody else to be the scapegoat, did not claim that the intelligence reports were 
useless, but that the rules made them difficult to read. In fact, only two of the participants 
an eared to doubt that the rules for safeguarding secret material might not have been the 
. rp 
primary factor in causing the books and pamphlets not to be read: Stalin repeatedly 
accused these documents of being boring, while Proskurov pointed out that not all the 
materials were, in any event, classified. Thus, while Proskurov's defence was self- 
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serving, nobody directly challenged his assertion that intelligence analyses were not read, 
283 
suggesting it contained a significant kernel of truth . 
Thus, the weaknesses Khalkin-Gol and Finland demonstrated in the chain running 
from theory to doctrine to training to execution very likely lay specifically in training. 
Theory moved into doctrine reasonably well, as seen in the reflection of theory in the 
field regulations of 1929 and 1936. Field experience was analyzed and published, but 
then languished in safes. The Soviet's initial performance suggests that their training 
programs were poor overall, which Timoshenko's December 1940 injunction to "Teach 
troops only that, which is necessary for war, and only thus, as is done in war" suggests 
was a recognized force-wide failing. 
284 
Finland 
A few months after the conclusion of hostilities at Khalkin-Gol, the Soviets 
attacked Finland, a much more public arena. The disastrous performance of the Red 
Army in the first month of the Winter War is well known, the destruction of the 44 th 
Motorized Rifle Division at Suomussalmi being the most famous example. Carl van 
Dyke recently described the process by which the Red Army reformed and retrained for 
eventual success in Finland. 285 The Soviet Air Force appears to have gone through a 
similar process, with an equally painful beginning and, eventually, a somewhat less 
painftil conclusion. 
The terrible weather exacerbated a number of the problems the Soviets faced. 
Temperatures normally ranged from -25C to -45C and dipped down to -50C for a few 
days. In the course of 3 months and 13 days of combat, only 24 days provided good 
flying weather, the rest involving some combination of visibility under 4 kilometres, 
storms, low clouds and fog. The problems caused by low temperatures should have been 
283 Chubaryan, Shukinan, eds, Stalin and the Soviet-Finnish War, pp. 197-200. 
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foreseen. Just how bitterly cold winter could get in that part of the world should have 
been no more of a surprise to the Soviets in 1939-1940 than it is claimed to have been to 
the Germans in 194 1. Thus, reports of oils freezing up, and poor facilities for pilots and 
crews against the cold, indicate poor preparation. Poor preparation is also suggested by 
very low standards of maintenance. 
286 
Bad weather would seem to be a better excuse for poor performance, but the 
Soviets were unhappy with their results in this regard as well. To their surprise, programs 
from the NII (Nauchno-issledovatel'nii institut, Scientific Research Institute) intended to 
train pilots to fly in night and bad weather had almost completely failed - even specialists 
from the NII could not perform the tasks well. Since many of the pilots had great 
difficulty flying in formation, let alone manoeuvring in formation, performing these tasks 
in anything other than clear daylight was almost impossible. 287 
On top of this, bomber pilots were often unable to hit their targets. In one 
instance, on 26 December 1939, three DB3 bombers attacked a friendly position on a hill, 
mistaking it for an enemy position. Of 30 bombs dropped, not one hit the 
hill. 288 In a 
more general account of the activity of Soviet bombers in the first month of the war, 
Komkor R. S. Shelukhin, reporting to Defence Minister Voroshilov, stated that: 
Hundreds of bombers are sent, thousands of bombs are dropped, and tens 
of aircraft are lost, in order to destroy some object (for example: a radio station, a 
bridge, etc. ), the accomplishment of this mission drags out for weeks and in the 
end loses its intended purpose, and the destruction itself does not lead to the 
intended goal. This leads to a great waste of resources and pointless loss of 
strength, as a single zveno [triad of aircraft] should be sufficient for the 
destruction of one of these objects, if it were well trained with dive bombers and 
could accomplish the mission on one sortie. 
289 
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Air units repeatedly used the same paths to targets, allowing the Finns to predict 
their courses and meet them more easily. Additionally, the Soviets seem to have failed to 
account for increasing means of resistance being sited at a target that was repeatedly 
struck . 
290 Co-ordination problems between the Leningrad Military District's Air Force 
and the Baltic Fleet Air Force led to several friendly fire incidents and the loss of at least 
three aircraft before special recognition marks were added to aircraft. 291 
Shelukhin placed the blame for this on the youth and inexperience of the Air 
Force commanders. Moreover, lessons from previous conflicts were being incorrectly 
applied: 'Many comrades here received combat experience in Spain, China, and Khalkin- 
Gol, and here they apply it, without any consideration of the situation.... 1292 In prior 
conflicts, the numbers of aircraft had been small and the crews experienced; the old 
recipes were failing with inexperienced crews and massed airpower. In Finland, the 
inexperience was part of the reason that, '... our powerful aviation, with such colossal 
numerical superiority, could do almost nothing to the enemy in the course of a month. 293 
The Soviets were aware that despite their efforts, traffic moved freely on Finnish railroads 
and roads, Finnish command and control had remained untouched, and attempts to 
blockade Finland from outside supply had been a failure. 294 
Nothing of the sort could occur, if our aviation acted purposefully on the 
basis of carefully crafted plans and closely calculated operations; if it acted 
decisively and effectively, with maximal use of its resourceS. 
295 
As this suggests, the Leningrad Military District's Air Force staff had a number of 
problems over and above the problems that existed in the air units themselves. 7hArmy, 
which controlled the units directly, continually changed their missions, which in turn 
290 Doklact Komkora R. S. Shelukhina, 1.82-84. 
291 Boevie deistviya VVS KBF, pp. 19-20. 
292 Doklad Komkora R. S. Shelukhina, 1.87-88, quote on 1.88. 
293 Doklad Komkora R. S. Shelukhina, 1.88. 
294 Doklad Komkora R. S. Shelukhina, 1.88; van Dyke, Soviet Invasion of FinlqpA, pp. 91-93. 
295 Doklad Komkora R. S. Shelukhina, 1.89. Emphasis in original. 
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suggests poor planning and thus poor training of the staff and commanders. While the air 
staff worked hard to deal with the many and changing requirements, Shelukhin found a 
distressing lack of operational focus: 
296 
There is no purpose, there is no co-ordination of actions, no calculations, 
not one planned operation. And people hope to win easily. Therefore there is no 297 battle with enemy aviation [and Finnish air strength is rising] . 
This lack of a central planning was worsened by theories propounded by F. A. 
Arzhenukin, who convinced others in the Soviet military that a very limited number of 
bombs were sufficient to devastate a given area by assuming they would tend to fall in an 
even distribution: for example, 50 bombs for a hectare of ground. This theory was 
thoroughly disproven by the evidence that the Soviets had dropped thousands of bombs 
on some areas to no appreciable effect. 
298 
Shelukhin recommended that trained crews and units be brought in from across 
the Soviet Union in order to bring those units in the Leningrad Military District up to war 
readiness. This, he hoped, would deal with the persistent problems in training by raising 
the number of trained crews in combat units. To deal with the problems at the higher 
echelons, he suggested that all of the Air Force commands be centralized into one 
command, instead of divided out amongst armies and corps, in order to facilitate the 
generation of focused operations with specific goals. The recommended operational 
goals were: suppressing the Finnish Air Force, breaking the Finnish road and rail net, 
destroying Finnish command and control, isolating Finland from external sources of 
assistance. ) and tactical support of the ground 
troops. 299 
The 50 th Rifle Corps, tasked with cracking the Mannerheim Line at 
Summa, noted a near lack of air support until 30 January 1940. After that, relatively 
296 Doklad Komkora R. S. Shelukhina, 1.89-92. 
297 Doklad Komkora R. S. Shelukhina, 1.92. 
298 Doklad Komkora R. S. Shelukhina, 1.92-93. 
299Doklad Komkora R. S. Shelukhina, 1.94. 
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significant bombing strikes up through 10 February totaled some 653 sorties into the 
Corps' area -a frontage and depth of 6 kilometres. However, bad weather prevented 
aviation from supporting the actual artillery preparation and initial attack on II February, 
and support thereafter was sporadic at best. A noteworthy success on 18 February, when 
the 50 th Rifle Corps' report claims an artillery reconnaissance aircraft called effective 
artillery fire onto approaching Finnish reserves near Raiakorpi, serves to highlight the 
dearth of any other reported employment of aviation. 300 
Despite identifying many problems in analysis, matters did not dramatically 
improve, unlike Khalkin-Gol. Part of the problem was the uncooperative weather. 
However, the deeper problems lay in training issues. While these appear to have been 
overcome at Khalkin-Gol, where the weather was favourable and target areas easier to 
differentiate, they were not so easily overcome in the Karelian winter and forests. In 
addition, the scale of operations at Khalkin-Gol was smaller, allowing the Soviets more 
latitude in filling positions with carefully selected officers. Moreover, the Soviet 
commander at Khalkin-Gol, Zhukov, proved to be one of their finest officers. Kirill 
Afanasievich Meretskov, commanding the Leningrad Military District and the 7thArmy 
in the Finnish War, lead a less distinguished career. If Zhukov's legendarily forceful 
personality had been in command in Finland, would 7 th Army still have waffled about 
assigned missions? 
At the war's end, the Red Air Force had not succeeded notably in meeting any of 
its ob . ectives. Tactical support improved but was often absent. The Finnish road and rail 9 
net continued to ftmction despite the bombs dropped in their direction. Finnish command 
and control was affected somewhat but not critically impaired. Finnish industry and 
foreign supplies were not slowed. Soviet efforts at terror-bombing towns and villages 
'0' Komeev, Chemov, and Moroz, Boevye deistviya 50 SKpo propyvu lind Mannergeima (s 11.2 po 13.3 
1940 g. ), (Moscow, 194 1, Typescript); pp. 41-44,107-118,131-132,234. 
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produced no useful results and probably stiffened Finnish resistance, as the Soviets 
should have known from the Spanish war and their own theorists. The results were in no 
way commensurate with the effort expended. The key measures the Soviets attempted in 
order to weaken or disrupt the Finns appear to have been offensive counter air, air 
interdiction against transportation networks, and close air support of Soviet offensives. 
Once again, they appeared to know the effect they wanted to achieve, but were unable to 
carry out their intentions in practice: an inability to translate theory and doctrine into 
execution. 301 
Lessons Learned 
From 1936 through 1940, the Soviets engaged in a series of combats of increasing 
scale. In Spain, when their aircraft were the most modem and their pilots hand-picked, 
they enjoyed a fair degree of success. The outcome of their effort in China is not entirely 
clear but seems to have been important around Wuhan, and assisted in keeping a Chinese 
Air Force in being. At Khalkin-Gol, the local air units were caught flat-footed, but an 
infusion of expertise and reinforcements rectified the situation. The largest and last of 
these small wars, against Finland, was also the war with the largest commitment, leaving 
the Soviets with the least ability to compensate for their problems by bringing in expertise 
from beyond the combat zone. Coupled with the difficulties of the theatre, the war with 
Finland exposed both the weaknesses in the combat preparation of Soviet air units and the 
fact that aircraft which had been world-class a scant 4 years before, over Spain, were 
already sliding into obsolescence. While in smaller wars the Soviets were able to 
overcome their problems, the Finnish war was of sufficient scope to overwhelm the ad- 
hoc solutions that had worked elsewhere. 
301 Doklad Komkora R. S. Shelukhina, 1.94, p. 88; van Dyke, Soviet Invasion of Finlan chapter 4: 
Komeev et al., Boevye deistviya 50 SK, Pavel Aptekar', 'Falcons or Kites? The Red Army Air Force in the 
Soviet-Finnish War (The Journal ofSlm, ic Military Studies, 4,1999, pp. 138-148). 
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The Soviets learned mixed lessons from the loss of 600 aircraft. Smushkevich, by 
that time Chief of the Air Force, headed a commission formed in 1940 to study the results 
of the Finnish war. They recognised that Soviet aircraft were too slow overall, the DB-3 
heavy bomber was obsolete, and that co-ordination between air and ground forces needed 
a great deal of work. Furthermore, they recommended that aviation be divided up such 
that a smaller part was formed into tactical aviation, subordinated to armies, while the 
majority formed operational aviation, subordinated to Fronts. This was, in fact, an 
attempt to move the level of subordination of most air units to higher echelons. During 
the Finnish War, difficulties with coordination between the front lines and supporting air 
units had been such that the Soviets had attempted to subordinate most air units to ground 
armies. Smushkevich's commission concluded that this over-concentration of force lead 
to inflexibility in concentration. Furthermore, army staffs tended to plan air missions 
without especial regard to their utility: Smushkevich noted both that bombing missions in 
support of quiet sectors were largely pointless, and that, 'There was a race for the greatest 
number of sorties and tonnages of bombs dropped, without consideration of what tactical 
or operational effects they might achieve. ' (The latter, presumably, was an unintended 
consequence of rating air unit effectiveness in terms of tonnages dropped. ) Finally, the 
practice of direct subordination to armies caused operational missions to be short-changed 
in favour of strictly tactical support. Despite these criticisms, however, armies continued 
to have aviation in direct subordination until the spring of 1942, and on the eve of war, in 
June 194 1, almost 60% of Front aviation was subordinated to annies. 
302 
Some matters were altered in the new manuals for fighter aviation (BUIA-40) and 
bomber aviation (BUBA-40) though not all the changes were for the better. In 
accordance with the Soviet tenet of massed employment, BUBA-40 usefully specified 
102 Aptekar', 'Falcons or KitesT, pp. 146-147; Novikov, Boevie deistviia na Abalkhin-Gole, p. 177-178, 
Kokoshin, Armiia i Politika, p. 100; Migulin, Teorha i praktika, pp. 69-70,89-90. 
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that concentrated bombing was preferable, either through the use of regiments at a time 
on a single target, or by echeloning the strike into a rapid series of strikes by smaller 
groups. On the other hand, BUIA-40 dismissed the use of radio in combat. T. T. 
Khriukin 303 , who commanded an army's air units 
in Finland, was convinced by th's 
experience of the need for direct radio communications between air units and the ground 
units they supported, in order to enable direct communication for the designation of 
targets. While BUBA-40 and BUIA-40 both claimed to take into account lessons learned 
at Khalkin-Gol, but one of the lessons learned at Khalkin-Gol was the need for a light, 
reliable, long-range radio in all fighters. Additionally, the 1939 Provisional Field 
Regulations were still in effect, which permitted the attachment of air units down to 
corps. The greatest weakness of the Soviet Air Force, however, was training. Many of 
the fixes for problems in Finland turned out to be a matter of organizing matters precisely 
as written in the manual, especially the cross-posting of staff officers between air and 
ground HQs to arrange signals, times, places, and targets. 304 
Smushkevich also concluded that the Red Air Force was in no state to counter the 
Luftwaffe. While an accurate assessment, Smushkevich along with his Chief of Staff, F. 
A. Arzhenukin, and Air Force Commissar Agal'tsov, were removed from their posts for 
having the temerity to present that conclusion. Smushkevich's replacement, P. A. 
Richagov, was a veteran of the Spanish war and had served in China. 
305 
However, the majority of the other conclusions were not new. The weaknesses of 
various aircraft were becoming apparent during Khalkin-Gol, and the development of 
303 Timofei Timofeevich Khriukin joined the Soviet Air Force in 1932, serving as a pilot in Spain, the 
commander of a bomber group in China, and commanded an Army's air units in Finland. He commanded 
the Air Armies of various Fronts during the Second World War. Died in 1953. (V. A. Zolotareva, et al., 
Nakanune voini, p. 203. ) 
304 Migulin, Teoriia i praktika, pp. 71-8 1; Novikov, Boevie deistilia na Khalkhin-Gole, p. 15 8-159,163, 
178; T. T. Kliriukin, p. 203, in V. A. Zolotareva, et al., Nakanune voini: Materiali soveshchaniia vishchego 
rukovodiashchego sostava RKK, 4 23-31 dekabria 1940 g.. Russkii arkhiv. - 
Velikaia Otechestvennaia, T 
12(l), (Terra: Moscow, 1993). 
305 Aptekar', 'Falcons or Kites? ', pp. 146-147, Migulin, Teoriia ipraktika, pp. 89-97. 
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replacements had been accelerated . 
306 The DB-3 bomber was already undergoing a 
modernization so extensive that the resulting 11-4 is only dimly reminiscent of the DB- 
3.307 The need for speed in aircraft of all types had been a matter of debate within the 
ranks of Soviet air theorists, with those favouring speed as the prime factor in a combat 
aircraft already winning the debate. Some of Smushkevich's recommendations on 
organization were put into effect. By the beginning of 194 1, the Air Force had been 
reorganized from its older organization, with a split between High Command 
Reserve/Special, Front, Army, and Troop aviation, to something closer to Smushkevich's 
suggestion: a split between High Command Reserve Aviation, which was mostly 
bombers; Frontal Aviation, in which each Front possessed at least a division of each of 
bombers, fighters, and reconnaissance aircraft; and Army Aviation, with each Army 
possessing its own mixed air division, of one regiment of each of bombers, fighters, and 
308 
assault aircraft . 
What did not happen was an improvement in training, an area where both 
Khalkin-Gol and Finland revealed serious weaknesses. The purges can only bear part of 
the blame. The dramatic expansion of the Soviet military in the 5 years before 
Barbarossa also played a distinct role. In 1938 the Red Army had 1.5 million men. By 
June 1941, it numbered five million with a trained reserve of fourteen million. This 
massive, rapid expansion would have produced a shortage of trained officers at the best of 
times; the purges sharply exacerbated the problem. 
309 Moreover, the Air Force suffered 
problems with basic pilot training. 
306 Novikov, Boevie deistviia na Khalkhin-Gole, p. 177-178, Kokoshin, Armiia i Politika, p. 100. 
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In January 1937, the Air Force had 12 flight schools providing basic flight training 
before pilots were sent to their units for conversion and advanced training. By June 194 1, 
it had 83. This massive expansion produced an ever-growing number of graduating 
officers: 8,713 in 1938,12,337 in 1939, and 27,918 in 1940. However, output of officers 
did not keep pace with the increase in the number of schools due to a number of shortfalls 
illustrated by the 50% shortage of aircraft, 60% shortage in fuel, and, most importantly, 
44% shortage in instructors in early 1941. Thus, those 83 schools could as easily be 
considered 40 given that the average school was missing half of its planes and instructors. 
Moreover, the basic flight training regimen was shortened seven times in 1939 and 1940, 
bringing the peacetime training program to the span of that used in wartime. In 1940, the 
Soviet Air Force faced a shortfall of some 60,000 Air Force officers, including 6,000 
officers were dismissed from the Air Force and arrested during the purges. Since the 
weight of the purges fell most heavily on the upper ranks, turnover in command positions 
was extremely rapid. In early 1941, two thirds of Military District (effectively, Front) Air 
Force commanders and chiefs of staff, and 97% of all air brigade and corps commanders 
and chiefs of staff, had held their posts for less than a year. It is thus no great wonder that 
Shelukhin commented that one of the greatest problems in the Finnish War was that 
commanders were not only 'youthful and inexperienced', but indeed so inexperienced 
that they did not realize their own incompetence and therefore were not seeking to 
improve. Worse, the purges tended to kill the brightest and most efficient, while sparing 
those best at kowtowing to the latest party line. As a result, the officers suddenly 
No. 3, September 1992), pp. 332-348; V. Shlykov, 'I tanki nashi bystri', (Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn', 9,1988, 
pp. 117-129), p. 125. 
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catapulted beyond their training and experience frequently had poor mentors to guide 
them in their new jobs. 
310 
Whatever their manuals and theories claimed, the Achilles Heel of the Soviet Air 
Force was implementation, a problem they shared with the Red Army. In addition to the 
troubles with training, there was a grave problem with the dissemination of experience. 
The Soviets placed a premium on the 'analysis and generalization' of war experience, a 
process which certainly occurred with respect to Spain, Finland, Khalkin-Gol, and 
probably occurred regarding the conflict in China. Nonetheless, despite extensive 
analysis, some of it quite incisive, the Red Air Force demonstrated a consistent pattern of 
failing to learn from its previous errors, even when those errors had been identified and 
practical solutions written out. Units at Khalkin-Gol were thus oblivious to experience 
from Spain and China, and those in Finland unaware of lessons from Khalkin-Gol. 
Clearly, a key problem the Soviet Air Force experienced in its wars from 1936 
through 1940 was an increasing inability to avoid using a rising number of poorly trained 
personnel as the scale of the wars, and the scale of their training shortfall due to rapid 
expansion, both increased. Moving our focus from the Soviet's practical, day-to-day 
problems, to the realm of theory, we find that the experience of the small wars from 1936 
through 1940 had wrought a number of changes. One of the most dramatic impacts of 
war experience on theory was the success of Soviet fighters over Madrid in 1936, which 
destroyed the theory of bomber's invulnerability, and demonstrated both the viability of 
fighter interception along with the need for fighter escort. 
As noted in the previous chapter, in 1936 the fighter's fortunes in Soviet theory 
were falling, shot down by a wave of optimism about the ability of fast, heavily-armed 
bombers to fight their way through to targets in the face of fighter opposition. This was 
"0 Fedorenko, N. 'Podgotovka letnykh kadrov v 1939 - 1941 gg", (Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal, 4,1976, 
pp. 100-103), p. 101; Komal, F. B. 'Voennie kadri nakanune voini', 
(Voenno-Istoricheskii Zhurnal, 1, 
1990, pp. 21-28), pp. 21-28-, Doklad Komkora R. S. Shelukhina, 1.88. 
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based in large measure on optimism about the ability to mount heavy armament in 
bomber turrets and a supposed superiority in fire this would generate, during a period in 
time when the speeds of bombers and fighters were about equal. In 1936, the equality in 
speed was beginning to disappear as a newer generation of fighters came off the drawing 
boards, as exemplified in 1938 by the ability of the German Me-109 to intercept the 
Soviet SB ('skorostnoi bombardirovshchik' or 'fast bomber') which had hitherto proven 
too fast to intercept. The interception of bombers over Madrid by Soviet fighters made it 
politically difficult to avoid the conclusion that fighters could indeed be an effective 
defence against bombers. The interception of the SB drove home the point that newer, 
faster fighters could overtake bombers designed for speed. The bomber's proponents 
went into a relative decline from this point, leaving only P. lonov to argue for them over 
fighters, and by 1940 even lonov had conceded that the fighter was a 'deadly threat' to 
the bomber. Madrid brought the fighter back out of the wilderness, and the Me- 109's 
appearance prompted focused work on a newer generation of fighter aircraft. This search 
was intensified after Khalkin-Gol, and the resulting aircraft began to enter service in 
311 1940-1941. 
The Pe-2 and 11-2 stand out of the above list because they are not fighters. The 
development of these aircraft, too, was prompted in part by experience in Spain. A low- 
level 'shturmovik' assault aircraft for close air support had been desired for some time. 
The bomber mania shortly before the Spanish war had driven the idea into decline, but 
Guadalajara, for all that it is a problematic example in retrospect, lent great credibility to 
the concept of the low-level shturmovik style of close attack aircraft. Engine technology 
limitations defeated Soviet design efforts in the 1920s. In the late 1930s, engine 
technology caught up with their desires, and the 11-2 close-attack aircraft was bom and 
"' Avdeenko, P., 'Sovetskoe swnoletostroenie v gody predvoennikh piatiletok (1929 - 1940 gg. )', (Voenno- 
istoricheskii zhumal, No. 7,1974, pp. 86-89), pp. 87-89; Novikov, Boevie deistviia na )Uialkhin-Gole, p. 
177-178; P. Ionov, 'Operativnoe iskusstvo VVS', (Vestnik Vozdushnogo Flota, July 1940, pp. 9-17), p. 17. 
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went on to be the most famous Soviet aircraft of the Second World War. 312 The Pe-2 
dive-bomber began to be reworked from a high-speed interceptor project in May 1940 
and went on to be the mainstay of their light bomber force as both a level and dive 
bomber. The existence of the programs to develop these two bombers, as well as the 
programs to develop new fighters, is part of the evidence that the Soviet leadership 
understood the changing requirements of aerial warfare. 
Against this background, Defence Comissar S. K. Timoshenko's conclusion at the 
December 1940 conference, at the Soviet Air Force lacked unity regarding the conduct of 
operations may seem odd. However, his assessment was simultaneously perfectly 
accurate, and quite untrue. The conference in December 1940 served to highlight the 
differences in opinion, but also shows the areas where everyone agreed. 313 
The Conference consisted of a series of papers on major issues of offence, 
defence, and training,, each followed by discussion from the floor. The speakers were all 
major figures, one of the highlights being an extensive paper on the 'modem offensive 
operation' by G. K. Zhukov. The discussions, while civil, were contentious and to the 
point. As a case in point, witness F. N. Remezov, commander of the Orlovskii Military 
District, calling Zhukov to task for his desire to introduce the exploitation force into the 
breach to early, thereby getting it caught in the breakthrough battle -a penchant Zhukov 
went on to demonstrate repeatedly in World War 
11.314 Only one of the papers dealt 
solely with the Air Force, but nearly all of them considered the roles of the Air Force in 
the topic under discussion. 
312 interestingly, the hedge-hopping attack profile of the Shturmovik was apparently an idea imported from 
Italy in the mid to late 1920s. M. Vladimirov, "Breyushchii poliot' i poliot na maloi visote', (Vestnik 
i, ozdushnogoflota, 1,1929, pp. 16-18), p. 16. On the Soviet's enthusiastic adoption of the idea, see both 
Vladimirov's article and A. Turzhanskii, 'Shturmoviye deistviya po kollonam na pokhode s primeneniem 
'breiushchego poliota", (Vestnik vozdushnogoflota, 1,1929, pp. 14-15). 
"' S. K. Timoshenko, 'Closing Speech', p. 357, in V. A. Zolotareva, et al., Nakanune voini. 
314 F. N. Remezov, p. 170, in V. A. Zolotareva, et al., Nakanune voini. 
142 
The single hottest topic regarding the Air Force was one that had long been a 
point of contention: how to gain air superiority, and what exactly air superiority meant. 
The Spanish war had restored the fighter to its rightful place as an effective means of 
aerial combat. However, the debate over the usefulness of fighters was, at its core, a 
debate over where air superiority should be achieved: by aerial combat, by bombing 
airbases, or by bombing factories? Even the proponents of the invincibility of bombers 
had been convinced that their aerial battleships would be trading fire in the skies, and 
while it became clear these battles were fantasies, the debate's core question remained 
unanswered. 
Of least interest to the Soviets was the option of directly bombing enemy 
factories. While such operations are repeatedly mentioned by Soviet authors, the option 
of factory bombing also, almost always, seems to be included out of a desire for 
completeness that pervades many potential-mission laundry lists they put together. When 
the discussion becomes more specific, deep bombing almost always departs from the 
picture. Factory destruction was an option the Soviets were aware of, and theoretically 
interested in, but it was not a priority in their minds. In S. K. Timoshenko's words, 
The decisive effect of aviation is not gained through raids on the deep rear, 
but through combined actions with troops on the battlefield, in the region of a 
division or army. 315 
As a consequence, when the Soviets discussed air superiority, they tended to mean 
what they called operational air superiority - over a specific area for a given duration - as 
opposed to what they called strategic air superiority, in which the enemy air force was 
completely on the ropes through the destruction of its forces and also the destruction of 
the industrial and training sources of its forces, and they periodically reminded each other 
of the difference between these two notions. The need for operational air superiority was 
315 S. K. Timoshenk-o, 'Closing Speech", p. 340, in V. A. Zolotareva, et al., Nakanune voini. 
143 
unquestioned: Zhukov's declaration that 'Mastery of the air is the basis of the success of 
an operation 316 went down without any murmur of protest. 
Thus, the central debate lay between achieving air superiority through aerial 
combat, or through bombing enemy airbases. On this issue, the two camps broke down 
along lines based on the experience they saw as relevant. In Spain, China, and Mongolia, 
while strikes on airbases had been initially successful, dispersal and maskirovka soon 
largely overcame the ability of either side to effectively locate and strike the other's 
bases, to such an extent that at least 40% of strikes sent out failed to find a valid target. 
By contrast, the Luftwaffe demonstrated in Poland and France that it was indeed possible 
to launch a massive, concerted strike on enemy airbases and achieve oPerationally 
decisive results. The Soviets credited the Germans with a numerical advantage in France 
that had not in fact existed, but this error did nothing to obscure the essential result. A 
series of articles and official analyses of Poland and France relentlessly pointed up the 
same conclusion: the Luftwaffe had, twice, inflicted disaster upon its opponents by means 
of a very carefully planned and executed strike which focussed as much air power as 
possible on achieving a surprise strike on enemy airbases to disrupt operations and 
destroy equipment, followed by repeated concentrated hammer-blows on those airbases to 
ensure that the enemy could not recover before the ground forces made the issue of 
recovery irrelevant. 
317 
Nonetheless, argument over the credibility of doing significant damage to an 
enemy air force through strikes on airbases broke out twice during the 1940 conference. 
The first was sparked by a comment of Zhukov's, in his paper on Front offensive 
316 G. K. Zhukov, 'Character of the Modem Offensive Operation', p. 139, in V. A. Zolotareva, et al., 
Nakanune voini. 
317 See, for example: B. A. Pogrebov, 'Vozdushnie sili v germano-pol'skoi voine', (Vestnik vozdushnogo 
flota, June 1940, pp. 13-24); E. Chalik, V. Lozovoi-Shevchenko, 'Deistviia aviatsii na zapadnom fronte', 
(Vestnik vozdushnogoflota, August 1940, pp. 14-39); B. M. Lozovoi-Shevchenko, 'Vozdushnoe razvedka 
aerodromov', (Vestnik vozdushnqgoflota, September 1940, pp. 11-21); E. F. Burche, 'Maskirovka VVS v 
voine na Zapade', (Vestnik iozdushnqgoflota, September 1940, pp. 55-60); Razvedivatel'noe Upravlenie 
Genshtaba Krasnoi Annii, Deistviia VVS i, i, oine na.: apade, (Moscow, 1940). 
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operations, that '... mastery [of the air] is gained through the bold and unexpected 
powerful blow of the entire VVS on the enemy's aviation in its basing regions. ' G. A 
Shtern, veteran of Spain, Mongolia, and Finland, and, at the time of the conference, 
commander of the Far Eastern Front, disagreed mildly, reminding the assembly that aerial 
combat was at least as important. Greater disagreement on base strikes came from P. V. 
Richagov's paper, immediately following Zhukov's, on the battle for air superiority. 
Richagov had served in Spain, China, and Finland, and was Chief of the Main Directorate 
of the Red Army Air Force at the time of the conference. While recognizing that strikes 
on enemy airbases were necessary, he also declared that the complexity and difficulty of 
the operation was such that, 'Most such strikes will not succeed. ' D. T. Kozlov, who 
commanded a rifle corps in the Finnish War and was the Chief of the Main Directorate of 
Air Defence during the conference, argued briefly with Richagov over the efficiency of 
base strikes, insisting on the need to concentrate all available Frontal aviation on the first 
day of the operation against the enemy air force, bomb their airbases, and thereby prevent 
the enemy air force from interfering with ground operations. M. M. Popov, then the 
commander of the I't Red Banner Army of G. M. Shtern's Far Eastern Front, and a 
veteran of the Russian Civil War (but not Spain, China, Mongolia, or Finland), argued 
that base strikes were only of use in the initial period of a war. Strikes on Poland and 
France had depended heavily on surprise, and even these, with their 'colossal' results, had 
left enemy aircraft flying - Popov cited an (incorrect) report of Polish aircraft destroying 
some 100 German tanks in one raid. After the initial strikes, the enemy dispersed, and, as 
at Khalkin-Gol and the Battle of Britain, repeat strikes needed much greater numbers of 
both bombers and escorts to achieve far less stunning results. Several speakers supported 
Popov, leaning especially on their experiences in Spain and Khalkin-Gol for support of 
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the notion that, without a high degree of surprise, results such as the Luftwaffe had 
achieved were not possible. 318 
In the end, Smushkevich and Richagov, who both in their separate ways insisted 
that destruction in the air and on the ground were both important, capped the argument. 319 
This is not, in fact, the compromise position it may at first seem, but recognition, by both 
speakers, of both the possibility and the difficulty of doing major damage to the enemy air 
force through strikes on air bases. Moreover, such an attitude fit in well with the 
prevailing attitude regarding the proper employment of the air force. Smushkevich 
demonstrated this in his commentary: 
Only through proper organization of our rear area, good training of our flight 
crews, provision of sufficient airbases and communications, ammunition, fuel, 
through clever and very frequent manoeuvre in order to deceive the enemy, can 
we achieve predominant mastery of the air on defined axes, on defined sectors and 
only at defined times. 
It is possible that the war now underway between England and Germany, 
if the nerves of the English leadership do not break, may continue for several 
years despite ceaseless raids on Birmingham, Liverpool, even given great German 
superiority, [discusses basing locations], all the same the end result will be 
decided not in the air, but on the ground, when the ground forces enter the war. 320 
What Smushkevich's comments point towards is the linkage between Soviet 
attitudes on the proper employment of their air force and their attitudes on air superiority. 
Most - though not quite all - of those at the conference, and of those writing in Soviet 
journals, contended that the central mission of the Air Force was to support the ground 
forces, and, specifically, to provide overwhelming support during major offensive 
operations. A. N. Lapchinskii was not at the conference, having died, apparently of 
3 11ý G. K. Zhukov, 'Character of the Modem Offensive Operation', p. 139; G. M. Shtem, p. 160; P. A. 
Richagov, 'Voenno-Vozdushnie Sili v nastupatel'noi operatsii iv bor'be za gospodstvo v vozdukhe', p. 177 
(quoted); D. T. Koz1ov, pp. 182-185; M. M. Popov, pp. 185-188; E. S. Ptukhin, pp. 188-190; G. P. 
Kravchenko, pp. 192-194; all in V. A. Zolotareva, et al., Nakanune voini. E. S. Ptukhin, then commanding 
the air forces of the Kiev Special Military District, had taken part in the Spanish and Finnish wars; G. P. 
Kravchenko, then commander of the air force of the Baltic Military District, served in China and at 
Khalkin-Gol. 
319 Ia. V. Smushkevich, pp. 197-198; P. V. Richagov, pp. 206-207, both in V. A. Zolotareva, et al., 
Nakanune voini. 
320 Ia. V. Smushkevich, pp. 197, in V. A. Zolotareva, et al., Nakanune voini. 
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natural causes, on 2 May 1938. The publication of his fmal book, Vozdushnaia armiia 
(The Air Army), in 1939 suggests that, indeed, he was not a victim of the purges. In his 
final book, he argued forcefully for smaller aircraft capable of supporting the ground 
forces, noting that, 
Aviation appeared in warfare as a new, powerful offensive factor. From 
this the logical conclusion is the unity of action of ground and air forces for the 
achievement of overall success.... 321 
Looking over the course of Soviet air theory from 1918 to 1940, this is the single 
greatest pomt of agreement. Not everyone subscribed to this at any given time. Indeed, 
in the period leading up to the Spanish Civil War, many were headed in the other 
direction, and beginning to vocally favour the use of deep-raiding heavy bombers instead 
of staying directly linked to the ground war. Those attitudes, linked closely to 
assumptions that fighters were useless, fell by the wayside after the air battles over 
Madrid and Guadalajara, and within a short time the Soviet viewpoint was largely back in 
its accustomed place. Some still argued for strategic bombing, even at the 1940 
conference, but they formed a small minority. Long-range bombing was not dismissed, 
nor was it viewed as entirely undesirable - but most of those who mentioned it made it 
clear it took a distant second place to direct tactical and operational support of the ground 
forces. Long-Range Aviation existed, and had bombers, and got periodic lip service; but 
Frontal and Army aviation were the centre of attention, and Smushkevich's declaration 
explains, 
'It is already clear that only close cooperation between all forces 
subordinate to an all-arms Front or Army provides success in operations and war, 
and thus the only place of aviation is in all-arms battles and operations. 
322 
321 M. frtiuga, 'Kombrig A. N. Lapchinskii', (Voenno-istoricheskii zhurnal, 7,1972, pp. 122-125), p. 125: 
A. N. Lapchinskii, Vozdushnaia armfly, (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1939), pp. 15-16,88-120,144-146; quote on 
p. 97. 
322 Ia. V. Smushkevich, p. 197, in V. A. Zolotareva, et al., Nakantine voini. 
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These statements about the need for concentration of force on limited axes, 
closely tied into and supporting the operations of the Army, and the use of strikes on 
airbases at the outset of a major offensive, should not seem unfamiliar. In fact, all three 
were closely connected themes in Soviet Air Force thinking from the time of its 
inception. 'When the infantry loses, everyone loses 1323 is a fact that can-not be ignored by 
a continental power. As a result, 'Groundforces must not be deserted by aviation in their 
day of need'. 324 It logically follows that, for powers with hostile land Erontiers, tactical 
and operational support will almost always be at centre stage; and, indeed, this has tended 
to be the case historically. Since there are never enough resources to go around, the 
resources of the Air Force should be applied in the manner that will get the best results, 
though massed support of major land offensives. The massed support not only ensures 
maximum bombing power to assist the ground forces, but also the numbers to assist in 
gaining air superiority. 
However, while virtually all Soviet theorists would have agreed with the logic laid 
out in the previous paragraph, they were far less unified on the issue of organising it. We 
have just discussed the 1940 version of the long-running battle between advocates of air 
superiority through airbase bombing and advocates of air superiority through fighter 
combats. In some ways, this long-running argument may seem similar to religious 
arguments over salvation through faith or good works; both lend themselves to the 
compromise solution of using both methods. However, the problem of base strikes or 
fighter combats was not merely a question of the potential effectiveness of each method. 
Linked to that debate was the question of air force organisation. The issue of organising 
aircraft into squadrons and regiments was not much at issue. However, the question of 
323 Lee Kennet, 'Strategic Bombardment: A Retrospective', (R. Cargill Hall, ed., Case Studies in Strategic 
Bombardment, (Washington: USGPO, 1998), pp. 623-632), p. 625, commenting on the article by Richard I 
Overy, 'Strategic bombardment Before 1939', (Hall, ed., Case Studies in Strategic Bombardment, pp. I I- 
90), pp. 74-75. Overy makes the case in somewhat more detail; Kennet's is a pithy summation. 
324 A. Lapchinskii, Bombardirovochnaia aviatsiia, p. 47. Emphasis in original. 
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what air units, of what size, should be attached or subordinated to what ground units, and 
with what degree of permanence, was of great importance. In this regard, the Soviets 
were divided. 
The question of air unit subordination was tangled because the solution was 
difficult. The most common subject of contention - to whom a close support regiment 
should be subordinate - serves as a good example. Obviously, the regiment needed to be 
able to provide timely support and be well briefed on the operations of the supported unit. 
This could, in theory, be accomplished by permanently attaching the air regiment to a 
ground corps. Unfortunately, this would also mean the regiment would likely be 
unavailable to support any other corps. If the regiment was temporarily attached, the 
degree of inflexibility dropped, but the ease of co-operation also dropped. If all regiments 
were kept subordinate at the Army level, or Front level, the ease of concentrating their 
firepower on the necessary axis became correspondingly easier, while the potential 
difficulty of cooperating with a given ground force unit became greater. Thus the 
dilemma: flexibility of concentration, or flexibility in cooperation? 
In fact, the key problem underlying the issue was not attachment, but 
communications. Here, as elsewhere in the Soviet military, the weakness of signals assets 
made itself felt. The core reason that an air regiment directly and permanently attached to 
corps gave better results to that corps lay in the ease of communication between the two 
staffs. Co-located and needing to send signals over only short distances, it was simpler to 
work out the communications. Temporary subordination removed some of the ease by 
removing the day-to-day familiarity with each other's operations. Not subordinating the 
air units at all usually ensured that all communications between the supported ground unit 
and the supporting air unit had to go through some higher headquarters. Part of the 
solution to the problem was the attachment of air staff officers to the 
headquarters of 
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supported units, and manuals, theoretical works, and Conference participants all 
recommended this solution. However, the true sword for this Gordian Knot was better 
and more plentiful communications equipment and personnel. One of the Conference 
participants, T. T. Khruikin, suggested a specific remedy to the problem: ensure radio 
communications with the ground where the support was needed, and then air units could 
be held as Front assets for flexibility in concentration while still retaining flexibility to do 
325 
precisely what the front line forces needed . Eventually, the Red Air Force would come 
to this solution. 
In the meantime, the topic was hotly debated. Smushkevich favoured retaining all 
air units at the Front level, while Richagov favoured splitting air units between Army and 
Front, with Army air units providing direct tactical support, while Front air units fought 
for air superiority and conducted operational missions. Virtually ever other speaker on 
Air Force topics also had an opinion on the subordination, if only in passing. As 
previously noted, in Finland, their largest recent engagement, the Soviets had attached 
much of their airpower at the Army level, thereby short-changing support for operational 
missions but generating better cooperation, and this organization was to persist until after 
the outbreak of Barbarossa. Not for nothing was one of S. K. Timoshenko's orders to the 
Air Force, given in his closing speech at the Conference, 'learn to cooperate with the 
ground -) . 
326 
One reply to Timoshenko's assertion, albeit proffered before Timoshenko's 
speech, came from Smushkevich: 
All our problems amount to this: we happily read the article of some 
correspondent, especially if translated, but our own manuals we do not read and 
do not know. 
325 T. T. Khriukin, pp. 203, in V. A. Zolotareva, et al., Nakanune voini. 
326 Ia. V. Smushkevich, p. 197, P. A. Richagov, 'Voenno-Vozdushnie Sili v nastupatel'noi operatsii iv 
bor'be za gospodstvo v vozdukhe', p. 176-180, S. K. Timoshenko, 'Closing Speech', p. 366, in V. A. 
Zolotareva, et al., Nakanune voini. 
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*-. Our problems stem from the 
fact that we do not bring into life that 
which we know; troubles because we do not teach our VVS how to carry out the 
forms of combat employment of the VVS which we know. 327 
Smushkevich was both right, and wrong. Officer training was an area of deep 
problems, as discussed above. Purges, inexperience, and over-rapid promotion made it 
difficult to keep commanders on top of their tasks. However, the other side of the coin is 
that the Soviet manuals and textbooks were often not terribly helpful. While usually free 
of ideological cant, the manuals often failed to be sufficiently specific or to give more 
than general guidance in the solution of problems. When read by a commander who 
already knew his business, they might provide excellent food for thought, and the issues 
of practical implementation that the manuals frequently glide past could be filled in from 
the commander's experience. When an inexperienced commander looked at them, the 
result was likely to be confusion. The laundry lists of methods and targets that plague 
their 1930s textbooks, devoid of explanations of their relative importance, ease of use, 
utility in various situations, or practicality, cannot have eased the job of a neophyte 
commander. The Soviets did learn to reverse this trend, albeit at great cost. 
An excellent example of this trend is found by comparing A. K. Mednis' 1935 
Taktika shturmovoi aviatsii: uchebnik dlia letnikh shkol i stroevikh chastei VC RKKA 
(Tactics of Close Support Aviation: Textbookfor Flying Schools and Line Units of the 
RKKA AF) with S. S. Krupin's 1946 Shturmovoi aviakorpus vo vzaimodeistii s tankovim 
korpusom pri razvitii prorivaftonta (uchebno-metodicheskii material) (The Close 
Support Air Corps in Cooperation with a Tank Corps During The Development of a 
Breakthrough (study-training material)). Mednis' book is smoother reading, and 
discusses a wide variety of possible employments of close support aviation on a laundry- 
list approach. Readers will come away from it with a general idea of things that close 
support aviation might attempt to do. Krupin's two-volume work is a more difficult, but 
327 Ia. V. Smushkevich, p. 196, in V. A. Zolotareva, et al., Nakanune voini. 
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more rewarding, read. The reader is led through an extremely detailed, very concrete 
example of the provision of support in a situation both archetypal and quite complex: 
providing close support for a fast-moving mobile formation. The first volume details the 
mission, orders, and situation; the second, somewhat larger, volume details the solution to 
the problem, including a complete set of orders, and detailed maps of communications 
nets. Mednis' book, typical of pre-war manuals, might well prove helpful to a well- 
informed officer, but will leave the recent initiate at sea, unsure of 'what do I do nowT 
when faced with reality. Kuprin answers the neophyte's question, and gives the seasoned 
officer something to ponder in the light of experience. The second might not spark the 
imagination, but it provides a concrete basis on which to conduct real-world operations. 328 
Timoshenko's closing speech at the Conference provided an incisive and damning 
look at the state of the Soviet Air Force. He reiterated that the role of the Air Force was 
tactical and operational support, ruling out raids on the enemy deep rear; and went on to 
state in more detail that the Air Force's primary missions were air superiority, tactical 
support during the breakthrough operations, and continuous support during exploitation. 
This was not a particularly controversial statement, as it summed up the central point of 
agreement in Soviet thinking about the Air Force over the past twenty years. He 
criticised the Air Force for failing to analyze or study its extensive experience -a 
criticism that was not entirely accurate, since the experience had been studied, but the 
results of the study appear not to have reached or helped line units. More controversially, 
he continued, 
... the 
leadership of the VVS does not have a unity of views on such 
questions as the nature and conduct of an operation, assessing the enemy, methods 
328 Mednis, A. K., Taktika shturmovoi aviatsii. - uchebnik dlia letnikh shkol i stroevikh chastei VC RKKA, 
(Moscow: Voenizdat, 1935,1" ed. ); Krupin, S. S., Shturmovoi aviakorpus vo vzaimodeistii s tankovim 
korpusompri ran, iHiprorivaftonta (uchebno-metodicheskii material). Chast I-ia: Zadanie, (Moscow: 
Voennaia Krasnoznamennaia Akademiia Komandnogo i Shturtnanskogo Sostava VVS Krasnoi Annii, 
1946); Krupin, S. S., Shturmovoi aviakorpus vo v: ýaimodeistii s tankovim korpusom pri ra--vitii proriva 
ftonta (uchebno-metodicheskii material). Chast 2-ia: Reshenie, (Moscow: Voennaia Krasnoznamennaia 
Akademiia Komandnogo i Shturmanskogo Sostava VVS Krasnoi Annii, 1946. ) 
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of conducting aerial warfare and bending the opponent to our will, choice of 
target, etc. 
We must bring order to this area, and the sooner, the better. 329 
In other words, Timoshenko accused the Air Force of a general failure to agree on 
the specifics of how it was to accomplish its tasks. The articles in Soviet journals, the 
vague nature of their manuals, the arguments in the 1940 Conference, and their often- 
poor showing in combat all suggest that this criticism was perfectly accurate. The Soviet 
Air Force agreed that it existed to support the ground forces. It did not agree on the 
priorities that flowed from this, or on the means of accomplishing the tasks suggested by 
those priorities. Was ground support more important than air superiority? How was air 
superiority to be achieved, and how was ground support to be organised? The Soviet Air 
Force had failed to provide clear and effective answers to these critical questions. 
In keeping with his central slogan, 'Teach the troops only that, which is needed in 
war, and only thus, as is done in war', Timoshenko ordered the Air Force to work out its 
problems: to come to agreement on tactical and operational issues, to solve the problem 
of cooperation with the ground, and, indeed, to learn to maintain its aircraft. The need for 
more and better training was stressed repeatedly, and, prophetically, Timoshenko 
reminded the Air Force that it needed to figure out how to accomplish its missions even in 
conditions of numerical inferiority. 
330 
In December 1940, though they did not know it, the Soviets had half a year to 
prepare. In June 194 1, Hitler launched his stukas east. Despite beginning with a 
tremendous numerical advantage, the VVS swiftly found itself in a position of numerical 
inferiority and desperately grappling with the question of how to help the Red Army stave 
off defeat while preventing its own annihilation at the hands of the Luftwaffe. All the 
329 S. K., Timoshenko, 'Closing speech', p. 357, in V. A. Zolotareva, et al., Nakanune voini. 
330 S. K., Timoshenko, 'Closing speech', p. 338-366, in V. A. Zolotareva, et al., Nakanune voini. 
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problems the VVS had failed to resolve since its inception now had to be solved while 
waging the largest land war in history. 
154 
Chapter 4 
The Great Patriotic War, 1941-1945 
From the perspective of a later observer, the various small wars of 1936 to 1940 
look like dress rehearsals for the main event, whose curtain rose in spectacular fashion on 
22 June 1941. The German invasion of the Soviet Union initiated the largest land war in 
history. All branches of the Soviet military were hard hit at the outset of Barbarossa, and 
among those hit hardest was the Air Force. Its aircraft, parked in dense formations, 
devoid of camouflage or defense, were caught completely by surprise by the Luftwaffe's 
initial strike. The Luftwaffe swiftly gained near-total air superiority and used it to assist 
the Wehrmacht in driving deep into the Soviet Union. Yet the Soviet Air Force recovered 
from this disastrous beginning and, eventually, reversed it. Von Hardesty aptly compares 
this course of events to the legendary phoenix, which dies in flames only to arise renewed 
from the ashes. The scope of the disaster that overtook the Soviet Air Force in the 
summer of 1941 is staggering: 1,339 aircraft lost on the first day of the war, 2,046 in the 
first week, 5,098 in the first month, and 8,166 by the end of October. As their aircraft in 
the western Soviet Union totaled 8,472 aircraft in June 21,194 1, the Soviet Air Force 
thus suffered nearly 100% losses from its deployed forces in four months. 
33 1 The 
explanation for this immolation lies, first and foremost, in the Soviet Air Force's state of 
readiness. 
Overall, the Soviets had 7,133 aircraft in the various military districts along their 
western border, plus 1,339 aircraft in DBA (Dal'naia Bornbardirovochnaia Aviatsiia, 
Long-Range Bomber Aviation) units stationed in the western Soviet Union. On paper, 
33 1 A. N. Efimov, '1941 god - opit planirovaniia i primeneniia voenno-vozdushnikh sil, uroki 
i -,, ivodi', (V. 
E. Pan'kin, ed., 1941 god - opit planirovanda i primeneniia voenno-i, o: 
dushnikh sil, itroki i ilvodi (po 
materialam voenno-nauchnoi konferentsd rukovodiashchego sostava tsentral'nogo apparata 
VVS. 
posviasshchennoi 70-leflu Soi, etskoi Annii I Voenno-Morskogo 
Rota), (MO SSSR Tsentr operativno- 
takticheskikh issledovanii VVS, Moscow, 1989), pp. 6-22), pp. 10-11,19. 
There were 7133 aircraft in the 
aviation of the western military districts, plus 
1339 aircraft in Long-Range Bomber Aviation. 
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this was a formidable force. In total, the Soviet Air Force comprised 19,583 aircraft in 
266 air regiments, many of which, in the internal regions of the Soviet Union, were meant 
to act as replacement aircraft, crews, and units for losses in the event of a war. The 
number of aircraft in the western military districts had risen steadily over the first half of 
1941, to the levels shown in Table 1, which displays a breakdown of the aircraft in the 
various border military districts on the eve of the war. The '% of a/c' line shows the 
percentage of each type of airplane against the total number of planes in the western 
military districts. The 'new-model aircraft' shows the number of newer aircraft that had 
arrived; these are included in the totals higher up in the chart. The 'Inoperable aircraft' 
line shows the number of each type of aircraft that needed repairs to be flyable. Finally, 
DBA, for which information available was less detailed, is shown on a separate column, 
with the total number of inoperable aircraft shown as both a number and a percentage in 
the lower right comer. 
332 
332 Efimov, '1941 god', (Pan'kin, ed., 1941), pp. 6-22), pp. 10- 11. 
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Table 1: Aircraft on June 21,1941 by Military District 333 






Leningrad (LVO) 308 74 857 31 11270 
Baltic (PribVO) 425 93 621 72 19211 
Westem (ZOVO) 695 70 870 154 1,789 
Kiev (KOVO) 516 80 1,238 79 1,913 
Odessa (OdVO) 268 0 640 42 950 
Total 2,212 317 4,226 378 1339 7,133 (8,472) 
Type as % of aircraft 
in Westem MIN, 
excluding DBA 
31 4.5 59.2 5.3 n/a 100 
(% including DBA) 
__(26.1) 
(3.7) (49.9) (15.8) 
New-model aircraft 360 18 1022 48 See below 1448 
Inoperable aircraft 273 26 1 562 58 171 919(19090) 
Inoperable as % 12.3 8.2 1 13.2 15.3 12.8 12.9 (12.9)1 
* Of these 1,339 aircraft, 60% (803) were DB-3F, an extensively upgraded DB-3 which entered production 
in 1936. Minute numbers of Er-2 (a further extensive upgrade of the DB-3F) and TB-7 (a four-engine 
heavy bomber also known as the Pe-8) bombers had begun to enter DBA service. 
334 
Also note that V. T. Iminov gives figures totalling 8030 aircraft in the Western Witary Districts of the 
USSR on June 22,1941. There is no apparent means of reconciling the disparity between the two. 
335 
The Soviet repair and maintenance system was being upgraded in 1941, with 
increases in the number of units, their personnel, and the equipment available, as well as 
retraining so that the mechanics were familiar with the requirements of the newer aircraft 
which were beginning to come online. 336 Nonetheless, the maintenance situation was not 
all that bad. At first blush, a 12.9% inoperability rate looks terrible. However, the RAF 
expected to have a 25% peacetime inoperability rate in its squadrons in the same era, and 
that rate did not count aircraft sent out of the squadron for major repairs and maintenance. 
333 Eftmov, '1941 god', (Pan'kin, ed., 1941), pp. 6-22), pp. 10- 11. 
334 V. T. Iminov, ed., Nachal'nii period Velikoi otechestvennoi voini. Vivodi i uroki, (Moscow: Voroshilov 
Academy, 1989), p. 62; G. S. Biushgens, ed., Samoletostroenie v SSSR 1917 - 1945 gg, kniga II, (Moscow: 
TsAGI, 1994), pp. 61-69. 
335 Iminov, ed., Nachal'nii period, Appendix 6. 
336 V. M. Shishkin, 'Organizatsiia tekhniko-ekspluatatsionnoi sluzhbi i remonta v VVS Krasnoi armii pered 
nachalom voini (ianvar' - 22 Hunia 1941 g. ) 
iv pervie mesiatsi voini (iiun' - sentiabr' 1941 g. ). ', (Pan'kin, 
ed., L941), pp. 66 - 76). 
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The USAF transport fleet expects readiness rates of 75% to 85% in the year 2000. Thus 
337 the Soviet Air Force's reported 87.5% readiness rate is, in fact, excellent . 
It is not clear from the data how much repair these inoperable aircraft required. It 
is possible, on the one hand, that a significant number required only minor maintenance 
and were reported as inoperable by units in order to gain better access to scarce 
maintenance materials. Yet, on the other hand, it is equally possible that the units chose 
to report only the worst cases, in order to present a better picture to their higher brass. 
The latter is more likely in light of the fact that the readiness rate is quite high, unless the 
Soviets were quietly increasing their readiness rate in light of the looming threat of war 
with Germany. 
Another source of trouble was the question of aircrew training. The deficit of 
pilots had caused the Soviets to shorten the pilot training course repeatedly, down to the 
wartime level of 90 days in October 1940. On the one hand, this permitted an output of 
9,613 pilots and 11,981 mechanics in 1940. On the other hand, the level of training of 
these pilots was not especially good. Most pilots in DBA were capable of operations in 
daylight in good weather. Just under a quarter could operate in daylight and bad weather, 
11.8% could handle clear nighttime flight, and only 2.5% were trained for flying in bad 
weather at night. 338 The state of training of crews in the western military districts is 
shown in Table 3. 
337 Correspondence with Erik Lund, 8 December 2000, citing E. A. Harrop, 'Planned Flying and Planned 
Aircraft Servicing in the Royal Air Force and the Effects of Aircraft Design on Maintenance, ' (Journal of 
the Royal Aeronautical Society 52 (1949), pp. 667-730), 669,720; Michael Yared provided a modem 
comparison: see John A Tirpak, 'A Clamor for Airlift', (Air Force Magazine, Volume 83, No. 12, 
December 2000, http: //www. afa. org/magazine/Dec2000/l2OOairlift. html): 
'In August, the spokesman reported, mission capable rates for the KC-135 were running at 86 
percent, vs. a 'desired' level of 85 percent. ' 
'There is no question, however, that the chief culprit behind the airlift shortfall is the C-5 Galaxy, 
which in August turned in a mission capable rate of 63.3 percent vs. a requirement of 75 percent. 
Broken C-5s consistently gum up the train of worldwide AMC aircraft movements which take 
place 24 hours a day, AMC officials reported. ' 
338 IU. V. Simakhin, 'Podgotovka aviationnikh kadrov i sostoianie ukomplektovannosti aviatsionnikh 
soedinenii i chastei lichnim sostavom. k nachalu Velikoi otechestvennoi voini', (Pan'kin, ed., 1941), pp. 86- 
92), pp. 88-90. 
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Table 2: Crew Training in Western Military Districts on the Eve of War 
339 
This table does not include DBA crewv 
_Crews 
Trained For Leningrad Baltic Western Kiev Odessa Total 
Day/Good Weather 1,135 787 1ý289 1,547 699 5,457 
As a% of crews 91 82 96 92 99 92% 
Trained In New a/c 0 0 64 100 44 208 
Day/Bad Weather 323 154 285 508 21 1,062 
As a% of crews 21 16 21 30 3 17.9% 
Trained In New a/c 0 0 4 0 0 4 
Night/Good Weather 314 126 242 359 39 1,080 
As a% of crews 25.1 13.2 18.0 21.3 5.6 18.2% 
Trained In New a/c 0 0 4 0 0 4 
Night/Bad Weather 27 0 17 0 0 44 
As a% of crews 2.2 0 1.3 0 0 . 7% Trained In New a/c 1 01 0 01 0 0 0 
This left around 480 crews who were insufficiently trained for combat under any 
conditions. Moreover, conversion training (normally conducted at the regiment level) to 
newer aircraft models was far from complete. Most crews for these aircraft had done no 
more than fly them around the airfield, leaving 1238 of the new aircraft without combat- 
effective crews. Training was usually cautious for fear of accidents, and also infrequent 
due to limits on available fuel. While the Far Eastern Military District managed to do 
over 100 hours of training per pilot in 1940, the Transcaucasus Military District, in 
second place, managed 70, and in many of the internal military districts pilots flew only 
30 to 40 hours. Since tow planes could not fly faster than 250kph, no aircrew could 
340 
practice firing at fast-moving targets . As can 
be seen in table 2, crews were trained in 
any numbers for combat only in good weather (v prostikh usloviiakh) in the daytime. 
While this seems terrible, and Soviet commentators at the time took it to be, night and all- 
weather flying capability was a Grail much sought but rarely attained among all air forces 
of the era. Moreover, despite their apparent lack of training, Soviet aircrew in 1941 flew 
339 Efimov, '1941 god', (Pan'kin, ed., 1941), pp. 6-22), pp. 10-11. 
340 IU. V. Simakhin, 'Podgotovka aviationnikh kadrov', (Pan'kin, ed., 1941), pp. 86-92), pp. 88-90; F. B. 
Komal, 'Voennie kadri nakanunye voiny', (VIZh, 1,1990, pp. 21-28), p. 26; Ia. A. Smushkevich, p. 45-46 
in V. A. Zolotareva, et al., Nakanime voini: Materiali soveshchaniia vishchego rukovodimhchego sostava 
RKKA 23-31 dekabi-ia 1940 g.. Russkii arkhiv. - Velikaia Otechesti, ennaia, T 12(l). (Terra: Moscow, 
1993. ) 
159 
bombing missions in weather which grounded the Luftwaffe - an observation lent 
credence by the fact that it comes from openly impressed Luftwaffe observers, who called 
Soviet aircrew training 'surprisingly high' in this respect. 341 While this might suggest 
that Soviet training standards were set much higher than the Luftwaffe's, wartime results 
suggest that this is not the case, as Soviet aircrew proved less well-trained than those of 
the Luftwaffe in virtually every other respect at the outset of the war. It is likely, instead, 
that Soviet Air Force commanders were simply more ruthless in attempting to conduct 
missions in dangerous weather. Moreover, they may have found that losses from the 
weather were outweighed by the reduction of losses due to the absence of opposition from 
grounded Luftwaffe fighters. 
The training picture is further clouded by the arrival of 1177 aircrew, fresh from 
flight training, into the western military districts on June 1,1941. This meant that 19.8%, 
or one in five, of the aircrew in these districts were new to their units, and had passed 
through only a very rapid training program. 342 Persistent troubles with training were one 
of the key reasons the Soviet Air Force suffered heavily in 194 1. True, some German 
aircraft outclassed older Soviet aircraft, but disparities between pilot skills can far more 
important than disparities between airframes. In this regard, it is of interest that Mark 
Hanna concluded after flying both aircraft in the 1990s that the 1- 16 was a better fighter 
than the Hurricane, a star of the Battle of Britain. 343 However, disparities in airframes 
and crew training were not the only sources of trouble for the Soviet Air Force. 
341 Walter Schwabedissen, The Russian Air Force in the E es of German Commanders, (New York: USAF y 
Historical Division and Amo Press, 1960), pp. 119-120. 
342 p. 1. Belonozhko, 'Operativo-strategicheskoe razvertivanie, sozdanie gruppirovki Sovetskikh VVS v 
zapadnikh prigranichnikh voennikh okrugakh v pervoi polovine 1941 goda. Organizatsiia upravleniia i 
vzaimodeistviia s sukhoputnimi voiskami. ', (Pan'kin, ed., 1941), pp. 42- 50), p. 44. 
343 Christer Bergstrom, Andrey Mikhailov, Black Cross, Red Star: Air War Over the Eastern Front, Volume 
1: Operational Barbarossa, 1941, (Pacifica: Pacifica Military History, 2000), p. 13; Mark Hanna, 'Flying 
the Rata', (http: //www. nzfpm. co. nz/articles/ratacwd3. htm, originally in Volume 5, #2,1998 of Classic 
Wings Downunder. ) Mark Hanna's commentary: 
'I had just flown a Hurricane for the first time, a week before the Rata [1- 16] and sorry to 
Hurricane aficionados, but I was really surprised and disappointed in the aeroplane's handling and 
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One of Barbarossa's enduring images is the Luftwaffe's fighters and bombers 
swooping down on overcrowded Soviet airfields, where aircraft lay parked wingtip to 
wingtip, inviting destruction and receiving it. The image is essentially accurate: the 
Luftwaffe struck 66 airbases on the first day of the war, which held around 5,000 aircraft 
(-70% of the aircraft in the western Soviet Union), and destroyed over 800 of them on the 
ground. The Soviet Air Force was unprepared for the strike, and paid a heavy price for 
this. Why, however, was it unprepared? The full answer to that question is still unclear, 
but an examination of Soviet basing and airbase construction does suggest parts of an 
answer. 
As mentioned above, the Soviets had 7,133 aircraft in the western military 
districts at the outbreak of the war. At the beginning of 1941, the Soviets had some 454 
airfields in the western military districts. In principle, each one could handle around 30 
aircraft (and thus each 63-aircraft regiment needed 3 airbases). In theory, there were 
enough airbases for the aircraft. In practice, however, the Soviets felt they were 592 
bases short at the beginning of May 194 1. At that point, they had already built 160 
airbases in 1941, bringing the total to 559, and planned to build another 490. During 
June, engineers completed another 52 airbases, bringing the total at the outbreak of war to 
614.344 
During the first half of 1941, aircraft had been arriving in these districts at an 
average overall rate of about 150 a month, with 400 arriving in March, for a total of 1,013 
performance (although very interesting and lovely to fly the type). I felt that you would be better 
off fighting in a Rata. At any rate I felt quickly far more comfortable in it. In air combat against 
early low powered 109's, I would suspect that the two aircraft were very comparable. Later 
variants of the Messerschmitt would easily be able to dictate the fight against the Rata due to the 
109's superior speed and vertical performance. Considering the Rata was in full squadron service 
by 1936 and was the first heavily armed, retractable gear, monoplane fighter in the world, it has 
many merits and surprisingly few vices. ' 
344 Efimov, '1941 god', (Pan'kin, ed., 1941), pp. 6-22), pp. 10- 12; A. 1. Kondioglo, 'Til Sovetskikh VVS v 
predvoennii period. Organizatsiia tilovogo obespecheniia v pervie mesiatsi Velikoi otechestvennoi voini 
(22 Hunia - sentriabr' 1941 g. )', (Pan'kin, ed., 1941), pp. 77-85), pp. 80 - 81; V. T. Iminov, ed., Nachal'nii 
period, p. 59; N. M. Ramanichev, Krasnaia anniia 1940-1941: mifl i deistvitel'nosti, (Excerpt of 
unpublished typescript (pp. 106-124)), pp. 119-120. 
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aircraft in six months. Given the rate of construction, this should not have overloaded the 
available airbases. However, it is probable that a significant portion of these aircraft went 
to the Kiev Special Military District, which was also undergoing the greatest expansion in 
airbases (its planned construction of 329 bases represents about half of planned 
construction in the western military districts). Furthermore, at the outbreak of war, 382 
airbases were available, but not in use. Over 40% of air regiments in the western Soviet 
Union were based two to an airfield, causing aircraft densities of over 150 aircraft in 
some cases. This suggests that either some of the airbases on the list were not, in fact, 
operable, or that Soviet command systems were not up to the job of handling greater 
dispersal. Indeed, both may be true. False reporting was hardly beyond the realm of 
possibility in the Soviet system. 
345 
The weakness of the Soviet signals system was also source of concern to the 
Soviets, and is bound up closely with the trouble the Soviets had in making the VVS an 
effective military instrument. While the VVS acquired its own signals arm in 1936, the 
levels of equipment this possessed in 1941 were in no way up to the levels intended or 
required. Communications between its 103 communications centers was all done on 
civilian telephone and telegraph lines, and provided neither the means of communicating 
between different air units, nor to the commands of Fronts and military districts. 
Funding, in 194 1, was only at 20% of the level needed to bring the communications 
system up to specifications. As a result, most airbases did not have internal wire 
communications, let alone external. Problems were worst in the newly acquired 
territories in the western Soviet Union, where the civilian communications net was weak. 
Along the western border, fighter units were not tied into the early warning system. 346 
345 Efimov, '1941 god', (Pan'kin, ed., 1941), pp. 10- 11; Rainanichev, Krasnaia armiia, p. 120. 
346 G. V. LJFianov, 'Organizatsiia sviazi i radiotekhnicheskogo obespecheniia boevikh deistvii aviatsionnikh 
soedinenii i chastei v predvoennii period (ianvar - 21 iiunia 1941 g. ) iv pervie mesiatsi Velikoi 
otechestvennoi voini (22 iiunia - sentiabr' 1941 g. )', (Pan'kin, ed., 1941), pp. 93 - 104), pp. 93-94. 
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In theory, the problems with wire communications were less of a concern than 
they might have been, because the Air Force was officially moving to radio 
communications in any event. However, the VVS was responsible for putting radios into 
airplanes, while the Red Army Main Signals Directorate was responsible for providing 
ground radios. Neither was able to provide radios in the quantities needed, leaving units 
at 30% to 50% of their intended levels of equipmente. Even those intended levels were 
modest, since not every aircraft was expected to carry a radio, and most radios were 
receive-only. Commanders' inexperience with and distrust of radios complicated this 
picture, especially with regard to directing aircraft onto targets. Furthermore, there was a 
serious shortage of trained signals operators. It is probably for this reason that 382 
airbases in the western Soviet Union were not in use, despite the overcrowding of aircraft 
at other bases. The means to communicate with those bases did not exist, and thus 
aircraft at them would have been useless. 347 
The Soviet command was well aware of the problems. A report by G. K. Zhukov, 
written on I April 194 1, noted that VVS signals in the western military districts were 
disastrous. In addition to equipment problems, there was no unified system or method for 
signals, staff spent training time doing farm work, and most signals staff had little 
knowledge or understanding of signals organization and security. Zhukov noted, 'the 
breakdown of combat readiness of signals in the troops of the VVS in peacetime will lead 
to the paralysis of command in wartime. ' 
348 
A third source of over-concentration was doctrinal. The doctrinal troubles were 
partly a response to signals difficulties. As discussed earlier, in the aftennath of the 
Winter War, the Soviets attempted to improve coordination between ground and air units 
347 Ramanichev, Krasnaia armiia, p. 120. 
348 G. V. TA'ianov, 'Organizatsiia sviazi i radiotekhnicheskogo obespecheniia boevikh deistvii aviatsionnikh 
soedinenii i chastei v predvoennii period (ianvar - 21 iiunia 1941 g. ) iv pervie mesiatsi Velikoi 
otechestvennoi voini (22 Hunia - sentiabr' 1941 g. )', (Pan'kin, ed., 1941), pp. 93-104), pp. 94- 101 (Zhukov 
quote from p. 10 1); Ramanichev, Krasnaia armfia, p. 12 1. 
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by decentralizing control air units away from Fronts, to Armies. While this made it easier 
for a given unit to coordinate activity with its supported Army, it left units with a smaller 
pool of signals equipment to draw on (Army instead of Front) and made command and 
coordination between air units in different armies more difficult. Furthermore, air units 
needed to try to find airbases to which their Army could provide signals support, a 
smaller area than that in which a Front could theoretically provide signals support. Thus, 
the doctrinal decision to concentrate air units at the Army level combined with severe 
shortages in communications equipment to create overcrowded airbases as an unintended 
result. 
349 
The other half of the doctrinal problem, however, comes from an incorrect 
assessment of the effectiveness of strikes on airbases. As discussed in the previous 
chapter, some of the top Soviet Air Force commanders did not believe that strikes on 
airbases were especially effective. Thus, while the Soviets intended to construct a great 
many airbases, it is possible that many Soviet commanders did not expect the 
overcrowding to be as severe a liability in the event of war as it turned out to be. 
Nonetheless, this can be overstated, as the Soviet commanders who thought strikes on 
airbases were ineffective explicitly stated that this was under conditions of defended 
airbases with aircraft that were both dispersed and camouflaged. None of these three 
conditions pertained to Soviet airbases on June 22,194 1, and Zhukov's last-minute order 
to camouflage and disperse aircraft suggests compellingly that the Soviet command knew 
this was the case. 
350 
The Soviets were caught in a bind: if they dispersed their aircraft to more airfields 
for better security, the deficit of signals equipment meant they would lose control of the 
349 Iminov, ed., Nachal'nii period, p. 6 1; Ramanichev, Krasnaia armiia, p. 107,12 1; Ullanov, 
'Organizatsiia sviazi', (Pan'kin, ed., 1941), pp. 93 - 104), p. 94. 
350 V. R. Zhuravlev, A. S. Anuffiev, N. M. Emelyanova, Tervie dni voini v dokumentakh', VIA, 5,1989, 
p. 43. 
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aircraft and thus the aircraft would become ineffective. If they did not disperse the 
aircraft, they risked having them more easily destroyed in the event of war. Vulnerability 
due to concentration on fewer airfields to ease communications could be offset by 
dispersal, camouflage, and defence at each airbase, but the Soviets did not accomplish 
these tasks. Thus their failure to Provide adequate signals support drove them to a 
dangerous solution, and local units did not follow through on measures to protect 
themselves: a gap between what they knew ought to be done, and what they were actually 
doing, such as Smushkevich had already noted in regard to the Finnish War. 
Signals turned out to be one of the major weaknesses of the entire Soviet military 
machine in Barbarossa. The under-allocation of funds to signals, and the existence of 
major deficits of signals equipment throughout the Soviet armed forces at the time, 
suggests that either the Soviets did not fully appreciate the importance of signals in 
warfare, or did not have the industrial capacity to produce signals equipment at the rate 
required by their military expansion in the later 1930s and early 1940s, or both. Since the 
Soviet government controlled industrial expansion, it is probable that the Soviet 
government as a whole under-rated the importance of signals. The Soviet people paid a 
high price for this error. 
Thus, the primary cause of the over-concentration of the Soviet Air Force does not 
appear to be Air Force doctrine. That doctrine had a role, to be sure, but the relevant 
sections of it were being created in reaction to the shortage of signals equipment and 
operators. However, the Air Force is not free of blame in the wider picture of the Soviet 
neglect of signals. As discussed earlier, Soviet Air Force manuals and commanders, by 
and large, did not pay sufficient attention to signals. While the Air Force hoped to 
improve its signals through radio, it is unclear if the planned use of radio was as extensive 
as was truly required: two way radios in every aircraft, linked into a network of command 
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radios on the ground both at headquarters, airfields, and the front line. Even if the 
intended adoption of radio represented a change of heart, the Air Force wound up paying 
the price for its earlier cavalier treatment of signals. 
Compounding the problem of signals were problems in training. This pertains not 
only to the problems with insufficient or untrained signals operators, but everywhere else 
in the Air Force as well. Commanders were hastily trained and hastily promoted to fill 
gaps in the ranks created by rapid expansion and purges. The rapid expansion caused the 
Soviets to curtail their crew training programs while the number of schools rose 
dramatically. Many of the aircrew were poorly trained, a matter made worse as new and 
unfamiliar aircraft appeared, and events would show they were not prepared for combat. 
An NKO directive in the winter of 1940-41 summarized training efforts by noting, '... the 
Red Army's air force's combat training was unsatisfactory. The flying-technical staff has 
poorly utilized new equipment. 
351 
The initial clash between the Luftwaffe and the Soviet Air Force is usually 
presented as one between a battle-tested force and one not used to combat. This picture is 
partly false. While the Luftwaffe was indeed battle-tested, the Soviet Air Force had seen 
some combat in the previous 5 years as well, in Spain, China, Mongolia, and Finland. 
The difference appears to be that the Luftwaffe learned Erom its experience, whereas the 
Soviet Air Force repeatedly failed to do so. In addition, the Luftwaffe had undergone a 
series of full scale trials by 194 1, while the only war to put any significant part of the 
Soviet Air Force at full stretch was the Finnish War. 
Thus the Soviet Air Force found itself facing a number of problems each of which 
was caused or compounded by another. Its aircraft were over-concentrated because of 
doctrinal considerations predicated on a deficit of signals equipment and operators that 
stemmed from a general Soviet neglect of signals. This was compounded by a generally 
35 ' Ramanichev, Krasnaia armfla, p. 118, citing TsAMO, fond 35, opis' 11304, delo 13, list 48. 
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low level of training for aircrew, which was in turn exacerbated by the arrival of new 
equipment. The problems with signals, and, in part, the low level of training, stemmed 
from the Soviet's failure to learn effectively from their experience in past wars. As a 
result, tactics continued to be out of date, signals continued to be under-rated, and the full 
danger of over-concentration on airfields improperly understood. The bright point in this 
picture was that, despite their repeated failures to codify the correct lessons learned into 
doctrine, the Soviets had a demonstrated ability to learn under fire: an expensive training 
tool, but better than none at all. 
Furthermore, the Soviet decision to subordinate most of their air units to Armies 
meant that they had, in essence, given up the ability to concentrate airpower. Since 
Fronts retained little in the way of assets, and the High Command retained control of 
heavy bomber aviation, the bulk of the power of the Soviet Air Force was incapable of 
shifting from Army to Army, let alone Front to Front. Battle-fighting is tactics, while 
operations is the art of orchestrating battles to achieve a goal - orchestration achieved not 
least through the ability to concentrate force where it is most needed in order to win those 
battles critical for the overall plan. Since 1918, Soviet theorists had argued it was 
necessary to mass airpower on the main axis for decisive effect, and doctrine similarly 
directed that airpower be used in mass. Thus, the failure of signals induced a failure of 
operational doctrine, nearly causing the operational air effort to cease to exist because it 
prevented the Soviets from being able to mass their forces where they were needed. This 
defect was remedied in 1942 after severe losses. 
Early on 22 June, the Luftwaffe launched a carefully planned and coordinated 
attack that struck both Soviet airfields and communications. The telegraph wire net, 
which carried Soviet civilian and military communications, was specifically targeted and 
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brought down, causing widespread disruption. The Soviets claim to have run periodic 
alerts at their airbases, with most units able to scramble air units with the specified time 
limits: 25 to 30 minutes for fighters, 30 to 60 minutes for close support aircraft, and 90 
minutes for bombers. However, the Soviet signals network was weak in peacetime, and 
the Luftwaffe's systematic bombing can hardly have improved the propagation of alerts 
to bases, thus compounding the Luftwaffe's advantage of surpnse. The exception to this 
rule was the Odessa Military District, which had practiced dispersing its aircraft on alert 
to alternate airfields, and whose warning order to do so, issued at 23.00 on 21 June, 
ap ears to have succeeded in part - though the lower losses in the Odessa Military . Pp 
District may stem just as much from its location off of the primary axes of attack in the 
initial days of the war. Other Military Districts also sent out this order, but, not having 
practiced the dispersal, it was unrealistic to expect that the order would be carried out, 
especially at night. 
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The Luftwaffe struck 66 airbases on June 22, which contained around 70% of the 
Soviet Air Force's aircraft in the west. Soviet losses on day one are reported as 1339 
aircraft, with over 800 of these on the ground. Official loss statistics for the period 22 
June through 30 October 1941 are: 
Table 3: Official Losses 353 
Date Cumulative Losses Daily Loss Rate Average Weekly 
Loss Rate 
23 June 1,339 1339 9373 
1 July 2,046 88 619 
22 July 5,098 145 1017 
21 August 61442 45 314 
22 October 7ý746 21 147 
352 B. B. Lariokhin, 1. A. Tref lak, 'Sovershenstvovaniia radiosviazi radiolokatsionnogo obespecheniia 
boevikh deistvii aviatsii', VIZh, 9,1986, p. 68; 1. T. Peresipkin, 'Voiska sviazi v period Velikoi 
Otechestvennol voini', VIZh, 4,1968, p. 36; Peresipkin, Sviaz'v Velikoi Otechestvennoi voini, p. 29-31,76, 
1. T. Peresipkin, 'Sviaz' Generalnogo shtaba', VIZh, 4,197 1, p. 20; Khor'kov, A. G., Boevaia i 
mobilizatsionnaia gotoinost'prigranichnikh voennikh okrugov nakanune Velikoi otechestvennoi voini, 
(Akademiia General'nogo Shtaba, Moscow, 19XX [smudged]), pp. 19,27,8 1; Efimov, A 941 god', 
(Pan'kin, ed., 1941, pp. 6-22), p. 13-14. 
353 Efimov, '1941', (Pan'kin, ed., 1941, pp. 6-22), p. 10-11,19. 
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30 October 8,166 53 368 
Average n/a 63 440 
These do not necessarily tally the claim of 3655 aircraft left in the Western Soviet Union 
on I July, and 2216 left on I August, which would require 3478 losses by I July instead 
of 2046, and 4917 losses by I August, which is fewer than the above chart claims were 
lost by 22 July. Considering that the Soviets were also reinforcing the western units with 
aircraft from the interior and eastern military districts, and also sent 4517 aircraft from 
factories, the losses above are probably under-reported and may well have exceeded 
10,000. Nonetheless, they paint a grim picture: by the end of October, after four months, 
the Soviets had lost more aircraft than there had been in the Western Soviet Union and 
DBA at the outbreak of the war. Indeed, by one claim the Soviets lost nearly half their 
aircraft in the West in the first week. The loss rate declined after that point, probably 
because combat had winnowed out the poorer Soviet pilots and ensured there were fewer 
planes available to lose, because the Soviets began to regain control of their own forces 
and thus were better placed to engage on their own terms, and because the Luftwaffe was 
suffering from its own mounting problems due to losses, maintenance, and logiStiCS. 354 
The Soviet rate of loss was, in most respects, disastrous: nearly 100% in four 
months. On the other hand, this rate of loss - effectively 300% per year - is apparently 
the loss rate the Soviets expected to sustain! Calculations based on the Spanish Civil War 
suggested that the yearly loss rate of aircraft in a major war would be 300-400% of 
aircraft engaged. Expected or not, the loss rate was one the Soviets were ill-prepared to 
handle. Rapid retreats forced the relocation of factories and training centers. Moreover, 
the losses at the front line prompted the Soviets to make an error the Germans would later 
commit as well: sending flight instructors into the front line. While this succeeded in 
354 Efirnov, '1941', (Pan'kin, ed., 1941, pp. 6-22), p. 10-16; Murray, Luftwaffe, pp. 81-107. 
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providing a short-term boost in the number of experienced pilots in the front lines, the 
long-term consequence was a reduction in the overall quality of pilot training. The 
apparent level of Soviet desperation suggests that if the 300%-400% loss rate was known, 
they had not fully understood what it would mean, and the Soviet war machine was in any 
event not fully up to the task of coping with it. 355 
Perhaps the Soviets had expected that the loss rate would apply to both sides. In 
this respect, they were not so far off the mark. The Luftwaffe sustained significant losses 
at the hands of the Soviets, suggesting that, for all the Soviet Air Force's failings, it 
nonetheless continued to provide noteworthy opposition. Out of an average strength of 
2462 aircraft on the Eastern Front, the Luftwaffe lost an average of 741 planes per month 
from June 22 through I November 194 1, for an average monthly loss rate of 3 0% and a 
yearly rate of 360%. This also amounted to a weekly loss rate of about 174, against the 
VVS weekly loss rate of about 440 for the same period. By 30 June, the Luftwaffe had 
lost 699 aircraft on the Eastern Front and had only 960 still operational there. By 27 
September, the Luftwaffe had lost 1603 aircraft destroyed (and another 1028 damaged) 
on the Eastern Front in three months. By contrast, the Luftwaffe lost 1385 aircraft in the 
Battle of Britain in three months. However, unlike the Battle of Britain, the battle for 
aerial supremacy on the Eastern Front continued, unrelenting. 356 Williamson Murray 
concluded, regarding the air war over the Eastern Front in 194 1, 
For the second year in a row, the Luftwaffe had lost nearly its entire 
complement of aircraft. The German air force could not look forward, as it had in 
1940 after the Battle of Britain, to a period of recuperation. The failure in front of 
Moscow meant that the war in the east would continue with its ever-vaster 
commitments and its interminable distances. 357 
355 Khor'kov, Boevaia i mobilizatsionnaia gotovnost', p. 49; A. S. Goriainov, 'Razvitie VUZov i 
podgotovka kadrov dlia VVS v nachale Velikoi otechestvennoi voini', (Pan'kin, ed., 1941, pp. 112-116), 
pp. 114-115. 
356 Williamson Murray, The biftwaffe, 1933-45: Strategyfor Defeat, (London: Brassey's, 1996), pp. 96- 
107, Bergstrom, Mikhailov, Black CrosslRed Star, pp. 72,192. 
357 Murray, Luftwaffe, Pp. 103-104. 
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While pre-war theory and doctrine pointed towards the use of strikes on enemy 
airbases as well as air combat in order to gain superiority over the enemy, the primary 
means the Soviets used to combat the Luftwaffe in World War 2 was aerial combat. They 
did not come to this conclusion immediately. On 22 June 194 1, the Soviet Air Force was 
ordered to bomb the Luftwaffe's airbases, debate on the value of such strikes 
notwithstanding. However, bombers units attempting this mission were, at best, poorly 
coordinated with fighter escorts, and often completely unescorted; and the sad fate of 
these large formations of bombers is well known. As a result, subsequent airbase attacks 
were generally not attempted in 1941. From 22 June to 30 September, the Soviet Western 
Front launched only 1,987 sorties on airbase attacks, just over 4% of the 50,000 or so 
sorties it launched in that time frame, while some 37% of all sorties by the Soviet Air 
Force up to 30 September were fighters on air superiority missions. The next major 
attempts to bomb German airbases did not occur until the fighting outside Moscow, when 
maj or efforts were made on II- 18 October and 5-7 November. These generated some 
success, but are noteworthy in part because they exist at all. Moreover, faced with high 
losses and the Luftwaffe's dominance in the air, the Soviets switched, by the end of June 
1941, to a policy of engaging in aerial combat only in favorable circumstances. The one 
shift from this Policy during the summer of 1941 came at Smolensk, when the Soviets 
committed numerous flight instructors in the hopes of turning around the air war. 
Luftwaffe losses increased, and Luftwaffe monthly losses in 1941 peaked in July, with 
16.1 % of aircraft in the East lost. However, Soviet losses also increased, and the effort 
was not sustainable from the Soviet side. Furthermore, the loss of instructors cannot have 
had a positive impact on the Soviet's training program. 
358 The shift to engaging the 
358 Efnnov, '1941 god', (Pan'kin, 1941, pp. 6-22), pp. 15-16; Murray, Lufiwaffe, pp. 90-92; Goriainov, 
'Razvitie VUZov', (Pan'kin, 1941, pp. 112-116), pp. 114-115; 1. V. Timokhovich, Operativnoe iskusstvo 
Sovetskikh VVS v Velikoi Otechestvennoi voine, (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1976), pp. 70-74, Bergstrom, 
Mikhailov, Black CrosslRed Star, pp. 84-85. 
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Luftwaffe only in conditions of tactical superiority is reminiscent of the concepts for the 
operations of a small air force the Soviets developed in the 1920s, but it is not clear if 
those concepts were explicitly explored in 1941, or rediscovered as a logical means of 
limiting losses. 
Also important in reducing losses were measures taken to protect airbases better. 
Steady work to improve camouflage and dispersal helped in reducing losses from 1570 on 
airbases in June to 99 in July and 33 in August. 359 
At the end of June 1941 . the Soviets shifted from focusing on both Luftwaffe 
airfields and ground support to focus wholly on ground support. As a result, some 47% 
of all sorties in the first three months of the war were for ground support. However, 
ground support was poorly organized. Soviet Air Force organization, with most units 
subordinate to armies, prevented the Soviets from massing on a decisive axis. High 
losses in bomber units ensured the Soviets would not have the aircraft to generate 
significant results without massing. By the end of September, the various Soviet Fronts 
each had between 17 and 120 bombers remaining, and 4 to 30 close-support aircraft each 
- almost all of them parceled out to subordinate armies. When combined with often- 
inexperienced commanders, signals still impaired by underfunding and enemy action, and 
requests from ground commanders who had little understanding of the capabilities and 
limitations of air power, the result was 'separate, episodic strikes', in which small groups 
of aircraft struck laundry lists of scattered targets, devoid of effective cooperation with 
supported units on the ground . 
360 The structural inability to concentrate on targets 
enforced by the dispersal of air units to armies and high losses was compounded by an 
"9 Efimov, '1941 god', (Pan'kin, 1941, pp. 6-22), p. 14. 
360 Iminov, Nachal'nii period, pp. 126-127; Efimov, '1941 god', (Pan'kin, 1941, pp. 6-22), p. 17, quote on 
p. 17; P. 1. Belonozhko, 'Operativo-strategicheskoe razvertivanie, sozdanie gruppirovki Sovetskikh VVS v 
zapadnikh prigranichnikh voennikh okrugakh v pervoi polovine 1941 goda. Organizatsiia upravlenfia i 
vzaimodeistviia s sukhoputnimi voiskami. ", (Pan'kin, 1941, pp. 42- 50), pp. 45-49; Timokhovich, 
Operativnoe iskusstvo, pp. 217-222. 
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order issued by Stavka on 4 July 1941 intended to use smaller groups of aircraft in an 
attempt to reduce losses, reacting to the destruction of large Soviet bomber formations in 
the early days of the war: 
Flying to bomb targets and troops in large groups is categorically 
forbidden. Flying to a given target at the same time should not be done by more 
than a single zveno or in exceptional cases by a squadron. 361 
Long-Range Aviation (DBA) fared little better. Despite prestige raids on targets 
such as Berlin and the Ploesti oilfields, raids on strategic targets accounted for only 5% of 
its activity. More frequently, it was called hither and yon by a series of competing 
requests from Stavka, Fronts, and the Soviet Air Force high command, leading it to 
attempt to accomplish numerous tactical and operational support missions with 
insufficient planning and less focus of effort. This scattering of effort was somewhat 
curtailed after 4 July 194 1, when the assignment of missions to DBA was reserved to the 
Chief of the General Staff, but the DBA had already suffered heavy losses. By 30 
September 1941, it retained only 402 of its original 1,339 aircraft, and 171 of those were 
not fit to fly. Furthermore, as of 3 July 194 1, Stavka ordered that all outdated bombers be 
used only at night, which preserved the bomber force at the cost of reducing its 
effectiveness. 
362 
The Soviets were well aware of their problems, and conducted several efforts to 
reorganize their force structure in the summer of 194 1. On 24 June 194 1, the Soviets 
instituted the post of Commander in Chief of the VVS RKKA, placing all Soviet Air 
Force units under the control of this staff for strategic, independent, and separate 
operations, and for gaining air superiority. Unfortunately, this meant the almost none of 
the missions actually being conducted by the Soviet Air Force were under centralized 
command, because they fell into the category of direct support. This change also placed 
36' Timokhovich, Operativnoe iskusstvo, pp. 218. A zveno had 3 aircraft, and a squadron 12. 
362 Efunov, '1941 god', (Pan'kin, 1941, pp. 6-22), p. 18-20; Timokhovich, Operativnoe iskusstvo, pp. 220- 
221. 
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all commanders of Frontal Aviation in direct subordination to the Commander in Chief of 
the Soviet Air Force, but left them also subordinate to their Front commanders, and 
moreover failed to subordinate the various army's air units to centralized command or to 
the Fronts commanding them. Similarly, the formation of the North-Western, Western, 
and South-Western Strategic Directions on 10 July 1941, intended to provide better 
operational control and centralization to both ground and air forces, was hindered by the 
fact that the bulk of Soviet aviation was controlled by armies. 363 
The Soviets were also experimenting with tactical organization. On 15 July 194 1, 
they began forming mixed air regiments, with two bomber and one fighter squadron each, 
in an attempt to provide better coordination between bombers and escorts. The 
experiment did not prove itself, in part because of logistic difficulties, and on 20 August 
1941 all regiments began to be formed out of one type of aircraft, with two squadrons per 
regiment. Of greater utility, the Soviets began forming Supreme High Command Reserve 
Air Groups (RAG VGK), of 80 to 160 aircraft (one or two bomber, one or two close 
support, and four to six fighter regiments each) on 21 July 194 1. These were intended to 
be equipped only with newer aircraft and better-prepared pilots. As importantly, they 
were controlled by Stavka, and thus could be directed against the axis most in need of 
reinforcement, as when three of them were flung against Guderian's 2nd Panzer Group in 
late August and early September 1941 - though they were committed sequentially, not en 
masse. Nonetheless, the formation of these Reserve Groups was an important step away 
from the inflexible system with which the Soviets had begun the war, and towards the 
critical reforms of the spring of 1942. They began to restore to the Soviet command the 
ability to concentrate the Soviet Air Force where it was needed. 
364 
363 Efimov, '1941 god', (Pan'kin, 1941, pp. 6-22), p. 19-20. 
364 Efimov, '1941 god', (Pan'kin, 1941, pp. 6-22), p. 20, A. G. Pervov, 'Nekotorie voprosi sozdaniia i 
primeneniia aviatsionnikh rezervov glavnogo komandovaniia nakanune iv pervie mesiatsi Velikoi 
otechestvennoi voini, (Pan'kin, 1941, pp. 131 - 139), pp. 136-138. 
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The Soviet Air Force's next attempt to take the war to the enemy occurred in 
October. The Soviets thought they had discerned a Luftwaffe plan to concentrate 
between 1,000 and 1,500 aircraft intended to launch a major attack on a variety of Soviet 
strategic and operational targets near Moscow on 12-13 October. In response, the Soviets 
launched as much of their forces as they could at Luftwaffe bases from II- 18 October. 
The impact of these strikes is uncertain; the Soviets claimed, at the time, to have 
destroyed an unlikely total of 500 German aircraft, while German accounts suggest the 
damage was relatively minor. A repeat attack on 5-8 November is claimed to have 
produced another 200 German aircraft losses. In all Probability the damage was relatively 
slight, but the wider significance was not: the Soviet Air Force was beginning to return to 
the fray. While the Soviets had lost some 21,200 aircraft in 1941, of which between 
10,000 and 15,000 were in combat, the majority of the losses took place early, and 
replacement machines continued to come. The Luftwaffe's records, in the same period of 
time, show a loss of 2,093 aircraft destroyed and another 1,734 damaged on the Eastern 
Front. However, the Luftwaffe received fewer replacements, and was further hampered 
by failure to adequately prepare for winter. The Soviets appear to have learned and 
applied their lessons from Finland in that regard. Furthermore, because the Luftwaffe's 
replacement abilities were far worse than the Soviet's, the Soviets were periodically able 
to claim numerical superiority even after their stupendous losses, and on occasion to 
threaten the Luftwaffe's air superiority, notably in the fighting for Moscow in late 1941 
and early 1942.365 
The Soviets were not entirely unhappy with the results of the air war waged in the 
winter of 1941-1942. A Northwestern Front report on the fighting in later 1941 and early 
365 Timokhovich, Operativnoe iskusstvo, pp. 72-74; von Hardesty, Red Phoenix: The Rise of Soviet Air 
Power, 1941 - 1945, (Washington: Smithsonian institution Press, 1982), pp. 
72-74; Bergman, Mikhailov, 
Red CrosslBlack Star, pp. 196-197,252-255. 
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1942 noted a number of successes. 366 The report extolled the virtues of pair-based tactics 
(leader-wingman), such as the Germans had pioneered in Spain. It also declared 
categorically that 'A pilot without a radio is half-blind', and that 'As a rule, in those units 
which are better provided with radios there are greater successes and fewer losses. ' 
Furthermore, the Northwestern Front reported that it had waged a successful battle for air 
superiority in covering an offensive, by launching a strike on Luftwaffe bases shortly 
prior to the ground offensive and then waging and aggressive campaign in the air: as they 
noted, 
367 
But, however successful the raids on airbases, they do not decide the 
question of mastery of the air, but only form the preconditions for it. Mastery of 
the air is won, in the end, through aerial combat. 368 
This fighter campaign was directed by forward control points, sited near the front 
lines and equipped with radios to connect them to both the fighter bases and the fighters 
in the air, allowing the Soviets to vector fighters where they were needed. Moreover, all 
pilots were rotated through the forward control points to ensure that all pilots were 
familiar with their abilities and limitations. The Northwestern Front was pleased with its 
successes, limited and tactical though they were, and overall the report strongly suggests 
that the Soviets were busily demonstrating their ability to learn under fire. 369 
A Soviet Anny report on the winter offensives in 1941-1942 paints the Air Force 
in a different light and makes it clear that, despite its improvement, the Air Force still had 
a long way to go. Examining the use of combat aviation, it noted that, 'Combat aviation 
is often scattered. Instances of massed use of aviation for systematic impact on the 
366 Note that these reports, while published in later 1942, were prepared by the relevant Fronts at a 
somewhat earlier date. The Sbornik publications followed a general order to the entire Soviet military to 
prepare after-action analyses of their combat activity, and the first two issues of the Sborniki used material 
already available from those formations that were already preparing reports. 
367 'Bor'ba za gospodstvo v vozdukhe na severo-zapadnom Eronte', (Sbornik materialovpo Lucheniiu opita 
voini No. 2, Sentiabr'- Oktiabr' 1942 g., (Voenizdat, 1942), pp. 98-102), pp. 99- 100. 
368 'Bor'ba za gospodstvo v vozdukhe na severo-zapadnorn fronte, (Sbornik materialov No. 2, pp. 98-102), 
P. 101. 
369 'Bor'ba za gospodstvo v vozdukhe na severo-zapadnom fironte', (Sbornik materialov No. 2, (Voenizdat, 
1942), pp. 98-102), p. 100- 102. 
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enemy on the main axis of his offensive are rare. ' - another instance of the Soviet Air 
Force recognizing its failure to execute its own doctrine. 370 Further criticism was leveled 
against the Air Force for its inability to provide effective support to the parachute assault 
operations the Soviet conducted in that winter: 
The majority of desant operations were conducted in the complete absence 
of support from combat aviation. In the best case a quite limited force of aircraft, 
designated for support, was unable to complete the assigned mission. [ ... ] Tactical coordination of aviation with landed desant forces was also 
absent. Aviation, as a rule, acted on indicated points thought to be occupied by 
enemy troops and fire points. Where the desant was at that moment, and if it was 
better to bomb the indicated point or some other, the aviation did not know. 371 
Thus, while the Air Force was improving its ability to contend with the Luftwaffe, 
it still faced grave difficulties in actually fulfilling its missions for the Army. Further in 
this vein, the report on offensive operations concluded that, 
Combat aviation should be centralized at the Front level. Dispersing 
aviation to armies is, in most cases, pointless. [ ... ] Combat aviation is most 
effective when centralized at the Front level, with its strikes massed on the most 
important targets of the enemy offensive. When the enemy's communications are 
difficult, combat aviation can gain significant operational results by destroying 
important roads and denying the enemy regular resupply. 372 
This shows that the Soviets were figuring out that the attempt to centralize 
airpower through the use of Strategic Directions had failed, and neither was the use of 
VGK Reserve Air Corps able to tip the balance far enough in overcoming the problems 
the Soviets faced in structuring their Air Force to concentrate its power. Recognizing 
this, the Soviets prepared a complete overhaul of their organization, and brought in a new 
person to command the Air Force: Aleksandr Alksandrovich Novikov. 
Novikov, whose military career began when called into the Red Army in 1919, 
graduated from the Frunze Academy in 1930, moved into the Air Force in 1932. He had 
370 'Operativno-takticheskie uroki zimnoi karnpanii 1941/42 g. ', (Sbornik materialov No. 2, (Voenizdat, 
1942), pp. 3- 10), p. I 
371 'Nekotoriie vivodi po desantnim operastiiam za 1941 god', (Sbornik materialov po i.: iicheniiu opita voini 
No. 1, lul'- A vgust 1942 g-, (Voenizdat, 1942), pp. 9-18), p. 12. 
372 'Operativno-takticheskie uroki zimnoi kampanii 1941/42 g. ', (Sbornik materialov No. 2, (Voenizdat, 
1942), pp. 3-10), pp. 7-8. 
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risen to be Chief of Staff of the Air Force for the North-Western Front (defending the 
Baltic states and Leningrad) by the time of the Finnish war, and took command of the 
Leningrad Military District Air Force in 1940. His successes in the defense of Leningrad, 
as both commander of Frontal Aviation there and as First Deputy of the Commander of 
the Air Force, led to his promotion to Commander of the Air Force on II April 1942. (In 
a sign of the improvement of relations between Stalin and his generals, Novikov's 
predecessor, Pavel Zhigarev, was not shot, but moved to command the aviation of the Far 
Eastem Militaly District. ). 373 
Novikov's experience in the Finnish War and during 1941 convinved him of the 
necessity of reorganizing the Soviet Air Force to enable greater concentration of force. 
While still the First Deputy of the Commander of the Air Force, he attempted to form 
aviation corps of several divisions, each composed of one type of aircraft. Stalin was not 
impressed, but permitted Novikov to experiment with such a corps to assist in the attempt 
to break the blockade of Leningrad in early 1942 and attempts to destroy the Demiansk 
pocket. Opinions vary regarding Novikov's level of success, with some analysts calling 
the Soviet Air Force presence 'negligible', while others call the Luftwaffe's loss of 265 
transport aircraft by the end of February 1942 as 'inordinately high' despite its overall 
success in preventing the fall of the pocket. Certainly the Soviet Air Force performance 
could have been better. Novikov tried a number of expedients in hopes of improving 
interception efficiency, including ordering IL-2 ground attack aircraft to intercept German 
transports. For these efforts, air force troops awarded him the punning rhyme 'Priekhal 
Novikov - zhdi novinki! ' ('Novikov's arrived - await novelties! 
9)374 
313 P. Kutakhov, 'Glavnii marshal aviatsii A. A. Novikov', (VIZh, 11,1970, pp. 61-65), pp. 61-62; John 
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This willingness to break with the past in pursuit of effectiveness stood Novikov 
in good stead when he rose to command of the Soviet Air Force. Novikov promptly 
began the process of replacing the old organization. In April 1942, ground armies lost 
nearly all of their aviation assets to Fronts, leaving only a regiment of reconnaissance and 
liaison aircraft to each army. Further, each Front's aviation was united into an air army. 
Each air army contained, in theory, eight fighter, four close support, two bomber, and one 
night bomber regiments in addition to training, reconnaissance, and liaison units. In 
practice, air army organization proved highly variable. 375 The Western Front was first to 
receive this treatment, in an order on 5 May 1942: 
In the interests of increasing the striking power of aviation and successful 
use of massed aviation strikes, unite the aviation forces of the Western Front into 
a single air army, to be designated Tt Air Army'. 376 
As companions to the air armies, Novikov formed further aviation armies as High 
Command Reserves. Initially, he intended to form at least three of these, two fighter and 
one bomber, with each aviation army to comprise some 200-300 aircraft in three to five 
divisions. However, only one of these, the I" Fighter Aviation Army, was actually 
formed. In practice, the High Command Reserve Aviation Army turned out to be 
excessively large and insufficiently mobile, maneuverable, or flexible, especially when 
placed alongside the air army already existing in a Front command structure. The High 
Command Reserve aviation army was replaced by the High Command Reserve air corps, 
intended to be more mobile, maneuverable, and more easily integrated into the structure 
of a Front and its air army. The aviation armies in formation, along with the various High 
Command Reserve air groups already formed, were reformed into air corps along the 
same lines as the air corps of the air armies themselves. Each corps contained two or 
Nautical and Aviation Publishing Company, 1993), p 
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three divisions, with bomber corps having 200-300 aircraft while fighter and close 
support corps contained 250 - 375 aircraft. Initially, there were also mixed air corps, of 
two fighter divisions and one division of either bombers or close support aircraft, but this 
organization was phased out in 1944. However, the bulk of this organization proved 
itself- Novikov had rebuilt the Soviet Air Force structure such that it could finally attempt 
in practice what theory and doctrine had long recommended: massing on the decisive axis 
in support of the ground forces. Indeed, the importance Novikov assigned to this can be 
seen clearly in the fact that the High Command's aviation army and air corps were built 
up in preference to the air armies of various fronts even in the desperate summer of 1942. 
By the end of 1942, thirteen reserve air corps had been formed, comprising 1/3 of all 
Soviet tactical air power, and they were given preference in delivery of modem aircraft 
types. By the end of the war, the reserve air corps comprised 43% of all front-line 
combat aircraft. As a result of Novikov's reforms, each Front had a small air force to call 
its own and to concentrate as its situation demanded. Of equal importance, the reserve air 
corps gave the Soviets the ability to concentrate massed airpower in a temporary and 
377 flexible manner by reinforcing each Front's air army as needed . 
Alongside these changes to the organization of frontal aviation, Long-Range 
Bomber Aviation was also reorganized. The early war structure of separate corps under 
the command of Long-Range Bomber Aviation (DBA), used at the discretion of Stavka, 
was soon downsized into separate divisions due to massive losses. On 5 March 1942, 
these divisions were consolidated into the ADD (Long-Range Aviation, Aviatsii Dal'nego 
Deistviia). In theory, ADD was to act as an independent, concentrated strike force 
against operational and strategic targets, but in practice it was usually tasked in support of 
377 A. M. Khorobrikh, A. A. Novikov, p. 92-96; Erickson, 'Alexander Alexandrovich Novikov', (Stalin's 
Generals, pp. 154-174), pp. 163-164; 'Aviationnii korpus', p. 36 in M. M. Kozlov, ed, Velikaia 
otechest-vennaia voina 1941 - 1945: entsiklopediia, (Moscow: Sovetskaia entsiklopediia, 1985); 
Timokhovich, Operativnoe iskusstvo, pp. 313-314; 'Massirovanie voenno-vozdushnikh sil v operatsii', 
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ground operations, directly, albeit temporarily, subordinate to a Front despite being 
theoretically independent. Eventually, in December 1944, ADD was organized as the 18'h 
Air Army (Long Range), directly subordinate to the Soviet Air Force as a reserve unit, to 
bring its place in the command structure into line with its mission. 378 
Putting these changes into place was not entirely smooth given the dire situation 
on the front in the summer of 1942. Particularly revealing in this regard is an analysis of 
air force operations, published in early 1943 as part of a general collection of analyses, 
but probably written and initially distributed in September or October of 1942. These 
documents were written by the analysts attached to every Soviet Front and Army from the 
spring if 1942 onwards, tasked with writing on the "use of war experience". Covering a 
wide range of topics, it noted that an Air Army would be overwhelmed when attempting 
to command the equivalent of 15 air divisions, which argued for the need to speed up the 
formation of permanently grouped air corps inside of air armies, similar to the air corps 
that already existed for the High Command Reserve. As a temporary measure, the report 
suggested forming operational groups out of sets of air divisions. On a wider scope, 
however, the report provides a good look at the state of Soviet thinking and effectiveness 
on the eve of Stalingrad. 
379 
A central feature of the report is an analysis of a failed offensive, launched by the 
Whand 61" Armies on 5-8 July 1942 near Bolkhov (southwest of Moscow). 500 aircraft 
were available at the outset of the operation, and the Soviets held air superiority for two 
days, delivering some 2400 sorties. This massive support assisted the 16thand 61" 
Armies in advancing 8 to 10 kilometers along parts of the 40 kilometer assault front. 
However, the Air Force's actions were limited to covering the battlefront and delivering 
close air support, while actions against the Luftwaffe and German reserves were absent. 
378 Timokhovich, Operativnoe iskusstvo, pp. 315-316, von Hardesty, Red Phoenix, pp. 85-86. 
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The Germans were soon able to reinforce the sector, while at the same time the Soviet Air 
Force was weakening through losses caused by enemy action and operational 
breakdowns. Therefore, Soviet sorties steadily declined while Luftwaffe sorties rose: 
Table 4: Bolkhov ODeration Sortie Rates 
Day Soviet sorties Luftwaffe Sorties 
July 5 1,411 39 
July 6 1,000 380 
July 7 561 748 
July 8 448 850 
Denied effective air support after the second day of the offensive, the Whand 6lt Armies 
were halted and driven back by German reserves. The anonymous Soviet analyst drew 
numerous conclusions from this experience, and the conclusions were well in line with 
both Novikov's predilections and pre-war Soviet theorizing. 380 
First off, the Soviets concluded that they had insufficient airpower to manage the 
task at hand. While the aircraft assembled had been able to assist the ground forces in 
moving forward, they had also been worn out by the third day, when the decisive battle 
for air superiority began, and they did not have enough strength to prevent the Luftwaffe 
from gaining superiority on the third day. To overcome the wear and tear of high- 
intensity operations (the Soviets lost 100 aircraft in the first day of the Bolkhov operation, 
mostly to mechanical failure) and to combat the inevitable rise in enemy air strength, the 
report recommended maintaining a significant reserve of aircraft and aircrew, especially 
in fighters. 381 
The study concluded that the main blow required a force of at least 600-800 
aircraft, of which at least 40% should be fighters, unless enemy air opposition was 
exceptionally weak. Furthermore, many of the fighters needed to be held in reserve to 
ensure that fresh machines and pilots were ready to counter the enemy's reinforcements. 
"' 'Massirovanievoenno-vozdushnikh silvoperatsii', (Sbornikmaterialov No. 4, p. 84-101), pp. 85,90-92. 
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While the report declared that the most effective use of fighters was in 'wide-ranging 
active operations over enemy territory', the critical air superiority mission required the 
use of three mutually reinforcing methods: direct airbase attack, aerial blockade of 
airbases, and the destruction of enemy aircraft through air combat. The anonymous 
analyst concluded that the Bolkhov operation's use of only the third method contributed 
to its overall failure, as did the commitment of 2,065 sorties of 3,979 (flown from 5 
through 10 July) to direct cover of the front line (defensive counter-air), as compared with 
1,767 on ground attack, 78 on reconnaissance, and a mere 69 on airbase attack. After 
losing air superiority, the 0 Air Army planned and conducted a simultaneous strike on 
four airbases on 9 July, presumably accounting for all 69 of the airbase strike sorties. 
While deemed successful in weakening enemy opposition on 10 July, and destroying a 
claimed 120 enemy aircraft in comparison to a claimed 150 destroyed in the air over the 
previous 5 days, the strike was too late to materially affect the situation on the ground. 382 
From this, the Soviets concluded, quite in line with their pre-war inclinations, that 
the primary principle of aerial warfare was 'decisive massing on the axis of the main 
blow': concentrated use of aviation, with massed strikes against enemy aviation and 
ground forces. 
383 
Insufficiencies of strength not only do not free commanders from the 
necessity of the massed use of aviation, but instead still further increase the 
demand for it; the less the strength, the more focused should be the use of aircraft 
for strikes on the most important targets. 384 
Massing, the report further notes, meant not necessarily a large number of physical 
aircraft being present, but producing the effect of, 
382 'Massirovanie voenno-vozdushnikh sil v operatsii', (Sbornik materialov No. 4, p. 84- 10 1), pp. 91,99- 
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* .. the relentless action of a 
large number of aircraft for an extended time 
with the goal of the suppression or destruction of important objects located in a 
relatively narrow section of the front. 385 
Equally, it fits well with pre-war Soviet attitudes to aerial warfare that, 'The 
actions of aviation always have the goal of providing combat assistance to the ground 
forces in an operation. ' 386 As a result, while the massed initial strikes could be carried out 
either before or concurrently with the opening of the ground offensive, the latter option 
was distinctly preferable in order to maintain operational surprise, given a sufficient 
preponderance of aerial strength. 
387 
Ensuring surprise was both important and difficult. While the aircraft could be 
flown on the evening prior to the offensive, constructing the necessary airfields and 
logistical supports necessitated extensive prior preparation. Basing some aircraft with a 
neighboring Front eased the pressure on the Front launching the offensive, and 
complicated the enemy's intelligence picture. Even so, the bare minimum number of 
airbases to handle the exPected 600-800 aircraft would be in the teens, and for more 
comfortable basing, and adequate reserves of deception and alternate bases would drive 
the number well into the thirties or more. Construction of this many bases required 
weeks, and the report noted specifically that the rear area services would require at least 
10 to 12 days to prepare. Concealing all of this from the enemy was accorded great 
importance, but no details of how this might be accomplished were suggested in the 
analysis beyond the need to provide plenty of dummy airfields. 388 
The Air Force was moderately pleased with its own performance, having gained 
air superiority for a time and contested it thereafter. Moreover, the new organization had 
385 'Massirovanie voenno-vozdushnikh sil v operatsii', (Sbornik materialov No. 4, p. 84- 10 1), p. 9 1. 
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generally proven itself, enabling the Soviets to concentrate aircraft better than before and 
thus to focus the efforts of airpower where it was needed. However, other aspects of the 
practical application of airpower were not as successful, and the Army was not especially 
happy with the support provided. Its report on events in the Bolkhov operation concluded 
that air and artillery cooperation with ground forces had been quite poor. The massive 
strike on 6 July 1942 mostly missed its targets, and the 192nd Tank Brigade lost 6 tanks 
to friendly aircraft. In another example of the prevalent poor coordination, on 7 July a 
major airstrike was conducted at 0700 in support of an attack scheduled to occur at 1400. 
In view of the Army's complaint, echoed by the Air Force, that the concentration of force 
had been insufficient, both overall and in detail, it is clear that the Soviet Air Force's 
performance had plenty of room for improvement. The next major demonstration of their 
abilities came farther south, at Stalingrad. 389 
Operations in the south went poorly for the Soviets in the summer of 1942. 
Weakened by the failure of the Kharkov offensive in the spring and the high command's 
focus on defending Moscow, Soviet forces in the Ukraine crumbled and fell back under 
the German summer offensive, aimed at Stalingrad and the Caucasus oilfields. As in 
194 1, the Soviets worked to concentrate their airpower, though they met with mixed 
results. Low numbers of aircraft and the high tempo of operations lead to many of the 
Soviet aircraft being grounded for maintenance, sometimes reaching 60-70% of all 
aircraft: on I September 1942, the 8th Air Army had 193 fighters and 195 bomber/strike 
aircraft, but only 57 fighters and 69 bomber/strike aircraft were functional. Forces 
concentrated on one hotspot would provide useful support, but when they were 
reallocated to meet a larger threat, troubles returned at the location suddenly forsaken. 
389 'Nekotorie vivodi po operatsii levogo kryla zapadnogo fironta', (Sbornik materialov po i.: ucheniiu opita 
voini No. 5, Marta 1943 g., (Voenizdat, 1943), p. 60-75), pp. 62 & 67. 
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Since both sides tended to commit to the same hotspot, the Soviets tended to wind up in 
large aerial battles with the Germans, with consequent increased losses. 390 
Attempting to conserve their forces, the Soviets found several expedients 
successful. Bombers attacked from high altitude, without fighter escort, using speed and 
surprise to evade interception. The anonymous Soviet analysts did not comment on the 
effectiveness of the bombs thus delivered. Close support aircraft attacked from medium 
altitudes instead of low altitudes, trying to reduce losses to ground fire and enemy 
fighters. This, too, depended on surprise to evade interceptors, and in the process 
doubtless reduced the effectiveness of the support provided due to reduced accuracy of 
fire from medium altitudes instead of low altitudes. The Soviets also made extensive use 
of night bombing. Around 2/3 of all 8th and l6thAir Army sorties in September and 
October 1942 were for close support (day or night) or those strike's escorts, with fighter 
defence and reconnaissance running a distant second and third, and deep strikes of all 
kinds forming a bare handful of the total. The Soviet analysis credits heavy close air 
support as critical to the Army's ability to continue resistance, though the changes in 
mission profiles likely reduced the effectiveness of that support even while assisting in 
maintaining an air force in being. The Soviets were again echoing their 1920s analyses of 
the actions of a small air force, though it is not clear that the commanders in 1942 knew 
thiS. 391 
390 'Deistviia VVS v bor'be za Stalingrada', (Sbornik materialov No. 6), p. 137-157), pp. 137-140. 
391 'Deistviia VVS v bor'be za Stalingrada', (Sbornik materialov No. 6), pp. 141-145. 
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Table 5: 8th & 16th Air Army Sorties, September & October 1942 392 
Mission September 1942 October 1942 
Close Support Strike 9,036 11,032- 
Airbase Strike 280 483 
Railroad Strike 91 217 
Strike Escort 3,282 1,441 
Fighter Defence 2,698 1,529 
Intercept 642 556 
Reconnaissance 1,501 1,291 
Transport 47 282 
Total 17,577 16,831 
The Germans suffered in these engagements as well. While the rate of loss was 
lower than that of the Soviets, the Luftwaffe units in the Stalingrad region were steadily 
ground down by combat and operational losses: one Stuka wing lost an average of an 
airplane a day over the course of four months. While no one loss was disastrous, the 
Luftwaffe was operating at the end of a tenuous supply line, and losses mounted faster 
than replacements arrived. At the beginning of Case Blue, Luftflotte 4 had around 1,15 0 
operational aircraft. By the middle of September, Luftflotte 4 had 550 operational 
aircraft, and 402 on 20 November. By contrast, the Soviet 8th, 16th, and 17th Air Armies 
recovered from their nadir in September, when they possessed only 270 operational 
aircraft, to some 800 operational aircraft at the outset of Uranus. In the battle that had 
become the main point of effort on the Soviet-German Eront, the Luftwaffe had been 
reduced to one third of its initial operational strength, while in the same timeframe, the 
Soviets, despite higher overall losses, had tripled their strength, increasing their forces in 
the area from some 400 aircraft to just over 1,200. Equally, in the same timeframe, the 
Luftwaffe's operational readiness rate had declined from around 75% to 55%, while the 
Soviet's readiness rate had risen from 40% or worse early in the summer to around 75% 
at the outset of the offensive (which, combined with numerical growth, meant that 
392 'Deistviia VVS v bor'be za Stalingrada', (Sbornik materialov No. 6), p. 14 1. 
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effective Soviet air strength more than quadrupled from late June to late November 1942). 
It is true that a long supply line hampered the Luftwaffe's efforts. However, it is equally 
true that German industry was unable to maintain a sufficient flow of replacement 
aircraft, while the Soviet industry could. Equally, the Luftwaffe was not improving as 
fast as the Soviets. Soviet improvements are highlighted by the increasing supply of 
radios, which permitted effective ground-controlled interception of enemy aircraft by 
airborne fighters in the Stalingrad region from the second half of October 1942.393 
Table 6: 8th, 16th, & 17th Air Army Strengths, 22 November 1942 394 
Note: Readiness Rate -75% 





8 284 273 65 122 7 751 
16 114 105 0 93 3 315 
17 1 82 40 10 79 0 201 
Totals 1 480 418 1 65 294 10 19267 
Operation Uranus, the Stalingrad counteroffensive, jumped off on 19 November 
1942 without the originally planned three days' preparatory assault on the Luftwaffe, due 
to bad weather. The weather also hampered air operations on both sides throughout the 
main attack, with the 8th and 16th Air Armies conducting only 3,769 sorties during the 
period of 23 - 31 November. This same bad weather also largely prevented the Luftwaffe 
from interfering in the operation, and the lack of a Soviet preparatory strike may have 
prevented the Soviets from losing surprise. Possibly the Soviets did not feel they had 
amassed a sufficient preponderance of force to attempt to suppress the Luftwaffe 
simultaneously with the opening of the offensive, though Stalin explicitly permitted 
Novikov to delay the offensive in order to ensure a sufficient preponderance of airpower. 
Howeverl the wartime after-action report on Uranus credits the Luftwaffe with having 
393 Hayward, Stopped at Stalingrad, pp. 194-198,210-211,225-226; 'Deistviia VVS v bor'be za 
Stalingrada', (Sbornik materialov No. 6, p. 137-157), pp. 137,141,146-148; Timokhovich, Operativnoe 
iskusstvo, p. 280. 
394 'Deistviia VVS v bor'be za Stalingrada', (Sbornik materialov No. 6), p. 148. 
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around 1,000 aircraft available. Luftflotte 4 had, in fact, 732 aircraft, of which only 402 
were operational. Most probably, the Soviets did not feel the planned attack on the 




However, the offensive did highlight the increased flexibility in Soviet command 
arrangements. The 8th and 17th Air Armies were each reinforced by a mixed air corps 
from the High Command Reserve in the weeks before the offensive, nearly doubling the 
strength of the 17th and increasing the strength of the 8th by a third. Equally, the 2nd Air 
Army, while remaining in the Voronezh Front, which was not part of the Uranus 
offensive, was operationally subordinated to the South-Western Front, tasked with the 
northern wing of the attack. Further reinforcements followed after the attack opened. 
This demonstrated that Novikov's reforms had brought the Soviet Air Force the ability to 
concentrate force where it was needed. 
396 
From the Soviet Air Force' point of view, the subsequent siege of Axis forces at 
Stalingrad was dominated by the effort to prevent German resupply from the air. A year 
earlier, from February to May of 1942, the Soviets had besieged six German divisions 
near Derniansk, which the Luftwaffe kept supplied until they were relieved. The cost of 
this effort was enon-nous for the Luftwaffe, which lost 265 transports out of nearly 500 
despite a quite limited Soviet air presence. The Soviets viewed the outcome as a failure, 
to be bettered on the next attempt. The Germans appear to have viewed it as a success, 
which played a role in their decision to attempt to maintain the forces trapped at 
Stalingra y air. 
397 
395 'Deistviia VVS v bor'be za Stalingrada', (Sbornik materialov No. 6), p. 148-149; Hayward, Stopped at 
Stalingrad, pp. 225-226; permission to delay Uranus: G. K. Zhukov, Vospominaniia i ra: 7mishleniia, volume 
2, (Moscow: Novosti, 1990), pp. 332. 
396 A. M. Samsonov, Stalingradskaia Bitva, (Moscow: Nauka, 1989), pp. 345-346,566-5 8 1. 
397 Murray, The Luftwaffe, P. 120; Hayward, Stopped at Stalingrad, pp. 233-246; this section of Hayward 
contains an extensive and up-to-date examination of the decision to supply Stalingrad by air. 
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Nonetheless, the airlift seems to have caught the Soviets somewhat by surprise. 
While the lift began on November 25, Novikov did not command a response to it until 
November 30. On that date, he commanded the 8th and 16th armies to commit one 
fighter and one close support regiment each to combat enemy transport aviation, dividing 
the airfields in the pocket between them. Flights of 4 fighters and 4 close support aircraft 
were to organize ambushes against German transports, attacking them in the air and while 
398 landed. 
Though this did produce the intended attacks on German bases and aircraft, the 
results were not enough to satisfy Novikov. Early on 4 December 1942, Novikov issued 
a significantly expanded directive, blaming the commanders of the 8th and 16th Air 
Armies for poor organization of previous efforts and informing them that, 'You shall 
consider the destruction of enemy transport aircraft your fundamental mission. ' All 
forms of aviation were to be thrown into the fray, with fighters keeping station over the 
German airfields to attack transports and radio for reinforcing fighters, and for bombers 
of all types to attack the transports on the ground. Night bombers were to harass the 
bases at night, in addition to frequent photoreconnaissance and daily reports to Novikov 
on progress and results. 
399 
Late in December, Novikov arranged a system of four zones for the blockade. 
The first zone, outside the encirclement, was for strikes on German airfields supporting 
the airlift. The second zone, over the encircling ring, was divided into five sectors, each 
to be manned by a fighter division. By this point in the siege, the ring had been widened 
sufficiently to permit these fighter units, and associated close support units, to be based in 
the encircling ring, instead of east of the Volga. In addition, this zone sported an 
398 V. 1. Migulin, Organizatsiia i osuchestvlenie vozdushnoi blokadi okru--hennoipod Stalingradom 
gruppirovki protivnika: uchebnoe posobie, (Moscow: Voenno-politicheskaia akademiia, 1975), pp. 12-13; 
text of Novikov's order, p. 3 1. 
399 MIgUlin' Organizatsiia i osuchestvlenie vozdushnoi blokadi, p. 13; text of Novikov's order, p. 32-33; 
attacks on bases in later November 1942 see Hayward, Stopped at Stalingrad, pp. 258. 
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extensive network of radio stations on the inner and outer encirclement rings to vector the 
fighters to incoming transports, and three radar stations on the most common German 
entry routes. The third zone, initially nestled in a band of 8-10 kilometres along the inner 
ring of encirclement but expanding throughout January, contained air defence artillery. 
The second and third rings were thus occupying the same airspace. Air defence artillery 
and fighter commanders were strongly encouraged to cooperate, and Soviet accounts 
suggest they did so. The fourth zone, inside the encirclement, intended to place the 
German landing zones under continual fighter patrol and bomber attacks, assisted by 
artillery fire from the encircling ground forces. 400 
By the time the last of the Stalingrad pocket collapsed on 2 February 1943, the 
airlift to Stalingrad had cost the Luftwaffe 488 transport aircraft and bombers. Around 
half of these were non-combat losses, a rate slightly higher than the Luftwaffe average of 
43% for the period, and half due to the actions of the Soviet Air Force and air defence 
artillery. The servicability rate of the surviving aircraft had dropped to 30% (after a low 
of 20% in mid-January). Luftflotte 4 had been reduced to 624 aircraft from its strength of 
1,610 when Case Blue opened, and only 240 of these were operational. Moreover, as in 
the previous year at Demiansk, the Luftwaffe had emptied its training establishments to 
provide transport aircrew, with disastrous results for the training program. While the 
Soviets had not completely prevented the Luftwaffe from providing resupply to the 
pocket, as Novikov demanded, and had themselves suffered extraordinary losses, they 
had nonetheless dealt the Luftwaffe a rate of attrition that Williamson Murray described 
as 'devastating'. The Luftwaffe did bounce back, providing significant support for 
Manstein's backhand blow against Soviet forces overextended in their drive for Kharkov 
400 Migulin, Organizatsiia i osuchestvlenie vozdushnoi blokadi, pp. 13-17; 'Deistviia VVS v bor'be za 
Stalingrada', (Sbornik materialov No. 6), p. 149-155. 
191 
in February-March 1943, yet, as noted by Joel Hayward, 'the peak of its power was 
past'. 
401 
Yet if the tide had begun to turn, this was not necessarily obvious to the Soviets at 
the time. The wartime after-action report on the blockade, unusually, fails to draw 
conclusions, and 1. V. Timokhovich similarly largely avoids the topic of Stalingrad in his 
survey of Soviet Air Force operational art in World War 2. A short study from 1975 
points up the overall success of the operation, but also points up Soviet faults in failing to 
organize the blockade sufficiently swiftly, failing to direct sufficient force against the 
transport bases outside the encirclement, difficulty with the weather, insufficient 
employment of radar, and poor placement of anti-aircraft artillery. Possibly the Soviet 
Air Force was uncomfortably aware that many of the most important improvements in the 
prevention of deliveries to Stalingrad came when the Soviet Army overran critical 
Luftwaffe bases, both inside and outside the pocket, forcing the Luftwaffe to undertake 
longer flights to poorer airfields. 
402 
Perhaps the Soviets were simply more interested in later offensive operations by 
the time the after-action reports were compiled together and published in later 1943. 
These offensive operations did receive direct coverage, with conclusions. Air support for 
the Middle Don operation in late December 1942 was intended to open with a week of 
preparatory missions, concentrating on reconnaissance, railroad interdiction, strikes on 
Axis airbases, and assisting 5th Tank Army. The reason for the decision to initiate the air 
offensive before the ground offensive is not clear, but it appears to have been a variation 
in application, not in doctrine. When the offensive opened, the focus was to shift to close 
air support, first in the breakthrough sectors, and then in support of exploitation forces. 
401 Hayward, Stopped at Stalingrad, pp. 283,290,310,322-323,332 (quote); Murray, The Luftwaffe, p. 
120,124 (quote), 199 note 192 [43% taken as an average of the stated 40.9% for July - December 1942 and 
45% for January - June 1943]. 
402 Migulin, Organizatsiia i osuchestvlenie vozdt4shnoi blokadi, p. 26. 
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These taskings suggest that when faced with a question of priorities, the Soviets chose 
close air support over air interdiction or offensive counter-air, a choice running counter to 
pre-war doctrine and theory. Between bad weather and limited forces, however, the 17 ffi 
Air Army in fact concentrated solely on direct support to the 5th Tank Army and 
reconnaissance, with only 38 sorties of 1,263 devoted to railroad interdiction and 124 to 
airbase attack. 
403 
While the offensive was underway, from 16 through 31 December 1942, most 
sorties were devoted to support the ground forces, both in the plan and in reality. In some 
instances, co-operation went well. The command post of the 5th Tank Army received 
intelligence of an enemy concentration at 0700 on December 20 1942. By 0800, two 
fighters had conducted reconnaissance and reported 70 tanks, 30 trucks, and a large 
number of infantry. From 0800 through 1400, a series of strike groups of 4-5 
shturmoviks and 4-7 fighters kept the group under attack, culminating in a larger strike 
from 1500 to 1515 as preparatory fire for an ground attack, which succeeded. 404 
However, matters did not always go so well. On 18 December 1942, aerial 
reconnaissance detected large Axis railroad movements, but the Soviets were unable to 
bring any significant force to bear upon these lucrative targets. Concentration on close 
support inevitably meant reduced force on other targets, with 3,605 of 4,824 sorties by the 
2nd and 17th Air Annies devoted to close support, its escort, and top cover for the front 
line during the period 16 - 31 December 1942.409 sorties were devoted to 
reconnaissance, 293 to bombing airbases, and 517 to railroad interdiction (most of the 
latter at night). However, both the railroad interdiction and airbase strike efforts turned 
out to be scattered in both time and space, significantly reducing their impact; in the 
words of the anonymous Soviet analyst, "It is entirely understandable that the actions of a 
403 'Deistviia aviatsii v Dekabr'skoi operatsii na srednem Donu', (Sbornik materialov No. 9), pp. 25,29-30. 
404 'Deistviia aviatsii v Dekabr'skoi operatsii na srednem Donu', (Sbomik materialov No. 9), pp. 30-35. 
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limited number of aicraft on three rail lines did not produce the necessary results. " The 
analyst called for a greater focus of effort, echoing Soviet theorists of the 1920s who 
called for more concentration of effort, not less, when faced with an insufficiency of 
force. Interestingly, the analyst did not comment on the relative value of interdiction as 
opposed to close air support. 
405 
Equally, while close air support worked well during the initial stages of the 
offensive, it tended to break down during the pursuit. The ground force's analysis of both 
the Stalingrad and the Middle Don operations concluded that air-ground cooperation was 
generally poor, permitting the Luftwaffe to work over exploiting ground units 
'unpunished', resulting in a suggestion of greatly increasing the anti-aircraft artillery 
assigned to tank and mechanized corps. Air support failed to break up or slow enemy 
reserves, and often failed to arrive on time for coordinated ground and air attacks. Air 
units also proved unable to move forward to new bases in order to maintain support of 
exploiting ground formations. The latter may be due, in part, to general logistics 
difficulties. The 3rd Mixed Aviation Corps was criticized for a very low sortie rate per 
aircraft per day of 2.5 during the Middle Don operation (as opposed to the highest rate, 
form the 2 82nd Fighter Aviation Division, of 6 to 10 sorties per aircraft per day, while 
night bombers averaged 4 strikes per night, all for the Middle Don operation). However, 
the report also notes that the 3rd Mixed Aviation Corps lacked fighter cover for its 
missions, repair equipment on its airbases, and often lacked fuel to fly, all while still 
based on the friendly side of the operation's start line. 406 
The Soviet Air Force had, in fact, tried to expand its forward basing opportunities, 
bringing 20 airbases into working order on newly-captured territory during course of the 
405 'Deistviia aviatsii v Dekabr'skoi operatsii na srednem Donu', (Sbornik materialov No. 9), pp. 35-40, 
quote p. 40. 
406 'Deistviia aviatsii v Dekabr'skoi operatsii na srednem Donu', (Sbornik materialov No. 9), pp. 34-40, 
'Nekotorie vivodi po ispol'zovaniiu tankovikh i mckhanizirovannikh korpusov dlia razvltiia profiva'. 
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194 
Middle Don operation and permitting some units to base forward from 26 December 
1942. Nonetheless, the logistics difficulties just noted doubtless made it difficult to 
supply airbases forward of the start line. The Soviet analyst also noted that, 'The given 
operation demonstrates the great influence on effective combat work of timely organized 
signals with air formations (units), especially radio. ' However, telegraph signals were not 
always available when needed, let alone radio, in light of which fighter and close support 
regiments frequently shared an airbase to permit good cooperation. The ground forces 
wanted close air support to be guaranteed to arrive no more than 30 minutes after it was 
summoned, and suggested the temporary subordination of air formations to specific tank 
and mechanized corps while those were engaged in a breakthrough. In fact, looking 
forward, all three of these were areas the Soviets would work out over the next few years, 
assigning an ever-greater number of radios to units, working out complex and ultimately 
successful plans for moving aviation forward with an offensive, and temporarily 
407 
subordinating large air units to the ground units directly involved in a breakthrough . 
Flexibility still suffered, though not as much as had been the case previously. The 
air force analyst for the Middle Don operation criticized the 2nd and 17th Air Armies for 
dividing their airpower equally amongst the four armies involved in the offensive, and 
then not shifting them to hot spots, permitting Axis airpower to concentrate and 
overwhelm Soviet on chosen sectors of the front. The Soviet basing dispositions were 
intended to permit a similar concentration and flexibility, but were brought down by 
difficulties with communications, still the Soviets' Achilles' heel. The Soviets knew 
what they wanted to accomplish, but were still facing grave difficulties in bringing it 
407 'Deistviia aviatsii v Dekabr'skoi operatsii na srednem Donu', (Sbomik materialov No. 9), pp. 26,37-40 
(quote p. 40); 'Nekotorie vivodi po ispol'zovaniiu tankovikh i mekhanizirovannikh korpusov 
dlia razvitiia 
proriva', (Sbornik materialov No. 8), pp. 50-5 1. 
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about. However, they were aware of the difficulties and becoming steadily more 
successful in finding methods of overcoming them. 408 
The spring of 1943 found the Germans still holding onto the Kuban region south 
of Rostov. Most of the Eront experienced a pause in these months, recovering from the 
winter's fighting or building up for the collision both sides foresaw at Kursk. Over later 
April, May, and early June, a series of Soviet efforts in the Kuban created several massive 
aerial engagements. While the ground forces' goal was to clear the Taman peninsula of 
Axis forces, the Soviet Air Force entered this round of combat with the goal of attempting 
to destroy as much of the Luftwaffe as possible. They did not achieve this goal, but the 
Soviets did succeeding in using the operations as a deliberate school in which to hone 
their skills. 
In fact, the initial actions quietly demonstrated that Novikov's earlier reforms had 
indeed increased the Soviet's ability to concentrate force. The North Caucasus Front 
opposing the Germans in the Kuban commanded two air armies, the 4th and 5th. Before 
the first of these engagements, these were reinforced with 3 reserve corps and 2 reserve 
divisions, the equivalent of a third air army. After the first engagement, the command 
staff of the 5th Air Army was sent to Kursk, leaving half of its units behind. These 
sweeping changes to the order of battle do not appear to have caused any untoward 
disorganization. 409 
At lower echelons, the Soviets engaged in extensive practice in aerial combat over 
the course of a series of engagements. Reading between the lines, radios finally became 
common in Soviet aircraft and forward ground control stations, because the lessons the 
Soviets wrote up regarding actions at the Kuban almost all revolve tightly around the 
408 'Deistviia aviatsii v Dekabr'skoi operatsii na srednem Donu', (Sbornik materialov No. 9), pp. 26,3 7-40. 
409 K. A. Vershinin, Chetvertaia vozdushnaia, (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1975), p. 23 1; L. Shishov, 'Nekotorie 
voprosi operativnogo iskusstva VVS v vozdushnikh srazheniiakh na Kubani v 1943 godu', (VIA, 5,1983, 
pp. 21-29), pp. 22-23; Timokhovich, Operativnoe iskusstvo), pp. 42-44. 
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proper employment of radio and its extensive use. On the ground, they built an extensive 
network of ground control stations on the front line for the direction of fighters and close 
support aircra , while in the air, they officially adopted flexible two- and four-ship pair 
tactics using vertical tactics, with radio providing the primary means of communications. 
In addition, methods of combat received intensive study. Commanders, including the 
commander of the Soviet Air Force, A. A. Novikov, and pilots studied combat results for 
lessons. The ace A. 1. Pokrishkin proved key to this process, synthesizing his experience 
into punchy formulas, notably 'Altitude - Speed - Manoeuvre - Fire', and teaching them 
as widely as possible in both lectures, training flights, and demonstration mock combats. 
German commentators noted a distinct rise in the effectiveness and confidence of Soviet 
pilots from this point, with steady improvement such that one Luftwaffe commentator (in 
September 1943) labelled Soviet fighter escort as 'exemplary'. 410 
However, the Kuban fighting was but a dress rehearsal for the main event of the 
summer of 1943. The Germans had decided to launch their major offensive for the 
summer of 1943 against the Kursk bulge, and the Soviets, discerning this, planned to 
defend, then counterattack once the German forces were broken. While the Germans 
delayed, bringing up more forces and improving their preparations, the Soviets likewise 
built up their forces and turned the bulge into a fortress. This build-up demonstrates the 
swing of advantage from German to Soviet in the war in the east. In 194 1, the Germans 
launched strategic offensives on three axes. In 1942, they launched a strategic offensive 
on one axis. In 1943, their one major offensive's goals were less decisive than in 
previous years, and the lengthening preparations suggest significant unease about its 
prospects. Kursk would also be the first major German offensive launched into the teeth 
410 Vershinin, Chetvertaia vozdushnaia, p. 208-260; L. Shishov, 'Nekotorie voprosi', (Voenno-istoriicheskii 
zhurnal, 5,1983, pp. 21-29), pp. 21-29; Von Hardesty, Red Phoenix, p. 143; Schwabedissen, The Russian 
Air Force, pp. 194-199,208,240-241,250 (quote from p. 208, cited as Colonel Kupfer, 'Verhalten 
russicher Jagdflieger', 10 September 1943, p. 1). 
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of a Soviet defence that was neither surprised, as in Barbarossa, nor seriously weakened 
by prior fighting, as in Typhoon and Blue. Unfortunately for the Germans, this meant an 
offensive in which their steadily diminishing advantages in tactical flexibility and 
prowess were reduced still further by extensive Soviet preparation. 
The air war for the Kursk battle began with base construction and raids by both 
sides. Both sides improved the local airbases, though the Soviet after-action report notes 
that the Gennans gained a distinct advantage in that, being on the offensive, they could 
site fighter bases 18-30 kilometres from the front line, and a handful only 5 or 6 
kilometres from it. The bulk of the German bases were within 50 kilometres of the 
German attack axes, while few of the Soviet bases were within the same radius. As a 
result, the Germans had an easier time achieving a higher sortie rate in the battle, serving 
to offset their overall numerical inferiority: the Soviets had 2,453 aircraft (of which 339 
were not functional, an excellent 86% readiness rate made possible by deliberately low 
sortie rates), while the Gennans fielded 1,850,28% of the entire Luftwaffe. The force 
structures were not identical, however, with 1,000 Soviet fighters facing 600 German, 750 
Soviet close support aircraft facing 100 German, 670 Soviet bombers to 1,000 German, 
and, highlighting the Soviet's reliance on fighters for reconnaissance, 14 Soviet 
reconnaissance aircraft, of which only 4 were fimctional, to 150 German. 411 
The Gen-nan advantage in reconnaissance was, in turn, offset by the usual, and 
increasingly effective, Soviet deception efforts. The 2nd Air Army, for example, built 17 
fake airbases, staffed them with 158 fake aircraft, kept the fake aircraft moving about on 
the fields and periodically landed real aircraft at them. In June 1943, the Soviets counted 
35 German raids on the 2nd Air Army's bases, of which 29 struck the false airbases. On 
"1 Murray, Luftwaffe, p. 157-159; 'Deistviia aviatsii v Kurskom srazhenii', (Sbornik materialov po 
izucheniiu opita voini No. 14, Mart - Aprel' 1944 g. ), (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1944), pp. 160-163,166. 
Percentage of the Luftwaffe figure based on Murray noting that 'total [Luftwaffe] losses for all theaters in 
July and August were 3,213 aircraft (50.6%)' (p. 159); this gives a total strength of roughly 6,500, of which 
1,850 is 28.46%. 
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the other hand, Soviet efforts were hampered by good German organization. In a move 
straight out of Soviet 1920s theory, and practice in 1930s China, many of the German 
412 aircraft moved into their bases the evening before the offensive began on 5 July 1943. 
The Soviets had planned to conduct two or three days of preparatory 
bombardment of German positions before the German offensive began. However, the 
Soviets were not certain when the offensive would begin until the evening of 4 July 1943, 
as a result of which the planned first stage of the operation was not conducted. Stage 2 of 
their plan covered the battle in the covering regions, expected to last one day, and Stage 3 
covered support for ground forces as the Gennans attempted to penetrate the main 
defence. The long preparation time ensured the Soviets were able to send air unit 
commanders to coordinate planning for both the air and ground battle with the ground 
units they were to support, for both the defensive and counteroffensive stages of the 
engagement, in several variants to cover possible German courses of action. In addition, 
the air armies were intended to send representatives to the command posts of the armies 
and fronts they supported. This did not entirely work out in practice. The 2nd Air Army, 
which defended against the southern German attack, not only failed to send 
representatives, but also failed to establish good communications with ground force 
command posts. Defending against the northern assault, however, 16th Air Army, sent 
13th Army an operations group that was equipped with radios, headed by the 
representative of the air army commander, and blessed with the authority to command air 
units directly. The operations group participated in planning the ground operation and 
visited forward command points. In the words of the Soviet analyst, 
As shown by the experience of this operation, such trips by aviation 
officers to ground force headquarters with the goal of resolving questions of 
cooperation, and becoming familiar with the conditions of their forthcoming work, 
have great importance. 
413 
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Despite the extensive time for preparations, other failings also surfaced. As noted 
in the after-action analysis, neither the 2nd nor the 16th Air Armies managed to deploy 
their forward radio command posts effectively, the 16th placing them too far from the 
front, the 2nd's radios failing to work in some instances, and neither sending specific 
commanders with the responsibility and authority to command aircraft from the posts. 
Although the analysis does not say so, it is probable that the radios, which were not tested 
prior to their failure, were not tested because of signals security concerns. Regardless, 
Insufficient organization of the observation, warning, and command of 
fighter aviation by radio in this operation greatly complicated the fulfilment of 
aviation's most important mission: winning mastery of the air. 414 
Other methods of winning mastery of the air also failed to work as planned. At 
dawn on July 5th, the 2nd Air Army, defending the southern sector, launched a massive 
strike against the German airbases at and around Kharkov, with assistance from the 
neighbouring 17th Air Army. 417 aircraft took direct part in the raid, which was detected 
by German radar and heavily engaged. The Soviet reports at the time attribute the lack of 
success to the German aircraft having already launched from their bases; the Germans 
claim to have slaughtered the strike as it moved into their airspace, and the near-total 
Soviet silence on the raid is telling. For the rest of the engagement, the Soviet Air Force 
went back to doing what it did best, close air support, flinging a tremendous weight of 
firepower in the direct of the German ground forces: the 16th Air Army alone expending 
2,000 bombs, 23,315 anti-tank cluster bombs, over 4,000 canisters of incendiaries, 4,000 
rockets, and around 566,000 rounds of cannon and machine gun ammunition during the 
defensive stage of the operation (from 5 through 10 July 1943). 
415 
414 'Deistviia aviatsii v Kurskom srazhenii', (Sbornik materialov No. 14), pp. 167 (quote p. 167). 
415 'Deistviia aviatsii v Kurskom srazhenii', (Sbornik materialov No. 14), pp. 168; 1. V. Titnokhovich, 
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Despite the intensity of the struggle, the sortie rates of Soviet bombers and close 
support aircraft remained low, partly due to the basing issues mentioned earlier, partly 
because fighter aviation was committed too heavily to patrolling the front lines to provide 
escort, and also very likely due to a desire to preserve the force's readiness for the 
planned counteroffensive. In any event, while Soviet sortie rates declined over the course 
of the operation, they did so less precipitately than those of the Germans. Soviet sorties 
averaged 1,500 per day from 5 July through 12 July 1943. While the Luftwaffe started at 
4,298 on 5 July to 3,140 Soviet, this fell to 2,100 on 6 July, against 3,227 Soviet. By 9 
July 1943, the Luftwaffe managed only 350 sorties on the northern wing of the operation, 
while the Soviets launched 956 sorties in the same sector. The Soviet analysts at the time 
concluded that the Soviet Air Force won air superiority on 7 or 8 July 1943 on the 
northern flank of the Kursk bulge, and on II July on the southern flank. 416 
The Soviet Air Force continued to work on improving, both during and after 
Kursk. Fighters became better at escorting bombers and close support aircraft, and large 
bomber strike groups were assembled instead of penny packets being scattered onto 
various targets. The Soviets were discovering that concentration of force made good 
sense in conditions of superiority as well as inferiority: 417 
According to the testimony of ground troops and observations of aircrew, 
concentrated blows of large groups of aircraft not only produced a strong impact 
on enemy troops, but also sharply raised ftiendly troops' morale. 
418 
The Soviets also noted that larger strike groups were more effective at 
disorganizing and confusing enemy air defences, as a result of which the strike aircrew 
could conduct their attacks more calmly and effectively. 
419 
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Problems remained, however. The Soviets did not have sufficient fighter aviation 
to cover all the missions it was tasked with, not least due to over-commitment of large 
groups of 18 to 30 aircraft to 'passive methods of combating enemy aviation' such as 
patrolling given sectors of the front or specific targets, instead of escorting strike aircraft 
or being vectored to intercept enemy activity. As a result, insufficient fighters remained 
for Soviet strike packages at Kursk, which accounted in part for their low sortie rate. 
When the ferocity of the ground battle demanded more sorties from strike aircraft, on 8 
and 12 July, they were sent in with insufficient fighter escort, and the resulting increase of 
only 100- 15 0 sorties more than doubled the strike aircraft's losses on those two days. 
Fighter employment improved as the battle wore on, moving slowly towards increasing 
reliance on offensive counter air instead of defensive measures, as a Soviet analyst noted 
and recommended: 
420 
Success in the battle for mastery of the air is achieved not only through 
numerical superiority in aircraft, their quality, and the training of aircrew, but also 
through correct organization of combat with enemy aviation. In this operation, 
despite numerical superiority in aircraft (of over one and a half times in fighters), 
in the first half of the operation we did not possess mastery of the air. The 
fundamental reason for this is that our aviation, conducting the battle for mastery 
of the air, did so with passive methods while the enemy utilized active methods of 
battle. 
Fighting for mastery of the air, aviation must move its actions onto enemy 
territory and there widely employ methods of free hunting, as well as the 
destruction and blockading of enemy aircraft at their airbases. Fighter aviation is 
efficiently used on the battlefield en masse to completely cleanse the air of enemy 
aviation at the times our bomber and close support aviation will operate, only 421 detailing a small force for close escort . 
When they did arrive on the battlefield, the strike aircraft did not always achieve 
their intended result because the Soviet command system could not always keep up with 
rapidly changing battlefield conditions. For example, the 17th Guards Rifle Corps 
expected air support for a counterattack on 6 July 1943. However, while the support was 
420 'Deistviia aviatsii v Kurskom srazhenii', (Sbornik materialov No. 14), pp. 181-187, (quote p. 183). 
Unfortunately, this report is coy about the actual losses per day. 
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summoned in a timely manner by the 16th Air Army's representative at 13th Army, it 
failed to arrive on time and also failed to arrive where it was needed because the 
battlefield had changed too much by the time the strike aircraft arrived, and the 16th Air 
Army representative was unable to provide updated infonnation to the strike while it was 
en route to the target. 16th Air Army, however, apparently did rather better than 2nd Air 
Army, which failed to deploy liaison officers by the beginning of the battle despite the 
extended preparation time. This absence caused extra steps in the communications chain, 
since calls for aircraft had to go from front line armies and corps up to the front 
headquarters, and then had to be passed down through the 2nd Air Army chain of 
command. By contrast, the 16th Air Army's representative with 13th Army, at the 
German point of attack, had the power to summon air units directly from their bases, 
bypassing numerous steps and shortening response times. 2nd Air Army attempted to fix 
this problem, sending representatives to the I st and 5th Guards Tank Armies by 10 July 
1943, but these representatives were not given the power to call for aircraft, and thus only 
served to provide information to the 2nd Air Army headquarters about the situation at the 
front, instead of improving its reaction time. The Soviet analyst at the time asserted that 
poor reaction times, usually caused by signals and liaison problems, constituted one of the 
greatest shortcomings of the Soviet Air Force performance in the operation. However, 
both the analyst's commentary and the actions of 16th Air Army, and to a lesser degree 
those of 2nd Air Army, show that the Soviets understood the effect they wanted to 
achieve and the means of achieving it: the devil lay in the details of implementation. 
422 
Lack of information about the front line, combined with 'poor designation of the 
front line by ground forces', led to numerous friendly fire incidents. The poor 
designation resulted, in part, from smoke and dust reaching 10 to 15 kilometres from the 
scene of the fighting - apparently a common occurrence in intense battles - which 
422 'Deistviia aviatsii v Kurskom srazhenii', (Sbornik materialov No. 14), pp. 183-186. 
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rendered marking panels invisible from the air. Signalling rockets were still effective, but 
were not used as the primary means of marking the front line until later in the operation. 
In addition, this provides further evidence of the Soviet's failure to organize effective 
forward control groups for their strike aircraft. As with effective forward control of 
fighters used with some success at Stalingrad and the Kuban, but apparently less so at 
423 Kursk, the concept was familiar, but it was not always effectively implemented . 
Kursk also demonstrated the similarity in focus of the Soviet Air Force and the 
Luftwaffe. Neither air force committed any significant forces to a deep battle, instead 
concentrating on the front lines. The Soviets devoted all of 139 sorties (out of 26,019) to 
interdicting German railroads, and all of these came out of Long Range Aviation's 2,299 
sorties. Equally, the Soviets concentrated on attacking German airbases only once during 
the operation, after which nearly all sorties were concerned with the front line. The 
Luftwaffe, too, conducted almost no activity beyond the Soviet front line. As noted by 
the ever-anonymous Soviet analyst, both side's desire to maintain secrecy for their build- 
ups explains the absence of air activity in the operational depths before the operation 
commenced. Given the massive numbers of available aircraft, however, the absence of 
significant efforts at air interdiction, by either side, is a compelling demonstration of 
where each felt its primary duty lay: close air support for the army in its hour of need. 424 
Nonetheless, the air engagement over Kursk is as indicative of the steadily 
changing fortunes of the war in the east as the ground engagement. On the ground, the 
Soviet army absorbed a full-scale German offensive, stopped it cold, and then launched 
its own massive and highly successful counterattack. In the air, the Soviet Air Force went 
head to head with the Luftwaffe. Over the Kuban, they fought each other to a draw. 
423 'Deistviia aviatsii v Kurskom srazhenii', (Sbornik materialov No. 14), pp. 186. 
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Over Kursk, the Soviet Air Force won. Its performance was by no means perfect, just as 
that of the land forces showed room for improvement. Nonetheless, the Soviet Air Force 
had recovered from its 1941 debacle and demonstrated that it could take the Luftwaffe 
head-on in a major engagement, and emerge the victor: a remarkable achievement. 
The Soviets continued to be interested in improving their performance. Training 
methods were revised in early 1943, including a regular rotation of instructors forward for 
short tours on the front line to ensure their remained current. Flight training programs 
increased from a January 1942 low of 6 hours of flying time towards 34 hours in early 
1943. Flight training paid increased attention to combat maneuvers. In January 1943, the 
Soviets formed the Main Directorate of Combat Training for Frontal Aviation, dedicated 
to training pilots to a higher standard through various methods, including demonstrations 
and group exercises. Equally, the Soviets appear to have begun to bring some highly 
qualified pilots out of the front line and into their training programs: Igor Kaberov, a 
Baltic Fleet ace and one of those who, before the war, had been made an instructor pilot 
immediately upon completion of flight school, was commanded to return to his job as an 
instructor pilot in August 1943. This may have been only a Navy action, as Soviet Air 
Force pilots appear to have remained at the front. However, front line pilots were also 
expected to teach, as shown by the actions of aces such as Pokrishkin at the Kuban. 425 
Yet the largest change to the air war in the east was the expansion of the air war in 
the west. In the process of Kursk and the counteroffensives following it over course of 
July and August 1943, the Soviet Air Force destroyed 1,030 Luftwaffe aircraft, equal to 
16% of the entire Luftwaffe on 30 June 1943. At the same time, the Anglo-American air 
forces destroyed 2,183 Luftwaffe aircraft. In total, this effort inflicted a stupendous loss 
425 Igor Kaberov (translated by Peter Rule), Swastika in the Gunsight, (Stroud: Sutton Publishing Ltd, 
1999), p. 5 8,194-196; von Hardesty, Red Phoenix, p. 143,179; Shishov, 'Nekotorie voprosi', ( VIZh, 5, 
1983, pp. 21-29), pp. 21-29; lu. I. Maslennikov, Podgotovka letnogo sosta-va v boevikh usloviiakh, 
(Moscow: Voenizdat, 1987), pp. 8-13. 
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rate on the Luftwaffe, destroying 50.6% of the Luftwaffe's 30 June 1943 strength. Faced 
with an attrition rate that would swiftly lead to its utter destruction, the Luftwaffe chose to 
concentrate on home defence, effectively ceding air superiority to its enemies on all other 
fronts. In 1941 and 1942, the Luftwaffe was able to focus support in the east. In 1943, 
threats and losses in the west grew steadily, causing the proportion of Luftwaffe strength 
in the east to fall even before the Kuban and Kursk, while fighter losses were higher in 
the west than the east from March 1943 through the end of the war. In 1942, the Soviets 
inflicted around 60% of all Luftwaffe losses. By the end of 1943, the Luftwaffe's 
primary commitment and attrition had moved to home defence. Commitments to others 
fronts were consequently much reduced, though the steadily growing scale of Axis 
disasters in the east ensured that the Luftwaffe continued to maintain a presence there. 426 
If the air war in the west had not soaked the Luftwaffe away from the east, the 
Soviet Air Force's victory at Kursk suggests it would likely have increased its degree of 
dominance over the Luftwaffe nonetheless. However, the Luftwaffe had in effect 
conceded air sUPeriority to the Soviets. German accounts make a brave face of this, 
noting their ability to seize air superiority in local areas for limited periods of time - 
exactly the sort of 'small air force' strategies that the Soviet Air Force employed during 
its own time of inferiority. The Luftwaffe continued to inflict losses on the Soviet Air 
Force in 1944-1945, just as the Soviet Air Force had administered punishment to the 
Luftwaffe in 1941-1942. Yet whereas in 1941-1942 the balance was swinging in favour 
of the Soviet Air Force, the balance in 1944-1945 swung ever further against the 
Luftwaffe, not only in quantity but also in quality. 1943 turned out to be the Soviet Air 
Force' most difficult year, with its highest loss rate, at 8,255 officer aircrew, 39.2% of all 
426 Murray, Luftwaffe, p. 113,124,157-159,174,182-183,245-25 1; Glantz, House, The Battle of Kursk, p. 
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active officer aircrew4", but in that year they demonstrated that the air war would 
continue to move in their favour, whether the Luftwaffe were soaked away or not. 
Despite the commitment of the Luftwaffe away from the Soviet front, however, 
Soviet Air Force losses did not decrease. [Please see chart series 'Soviet Air Force Loss 
Rates'. ] Numbers of aircraft rose steadily, doubling between January 1943 and January 
1945. Non-combat losses fell slowly in absolute numbers, and significantly as a 
percentage of aircraft available and in aircraft lost per thousand available per month. This 
indicates that Soviet training programs were producing better pilots more adept at 
avoiding accidents in operating their aircraft, which accounted for half of all losses in 
1941. Combat losses of aircraft, however, rose in absolute terms. This could make sense 
simply as an effect of there being more aircraft at the front, and thus in harm's way, but 
the number of aircraft lost to combat also rose in terms of losses per thousand available 
aircraft per month. Every other indication on the quality of the Soviet Air Force suggests 
its combat performance was steadily improving, and crew losses were at their worst in 
1943, which makes the increase in loss rates seem anomalous. Several other factors may 
have combined to produce this effect. First, the higher losses may have resulted from 
increased levels of air defence weapons along the front lines. Second, the flood of new 
aircraft from the factories may have made units at the front more willing to write 
damaged aircraft off instead of repairing them. Third, the losses may reflect a higher 
sortie rates and more aggressive missions due to an awareness that replacements were 
available, creating a higer loss rate in 1943 in the same manner that Soviet efforts at force 
preservation created the lower loss rates of 1942. None of these hypotheses can be 
427 Kirovsheev, Soviet Casualties, p. 222. 
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proven without further research, and the often-chaotic state of Soviet wartime loss records 
may mean that no answer will ever be forthcoming. 428 
Regardless, the Luftwaffe did in fact focus away from the east. This fact is 
demonstrated indirectly by the change in Soviet planning. Through Kursk, Soviet Air 
Force planning and attention placed a high priority on dealing with the Luftwaffe. After 
Kursk, the Luftwaffe increasingly became a non-factor in Soviet Air Force planning. 
This fact likely underlies the limited use the Soviets made of strikes on Luftwaffe 
airbases, another anomaly of the Soviet Air Force war effort. While pre-war theorists and 
commanders debated the effectiveness of offensive counter-air, and pre-war doctrine 
called for extensive strikes on enemy airbases, only 2% of all sorties by Frontal Aviation 
were directed at airbases during the course of the war: 
Table 7: Soviet Air Force Frontal Aviation Attacks on Enemv Airbases 429 
1941 1942 1943 1944 1945 
Sorties per Month IJ16 1ý452 1 ý247 1,027 2,148 
Percent of All Sorties 2.8 3.2 2.0 1.5 1.4 
Percent of Destroyed 
Enemy Aircraft 
15.6 33.3 32.4 12.9 5.8 
As table 7 illustrates, in the first half of the war, while the Luftwaffe was heavily 
committed in the east and the Soviet Air Force was struggling to survive, the Soviet Air 
Force made more extensive use of strikes on airbases in tenns of sorties allocated to the 
task. In addition, the Soviets thought the effects in 1942 and 1943 were significant, as 
those few sorties account for around a third of all enemy aircraft claimed destroyed. Even 
so, strikes on airbases were used only rarely, never rising above 3.2% of all sorties. 
Soviet historian 1. V. Timokhovich suggests four reasons for the disjoint between 
428 Kirovsheev, Soviet Casualties, pp. 222,254-255. Murray (Lufiwaffe, p. 249), notes that German close 
support losses rose steadily in the east as Soviet anti-aircraft density rose. 
429Timokhovich, Operativnoe iskusstvo, pp. 92-93. The enemy kill claims are based on Soviet kill claims 
and thus are untrustworthy (as are all kill claims, from any nation, without specific evidence 
from the side 
suffering the losses) except as evidence on Soviet attitudes about the effectiveness of strikes on airbases - 
which is the relevant point here. 
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perceived effectiveness and underutilization. First, concentrating bomber and close 
support assets on the close support mission resulted in strikes on enemy airbases tending 
to occur only during operational pauses. Second, the absence of long-range escort 
fighters made daylight bombing of enemy airbases too expensive in losses. Third, 
Timokhovich points to the difficulty of finding airbases and the complexity of the strike 
operations themselves, leading to his fourth point, that as a result of these difficulties, 
many in the Soviet command structure did not highly rate strikes on bases as a method of 
combating enemy aviation. 
430 
Soviet air reconnaissance was indeed often weak, with some 81% of all 
reconnaissance missions in the course of the war flown by non-reconnaissance aircraft in 
air units not specializing in reconnaissance. Furthermore, most of Soviet air 
reconnaissance was conducted by the pilot's eye, not by photograph, due to the low 
availability of reconnaissance cameras. Only in 1944 did photoreconnaissance missions 
begin to account for over half of all reconnaissance sorties. This weakness could easily 
have led to the difficulties Timokhovich points out in locating enemy airbases. Equally, 
Palashevskii's post-war analysis of Soviet offensive counter-air, notes that in 1944 and 
1945, the Luftwaffe was small enough to disperse over too many airbases to make strikes 
on airbases a particularly effective, and also tended to base beyond the range of fighter 
escort and the close support aviation the Soviets preferred to include in strikes on 
airbases. Frontal Aviation's focus on close support is equally to the point: given the 
option of directly assisting land forces, or bombing airbases, the Soviets had a marked 
preference for direct support, although pre-war theory and doctrine called for a much 
heavier effort on air interdiction and offensive counter-air than the Soviets attempted in 
World War 2. Combining all these factors with the Luftwaffe's withdrawal, however, 
makes the picture more complete. Difficulties in coordination and reconnaissance 
130 Timokhovich, OPerativnoe iskusstvo, pp. 92-95. 
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prevalent through 1943 meant that the Soviets were imperfectly impressed by the 
outcome of airbase attacks in that period, but by the time reconnaissance and coordination 
improved, the target had also melted away. The Soviets continued to attack airbases on 
occasion in 1944 and 1945. However, offensive counter-air is primarily a tool of gaining 
or ensuring air superiority. This was a matter of critical concern from 1941 through 1943, 
but not in 1944 and 1945; and not coincidentally, Soviet sortie rates on airbase strikes 
were distinctly higher (though still low) in 1941 through 1943. Since Soviet Air Force 
prowess in those years was not always great, it is unsurprising that many commanders 
concluded airpower was better employed supporting the ground forces, which could shut 
down enemy airbases in a quite decisive manner by putting tanks on their runways, as 
happened during the battles around Stalingrad. Thus, while the Soviets recognized the 
theoretical effectiveness of offensive counter-air, when air superiority had already won in 
the later war, they prioritised ensuring the ground forces advanced with maximum speed 
over crushing the remnants of the Luftwaffe: a case of specific circumstances trumping 
theoty, but not invalidating it. 
431 
The change in the scope and effectiveness of Soviet efforts can be seen over the 
course of 1944 and 1945 through the lens of one of their largest offensive operations, 
Bagration. Ordered on 31 May 1944 and launched on 22 June 1944, Operation Bagration 
exemplifies many of the trends in the Soviet's growing military abilities. Extensive and 
carefully prepared deception measures ensured that the German high command remained 
focused on Ukraine, the scene of more recent Soviet offensives, until 25 June. German 
forces were thus concentrated in the south of the Priplat, while the Soviets had 
concentrated their striking power in the north, unnoticed by the Germans. From 22 June 
"' 1. Palashevskii, 'Deistviia sovetskikh VVS po aerodromarn protivnika', (Voenno-istoriicheskii zhurnal, 
9,1976, pp. 21-28); Timokhovich, Operativnoe iskusstvo, pp. 94-95,122-125. Interestingly, Timokhovich 
defends eyeball reconnaissance as superior to photographic, because of the speed with which spotted targets 
can be relayed to strike units. 
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through 4 July, four Soviet Fronts surged forward, recapturing most of Belorussia and 
destroying 25 Axis divisions of an initial 38 in the sector. The offensive in Belorussia 
continued onwards thereafter at a somewhat reduced pace due to the need to refit and 
resupply, finally ending at the gates of Warsaw at the end of August 1944. Meanwhile, 
the Soviets uncorked offensives into Czechoslovakia and Romania, whose Axis defences 
were weakened by the need to reconstitute their shattered front line to the north. These 
offensives captured the Ploesti oilfields by 2 September 1944, further damaging the 
already parlous state of German petroleum supplies. 432 
On the eve of Bagration, the Soviet Air Force demonstrated its increasing ability 
to reinforce selected sectors. Four air armies were engaged in the operation, and two of 
them, the I st and 16th, were reinforced from reserves. The I st received four corps and 
four divisions totalling 1,506 aircraft, while the 16th Air Army received five corps 
totalling 1,047 aircraft. Moreover, the Soviet basing structure was well able to handle 
this influx of aircraft. Between the four air armies, the Soviets had basing for 7,000 
aircraft, and only disposed of 5,357 to put on them. This further enabled the Soviets to 
cloak their build-up by moving their air units forward in small groups, under low cloud 
cover, during the last three days before the opening of the offensive. 433 
Preparing for the offensive, the various Soviet Air Force divisions and corps, and 
supported ground formations, conducted training and wargames to test and refine 
methods of controlling air units over the battlefield, and backed these up with manoeuvres 
in which ground forces took part. This allowed the Soviets to test and improve 
communications and organization before the offensive opened. During the breakthrough 
portion of the offensive, representatives of each front's air army were stationed forward 
with key attacking corps, army, and Front headquarters. Communications were routed 
432 Glantz, House, Titans, pp. 201-22 1; Murray, Luftwaffe, pp. 285. 
433 'Aviatsionnoe obespechenie Belorusskoi operatsii', (Sbornik materialov No. 20), pp. 84-86. 
211 
via front headquarters to the air army headquarters, and thence to the air units, each stage 
usually operating by radio. The forward air army representatives also had direct radio 
links to the air army commander. This system was intentionally highly centralized, in 
order to preserve the ability of the air army commander to shift the focus of effort as 
needed. Nonetheless, the Soviets saw the need for sufficient flexibility to permit the 
representatives with forward exploiting units to call for airpower directly on occasion. 
Interestingly, Novikov ordered greater command flexibility in July 1944, yet the analyst 
was at pains to emphasize the preservation of command centralization in this operation, 
and the command structure is in some respects more centralized that that used at Kursk, 
although it appears to have been more flexibly so in operation. 434 
Direction of aircraft in flight at the front was accomplished through forward 
direction stations using radio, and problems experienced at Kursk with designation of the 
front line appear to have been solved through extensive use of smoke, rockets, and 
occasional use of dry firing passes to ensure identification of targets as friendly or enemy. 
In addition, the primary forces tasked with exploiting the breach had air army 
representatives with radio links back to the air anny headquarters. Densities of aircraft 
reached 100 fighters, 100 close support aircraft, and 60 bombers in zones 6 to 10 
kilometres wide and 30 kilometres deep in the primary breakthrough zones, with the 
bombers usually operating in groups of 30 to 60 aircraft to pound major strongpoints. 
Close support aircraft usually operated in smaller groups to provide a more constant 
presence, both on the front line and acting to suppress German artillery, mortars, and 
troop movements. The latter proved particularly effective when directed against 
retreating German forces channelled onto roads and paths by the region's swamps, thus 
434 'Aviatsionnoe obespechenie Belorusskoi operatsii', (Sbornik materialov No. 20), pp. 86-98; Hardesty, 
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delaying these columns, preventing them from deploying into new defensive lines, and 
assisting in their encirclement and destruction. 435 
Mobile forces were provided with extensive direct support in entering the 
breakthrough zone and during exploitation. For example, the 3rd Belorussian Front's 5th 
Guards Tank Army had a corps each of fighters, bombers, and close support in dedicated 
support, and had the commanders of those corps at its headquarters to speed 
communications, while the I st Belorussian Front's 9th Tank Corps had two close support 
corps in addition to continuous fighter cover. Each tank brigade of the exploiting tank 
corps had a specially outfitted tank with a communications officer for communications 
with supporting aircraft. As these ground formations drove westwards, they were escorted 
by groups of close support aircraft directed at points of resistance as they were 
encountered. These were both in larger groups available to be called for as required, with 
an average delay of 15 to 25 minutes, in addition to a steady stream of small groups of 
aircraft for immediate suppression. 
436 
Those same range limitations had hampered air support to prior major Soviet 
offensives when they drove deep, and thus out of the range of air support. For Bagration, 
the Soviets organized teams to move just behind the forward detachments of the 
exploiting forces. These truck-mobile teams of each comprised a detachment from an 
airbase service battalion, plus the engineering staff necessary to secure and prepare an 
airfield for use. The number of these teams varied from air army to air army in 
proportion to the number of air divisions it possessed, with the overall proportion 
apparently around one team per two divisions. Each team was expected to be able to 
prepare an airbase for use by a close support or fighter regiment within two or three days. 
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These groups functioned as intended as the operation progressed. Forward detachments 
seized airbases and provided security while the preparation teams went to work, enabling 
the Soviets to keep their air support moving forward with their armoured spearheads. 437 
This ability was a key part of the 'aviation offensive operation', the Soviet 
concept summing up their intentions and exemplified by Bagration: massive force 
employed flexibly yet in concentration, moving forward with the ground force's 
spearheads to provide them with continuous cover and fire support. The initial mention 
of this concept, in the Boevoi ustav pekhoti RKKA Krasnoi Armii (Red Army Infantry 
Combat Regulations, signed 9 November 1942), envisioned it as close air support for the 
tactical breakthrough, delivered in conjunction with artillery fires. By the end of the war, 
the Soviets saw it as consisting of two distinct stages: preparation of the attack, consisting 
of massed strikes shortly before attack jumped off, and accompaniment of penetrating 
forces, during which aviation ensured a constant supply of close air support for advancing 
forces and warded off enemy aircraft's attempts to interfere. Ensuring the rapid capture 
and exploitation of airbases close to the advancing spearheads proved a critical piece of 
this support. However, while this concept certainly relates to pre-war concepts of massed 
employment on the decisive ground axis, it bears little relation to the pre-war concepts of 
concentrating that effort on air interdiction, and does not really deal with counter-air 
operations. 
438 
The various measures taken by the Soviet Air Force to improve the quality of its 
support and maintain it into the depths evidently succeeded. In contrast to previous 
operational analyses, the Soviet Army had no direct complaints about the air support 
provided, noting heavy air support throughout the campaign except when 3rd Air Arrny's 
fuel supplies were interrupted, which did create difficulties for the I st Baltic Front which 
437 'Aviatsionnoe obespechenie Belorusskoi operatsii', (Sbomik materialov No. 20), pp. 87,102. 
438 A Kozhevnikov, 'Sovershenstvovanic aviatsionnogo nastupleniia', (Voenno-istoriicheskii zhumal, 5, 
197 1, pp. 14-2 1). 
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it was supporting. Further support for the effectiveness of Soviet Air Force arrangements 
comes from the Germans, who 'discovered from captured documents that the Soviet 
procedures for command and control of their ground attack force were hardly less 
sophisticated than their own', and was also equal to systems for close support in use by 
the British and Americans. 
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The Soviet Air Force, while doubtless taking losses itself at the rates noted above, 
crushed the Luftwaffe units facing them. Even though the Luftwaffe rushed more fighters 
to Belorussia from other regions in the east and also, unusually, from the west and from 
homeland defence, Luftwaffe strength in the east declined by 325 aircraft, to 1,760, over 
the course of June and July. The degree of the overmatch is also reflected in the Soviet 
Air Force analysis of the operation, which dedicates only a few occasional sentences to 
operations against the Luftwaffe in the air or on its airbases. Again, this is also reflected 
in studies of the Luftwaffe side of the campaign. Williamson Murray states that 'the 
Luftwaffe played no effective role' in Bagration, while Richard Muller notes that the 
Luftwaffe could no longer achieve even local air superiority by autumn 1944, though its 
loss rates were lower in the east than in the west. In part, Soviet dominance in the air was 
due to their immense numerical superiority: 5,357 Soviet aircraft opposed 775 German 
aircraft at the outset of the Bagration offensive. 440 
These ratios moved even further to the Soviet's favour as the war continued. In 
addition to sheer numbers, the Soviets continued to work on improving both their ability 
to control aircraft at the front line, and their flexibility in shifting the point of maximum 
support. Their ability to keep Soviet Air Force units moving forward is shown in the 
439 David M. Glantz, Harold S. Orenstein, Belorussia 1944: The General StaffStudy, (London: Frank Cass, 
2001), pp. 134-135,138,149,151,171,206 [this is a translation of Sbornik materialoi, po iiucheniiu opita 
voini No. 18, Mai - Iun'1945 g. ]; Murray, Luftwaffe, pp. 285-286 
(quote p. 286)-, Muller, German Air War, 
pp. 225-227 (quote p. 226); Richard Hallion, Strikeftom the Sky, (Washington: 
Smithsonian, 1989), p. 232. 
440 Murray, Luftwaffe, pp. 285-286 (quote p. 286); Muller, German Air War, pp. 225-226; 'Aviatsionnoe 
obespechenie Belorusskoi operatsii', (Sbornik materialov No. 20), pp. 
85. 
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example of the East Prussian operation in January-March 1945, where in addition to the 
mobile groups of the previous summer, the Soviet Air Force identified 53 locations they 
specifically desired to capture and integrated this into the operation's planning. This 
enabled the Soviets to continue to provide thousands of sorties per Air Army per day in 
support of critical stages of the operation despite winter weather, with a high point of 
14,156 sorties by the 4th Air Army in the first three days of the offensive. While the 
Soviets still saw close air support and covering their own forces fonn enemy attack as 
their primary mission, the missions assigned to the air armies also included requirements 
for attacks on German headquarters, command and control systems, railroads, and 
interdiction of reserves. However, though the Soviets appear to have been increasing the 
forces allocated to tasks aimed at deeper portions of the German battle array, interdiction 
appears to have remained a weak point relative to the actions of the Western air forceS. 441 
In part, this is because of the Soviet's continued tight focus on close support. An 
analysis of the role of bomber aviation, printed in October 1945, not only declared 
bomber aviation 'a resource of the High Command... intended for use primarily on the 
main axis of combat activity', but also stated the primary mission to be support of the 
front line and strikes on the enemy's immediate rear. The first key principle of bomber 
operations was massed use, concentrated on a selected groups of targets in order to ensure 
their destruction, whether by single large attacks or a series of systematic bombings, 
citing with approval planned densities of 50 to 60 tons of bombs per square kilometre for 
targets in the Berlin operation. The second principle was surprise. Third came economy 
of force: bomber aviation should not be wom out on non-essential tasks, in order to 
preserve the force for hammer blows at critical points. The fourth principle stressed the 
441 Sbornik matetialov po Luchendu opita voini No. 24, (Moscow: Voenizdat, 1947), pp. 27-78ý 95-120, 
162-193. 
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importance of maintaining a reserve in order to deal with inevitable losses and changes in 
the plan. 
442 
However, two other factors were also at work. First, during operations in Soviet 
territory, the Soviets had the support of a powerful partisan movement behind German 
lines. During the three days leading up to the Bagration offensive, these forces conducted 
a carefully planned and targeted campaign of 40,000 demolition strikes against the 
German rail net in Belorussia - the equivalent of at least that many successful aircraft 
sorties, and conducted with hand-guided munitions. By contrast, from 4 through 12 July 
1944, around 1,000 ADD (Long Range Aviation) bombers generated 2,600 sorties against 
railroads transporting German reserves towards Belorussia from Ukraine, all of them at 
night. This proved the capstone of Soviet efforts to weld the partisans into an effective 
force for operational interdiction, efforts underway since 1941 and bearing increasing 
fruit since Kursk. However, once outside the Soviet Union, the Soviets could not rely on 
such large-scale support to relieve the Soviet Air Force from the task of air interdiction. 
Even so, Soviet discussions of later operations do not indicate a rapid growth in 
operations against railroads. During the Oder-Vistula operation in January 1944, only 
821 of WhAir Army's 22,768 sorties were directed at railroads, bridges, and river 
crossings. During the course of the war, Long Range Aviation, on which the bulk of 
railroad interdiction fell, directed 40.4% of its sorties against enemy troops near the front 
line, and only 30.6% against railroads and enemy reserves as a combined category. 
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Second, the Soviets chose not to construct an Air Force with long range aircraft. 
Of the 125,000 aircraft built during the war, only some 17,000 were combat aircraft with 
442 V. D. Pallo, Osnovi boevogo primeneniia i sposobi boevikh deistvii bombardirovochnoi aviatsii, 
ýVoennaia akademiia VVS Krasnoi Armii, 1945), pp. 9-19 (quote p. 9). 
43 Erickson, Road to Stalingrad, pp. 240-248; Erickson, Road to Berlin, pp. 114-115,214-215; 
Timokhovich, Operativnoe iskusstvo, pp. 250-260, von Hardesty, Red Phoenix, p. 189; "Aviatsionnie 
obespechenie Vista-Oderskoi operatsii", (Sbornik materialov po izucheniiii opita voini 
No. 25, pp. 122- 
137), p. 134; 1. Timokhovich, "Nekotorie voprosi operativnogo iskusstva 
VVS-, (Voenno-istoriischeskii 
zhurnal, 11,197 1, pp. 12-2 1), pp. 19-2 1. 
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two or more engines, while building over 36,000 of the IL-2 series ground attack aircraft. 
When faced with a choice between producing more shorter-ranged aircraft or fewer 
longer-ranged aircraft, the Soviets invested heavily in short range and numbers. While 
this directly reduced their capability to conduct deeper operations against German 
logistics, it does not explain their relative disinterest in conducting operations against 
railroads within range of the Shturmoviki, despite the emphasis placed on such operations 
in pre-war theory and manuals. 
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Soviet post-war writers claim their wartime experience proved their pre-war 
theory. More accurately, wartime experience forced them to resolve debates existing 
before the war, and wartime practice did not always line up with pre-war theory and 
doctrine. In some respects, the Soviet's practice during the war eminently suited their 
pre-war tenet of massive concentration of force in support of the ground force's 
operations, which the Soviets eventually proved adept at delivering. However, pre-war 
usually theory envisaged this support in terms of air interdiction campaigns carrying the 
mission of artillery into greater depths than the artillery could effectively reach, 
particularly against reserves and railroads. Soviet wartime practice concentrated much 
more heavily on close air support, though the depth of aviation's activity increased as the 
war continued. The pre-war debate on the usefulness of offensive counter-air was 
resolved in the war: strikes on enemy airbases were rarely attempted, though the idea was 
rehabilitated again in the years after the war. Equally, Novikov resolved debates on the 
proper subordination of the Air Force to the Army, placing the overwhelming majority of 
air units in Air Armies subordinate either to Fronts to the the High Command, shifted as 
needed to support the main effort, an underlying intent which would have been familiar to 
the Soviets since 1918. 
"' "Aviatsionnaia promishlennost"', (Kozlov, et al., Velikaia otechestvennaia voina, 1941 - 1945, pp. 34- 
35), pp. 34-35. 
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The only strategic bombing missions the Soviets undertook amounted to prestige 
raids, similar to the American's Doolittle raid on Tokyo. However, the power of Anglo- 
American strategic bombing efforts clearly impressed them, especially when combined 
with the atomic bomb. The Soviets moved rapidly to build atomic bombs and bombers to 
deliver them, outright copying the B-29 as the Tu-4 for the purpose, though Kremlin 
politics in the Khrushchev era determined that the Soviets would develop missiles far 
more heavily than strategic bombers. The Soviets' pre-war lack of interest in strategic 
bombing had manifested itself in small numbers of modem aircraft suited to the task, and 
they built very few more during the war: doctrine, predilection, and capability all in step. 
The value of efforts USAAF and RAF efforts on strategic bombing are still much 
debated. One clear-cut benefit of the strategic bombing campaign, however, was the 
simple fact that it brought the Luftwaffe to battle, held it there, and steadily inflicted 
losses at a rate the German war machine could not cope with. The strategic bombing 
campaign could pursue this goal even before Sicily or D-Day. By contrast, the Soviets 
had no need of a separate campaign in order to bring the enemy to battle. Locked in a 
desperate struggle, it would have been a grave error in the earlier years of the war for the 
Soviets to divert production away from aircraft necessary for immediate font-line 
survival, towards tasks whose longer-term payoff might not come to pass if the front lines 
crumbled. In the later war, as the Soviet war machine grew in power and capability, 
ensuring the continued advance of the Soviet Army was still the Soviet Air Force's surest 
means of contributing to a swift end to the war. Bombing Ploesti reduced German oil 
production for a time, but German oil production at Ploesti came to a complete halt when 
the Soviet Army overran it in September 1944. 
Less visible than the aircraft, but equally important, the Soviet's most important 
asset in the Second World War was their ability to learn under fire. While repeatedly 
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demonstrated in conflicts prior to Barbarossa, the Soviets had also found it difficult to 
disseminate lessons learned during peacetime. They fixed this mechanism, steadily 
improving their performance and capabilities. Novikov's organizational reforms restored 
the Soviet's ability to concentrate force, a capability lost due to attempts, after Finland, to 
overcome shortfalls in their ability to deliver effective combat support. However, solving 
coordination and support problems by means of concentrating air force assets at the Army 
level and below essentially bypassed the core problems of training and signals. 
Those problems, increasingly well-solved over the course of the war, appear to lie 
at the core of the disaster that overtook the Soviet Air Force in the summer of 194 1. 
Inadequate signals lead to over-concentration of aircraft on airbases, exacerbated by 
deficiencies in training, and these produced the conditions in which the Luftwaffe's 
strikes could have maximal effect. Inadequacies in signals continued to plague the 
Soviets through 1941, with the situation slowly improving from 1942 onwards as more 
signals gear, especially radios, became available, and Soviet training programs became 
better able to provide trained operators. Soviet training programs for aircrew and officers 
had also been inadequate before the war, pressured by both purges and rapid expansion. 
As with signals, training problems were overcome as the war went on, but training 
inadequacies cost the Soviets dear in losses of pilots and aircraft, both in combat and in 
routine flying. Among the clearest lessons of the Soviet experience in World War 2 is 
also one of the oldest: time spent on training is never wasted. 
220 
Conclusion 
There is probably no one aspect of the employment of aviation that all Soviet 
theorists would have agreed on without reservation in the period 1918 - 1945. 
Nonetheless, several patterns do emerge from this Period. By far the clearest consensus, 
throughout both the entire time period and across various concepts of the use of an air 
force, formed around the concept of employing aviation en masse for decisive effect. 
Most, though not all, would further agree that such massed employment should be 
directed down the axis of the ground force's main effort, enabling decisive results for the 
Army's operations. Neither of these notions should be terribly surprising. The concept of 
mass applied to ground warfare for centuries, and finds easy application to aerial warfare. 
Equally, the air force of a continental power expecting to fight continental wars cannot 
rationally ignore the necessity of supporting the war on the ground, where victory or 
defeat can come with both swiftness and finality. Indeed, had the Soviets concentrated 
solely on building a strategic bomber force in the 1930s, they probably would have been 
worse prepared for Barbarossa and less able to bounce back so well from disaster. 
Equally, the assertion that the Soviets placed primacy on the ground support mission is 
not groundbreaking. However, this thesis has shown the depth and staying power of this 
primacy in Soviet attitudes in greater detail than prior works have done. In addition, this 
study shows the twists and turns of Soviet thinking in greater detail than has been done 
previously, falling into neither of the two common reductionist traps: of asserting a 
monolithic body of ever-more-perfect theory, nor that of asserting the Soviets slavishly or 
incompetently copied from the Germans. 
The charge of copying from a foreign model, especially German, claims that the 
Soviets learned how to organize and utilize an air force from the German officers sent to 
the Soviet's Air Force Academy from 1924 through 1933. Doubtless the students learned 
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something from their instructors, Gernnan and Soviet. However, mere presence is not 
evidence of decisive influence. Were that the case, there should be evidence of a 
significant sb; R in Soviet attitudes and writings beginning in or after 1924, attributable to 
the influence of German views on air power. This evidence is not present. First, as noted 
in Chapter 1, the fundamental tenets of Soviet thinking were in place by 1922, the 
resurgence in Soviet debate on the use of airpower began in 1923 and had not been absent 
prior to that point; and the very presence and variety of points of view debated by the 
Soviets demonstrates conclusively that they were not blindly copying from anyone. 
Second, the central tenets of Soviet thinking on airpower do not appear to have changed 
in the period 1918 - 1933 in a manner that is both otherwise inexplicable and in the 
direction German instructors would likely have pushed them. In fairness, the latter could 
be difficult to detect, since German thinking on the employment of aviation bore striking 
similarities to Soviet thinking, even before the exchanges began. These similarities are 
hardly surprising, since both were continental powers, facing more powerful enemies, and 
re-examining their military thinking in the wake of major systemic shocks: defeat in 
Germany, and defeat followed by radical revolution in the Soviet Union. Mary Habeck's 
work comparing the evolution of armor doctrine in both countries notes that despite their 
collaboration, German and Soviet officers cordially despised each other, and that the 
parallel development of doctrine in the two countries demonstrates convergent evolution 
(similar solutions to similar problems in similar circumstances, such as the barracuda and 
the northern pike). Unless evidence comes to light on the Soviet side demonstrating that 
the Soviets believed themselves deeply indebted to their German instructors, the case for 
Soviet doctrine being entirely or largely taught by German instructors must remain 4not 
proven' at best. Foreign influences certainly existed, through translations of foreign 
articles and manuals, contacts with officers in foreign air forces, and observations of 
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foreign manoeuvres. Yet the very existence of the extensive Soviet debates demonstrates 
that nothing was taken on board uncritically. The foundation of the Soviet approach to 
airpower lies in the Soviet's own perceptions of their strategic situation and the role of 
aircraft in it. While other nations discussed close air support, only the Soviets put in the 
effort to develop a purpose-built aircraft for the job: the thoroughly successful and 
massively produced as the IL-2 Shturmovik. The Soviets put in the effort to see the 
project to success precisely because the desired end product closely matched their 
perception of their needs. If they were blindly copying other's ideas, why did they not 
build fleets of slow single engine Stuka dive bombers instead, or continue develoPment of 
the Pe- 8 heavy bomber to rival the B- 17? 
445 
Over the thirty year span of this study, Soviet attitudes on how exactly the ground 
forces ought to be supported varied widely. The broader movement of their views on the 
topic followed understanding of the reality they faced. In the 1920s, massive close air 
support strikes were not feasible for their air force, and thus all assume that the then- 
current Soviet Air Force would be mostly be conducting the reconnaissance and patrol 
missions that lay within its grasp. Any offensive mission would, necessarily, be 
conducted by a force concentrated to win the ability to act in the air for a limited time and 
space. However, this study also shows the existence of another point of view: that the 
Soviet Air Force should be preparing for operations with a much larger force than they 
then possessed. This split in opinion underlay much of the debate on the use of airpower 
in the middle 1920s, but dropped out of sight towards the end of the 1920s as it became 
clear that Soviet industrialization was going to include a massive rearmament effort. 
445 Mary Habeck, Storin ofSteel: The Development ofArmor Doctrine in Germany and the Soviet Union, 
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With available aircraft increasing in numbers and capabilities, Soviet thinking ran 
towards deeper strikes. Many were essentially calling for a focus on air interdiction 
missions, bombing railways and troop columns in support of the land forces, though some 
began advocacy of strategic bombing in the Douhetian mould. Virtually all presumed 
that bombing airbases would prove key in attaining control of the skies. While this thesis 
is unfortunately unable to explain the sudden shift of attitude on the part of some Soviet 
theorists to a Douhetian stance in 1935, it is able to show when the shift began, and that it 
ended when Soviet fighters entered combat over Madrid in 1936. Equally, this thesis 
shows why some aspects of a Douhetian understanding of the importance and missions of 
heavy bombers might be attractive to the Soviets, because of their debate at the time over 
the effectiveness of fighters against bombers in air combat. 
In its third chapter, this thesis breaks new ground by examining the impact of the 
small wars the Soviets fought in from 1936 through 1940. The war in Spain began the 
process of providing a reality check on Soviet theorizing, showing that strikes on airbases 
were difficult to execute effectively and bombers far from invulnerable to fighters. 
Throughout the small wars leading up to the Soviet's involvement in World War 2, the 
gap between missions' theoretical simplicity and their practical difficulties showed 
steadily. Soviet analysts appear to have kept pace with events, but analysis and leasson 
learned were not effectively disseminated to line units, causing a failure of translating 
theory and analysis into training and effective execution. Only during the Finnish War 
did this gap manage to command their attention as a force-wide problem instead of a 
localized circumstance. Unfortunately, not all of the Soviet's solutions proved viable, not 
least because of further practical problems with training, supply of signals equipment, and 
political problems evidenced by an outbreak of nine-millimetre aneurysms and extended 
Siberian vacations amongst knowledgeable and experienced officers. 
224 
As this thesis demonstrates, the Soviet Air Force found itself ill prepared for war 
on 22 June 1941 due not only to surprise or simple incompetence, but due to interlocking 
effects of systemic difficulties with signals and training leading to poor solutions being 
chosen to solve command and control problems and basing issues. While this may not 
prove to be the full answer to the reasons underlying the Soviet Air Forces' disaster in 
1941, it is nonetheless the most complete explanation yet. 
The Soviet's learning process, ticking over but ignored until the Finnish War, 
provided one of the key supports for the Soviet Air Force's recovery and eventual victory. 
Nonetheless, the Soviets' Erequent claim that prewar theory was validated by wartime 
experience is paradoxical, simultaneously inaccurate in detail while accurate in broad 
strokes. Prewar Soviet theory did provide the Soviets with a vision of what they wanted 
to accomplish: closely coordinated massed employment of air power on the ground 
force's decisive axis. However, that vision failed to include the details of its own 
implementation. Some aspects of the vision's implementation in the months immediately 
before Barbarossa proved quite faulty, such as subordinating most of their airpower to 
armies. Other aspects of prewar thinking went largely by the board due to circumstances 
during the war, with strikes on airbases a relatively rare occurrence and operational 
interdiction of the type frequently described in prewar writings taking a distinctly 
secondary role to tactical support strikes. That the Soviets eventually arrived at a point 
close to that indicated by their initial overarching vision should not obscure the fact that 
the end point was not, in all respects, the same as the one initially described. Equally, 
however, possession of that overarching vision provided direction and purpose to the 
Soviet's learning efforts, without which their effects at recovery would likely have 
floundered instead of being directed to a goal. By the middle and late war, the divergence 
between the vision and the execution usually stemmed from practical circumstances, not 
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from repudiation of the vision, which in turn explains such phenomena as post-war Soviet 
analysts using the Soviet's Second World War experience to justify the importance of 
offensive counter-air. 
Overall, the Soviet approach proved itself in its own terms. However, even at the 
end of the war, its performance might well have been judged as poor in some regards by a 
prewar commentator such as Lapchinskii. He might well have wondered about the 
Soviet's relative failure to conduct bombing strikes to paralyze the German operational 
rear under conditions of near total air superiority near the end of the war, especially when 
compared to the effort expended and results achieved in this sphere by the Western allies. 
The Soviets forged a powerful weapon for tactical support, but in the process discarded 
not only their nascent strategic bomber force -a luxury in the Soviet's own frame of 
reference - but also largely abandoned large-scale efforts beyond close air support until 
late in the war. Admittedly, the Soviets could ignore this air interdiction because partisan 
raids provided the Soviets with an alternative source of interdiction until they had 
expelled the Axis from the Soviet Union in 1944, but the Soviets were not fully 
successful at air interdiction by the end of the war in their own terms. Even so, the Soviet 
Air Force provided vital assistance to the Soviet Army in defeating the Axis. If its 
perfonnance was never perfect, by the end of the war it was adept at providing the 
Soviets with the close air support support they desired and working on providing the level 
of air interdiction they hoped for. 
Soviet experimentation on means of implementing their vision did not end with 
the close of the Second World War. The later-war methodology of the air offensive, 
committing massive air support on the decisive axis, using air power to pave a path for 
the breakthrough and then escorting the exploiting units into the depths, while Soviet Air 
Force support units moved their airbases forward to ensure the forward echelon would not 
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outrun its air support, became a staple of Soviet Air Force thinking. Russian analysis of 
World War 2 operations for lessons pertinent to current operations continues to this 
day. 446 Following through on their lack of intense interest before and during the war, and 
for all that the Cold War Soviet Air Force liked to emphasize its reach through styling 
itself as "long-ranged, missile-equipped" [dal'nii, raketonosnii], strategic bombing 
remains the unloved stepchild of the Soviet Air Force. They developed aircraft for the 
role, and some have had quite a long service life, but the Soviet nuclear deterrent rested 
primarily on missiles controlled by a separate branch of the armed forces, leaving the 
Soviet Air Force to concentrate on tactical and operational support. Indeed, in 1997 
Marshal of Aviation levgenii Shaposhnikov questioned the need for heavy bomber 
aviation at all, especially in light of their cost and the Soviet Air Force' budgetary 
difficulties. 447 
Experimentation with the organization of the air force did not stop, either. In the 
1980s, the Soviets moved to greater decentralization of Frontal Aviation, in the interests 
of improved cooperation with the ground forces, just as they did after the Finnish War - 
and the experiment was overturned in 1988 on much the same grounds as Novikov's in 
1942: the need to concentrate forces as needed. The missions once filled by Troop 
Aviation increasingly have been filled by helicopters (in Aviatsiia sukhoputnikh voisk, 
Army Aviation) since the 1960s, but the subordination of these has ping-ponged back and 
forth between ground units, the Soviet Air Force, and the High Command. Nonetheless, 
most Soviet Air Force officers still see support for the ground forces as their defming 
446 For example, M. Kozhevnikov, "Sovershenstvovanie avaitsionnogo nastupleniia", (VIZh, 5,197 1, pp. 
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mission. A list of the primary missions of the Soviet Air Force written in 2001 by Soviet 
Air Force Commander in Chief Kornukov boils down to attaining and maintaining air 
superiority, and supporting ground forces. 448 
Nonetheless, this thesis cannot claim to be the last word on this topic. Archival 
access might clear up many questions, by allowing insight into Soviet decision-making, 
or closer access to the operational records to permit better analysis of the actual changes 
in thinking and practice during the various wars the Soviets fought. Many of the major 
personalities mentioned in this thesis are ciphers, and the rest are known only through 
Soviet-era biographies that verge on hagiography, and ghost-written memoirs. This thesis 
essentially ignores air defence and naval aviation, along with nearly every aspect of air 
unit tactics. All these topics warrant further study. This thesis does, however, provide 
further studies with an improved framework within which to understand the twists and 
turns of Soviet Air Force thinking. 
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